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ISLAMIC PREACHING AND THE MUSLIM PRACTICES IN INDONESIA

Preface by
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Preface by

Prof. Noorhaidi Hasan, Ph.D.

I am honoured to welcome and introduce this volume, *Islamic Preaching and the Muslim Practices in Indonesia*, authored by Acep Aripuddin, Professor of Da'wah and Muslim Society at UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung. This book addresses a question that continues to shape the trajectory of Muslim societies today: how Islam is actualized in thought, lived practice, and historical experience within a rapidly changing world.

At the heart of this volume lies a recognition that the life of Muslims unfolds through at least three interrelated dimensions. First is the realm of ideas—expressed in theology, *fiqh*, philosophy, politics, ethics, and mysticism. These ideas are not static; they emerge from ongoing dialectics, shaped by language, experience, and interaction with diverse intellectual and social environments. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, Islamic thought is continuously negotiated, contested, and reformulated in response to both internal dynamics and global currents. This intellectual dynamism is reflected, for instance, in the book's engagement with ulama who navigate the delicate balance between local custom (*adat*) and inherited intellectual traditions, revealing how authority is constructed, challenged, and reinterpreted across contexts.

Second is the domain of practice, where ideas are translated into lived realities. The volume offers a rich and nuanced examination of how Islamic teachings are embodied in everyday life—from ritual observance and social relations to economic

practices and cultural expressions. Particularly illuminating are the discussions on the idealism and lived experiences of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, which demonstrate how identity, faith, and social belonging intersect in complex ways. Similarly, the exploration of women's leadership within pesantren challenges conventional assumptions and highlights the evolving roles of women as agents of religious knowledge and social transformation. The chapters on da'wah and entertainment, as well as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, further illustrate how Islamic preaching adapts to new media, crises, and changing public sensibilities, often blurring the boundaries between the sacred and the popular.

Yet, as this book carefully shows, the relationship between ideals and practices is rarely seamless. The tension between normative aspirations and empirical realities persists, sometimes producing contradictions that call for critical reflection. Whether in the realm of halal tourism, where economic interests intersect with spiritual aspirations, or in broader patterns of religious conduct, the gap between what is envisioned and what is practiced remains a central concern. It is precisely within this space of tension that da'wah acquires its urgency and relevance.

Third, the book implicitly invites us to reflect on the historical trajectory of Muslim civilization. The memory of past intellectual and cultural achievements continues to inspire contemporary Muslim societies, even as they grapple with new and complex challenges. This historical consciousness is not merely nostalgic; rather, it calls for renewed efforts in scholarship, ethical renewal, and social engagement. The role of da'wah, in this regard, becomes pivotal—not only as a means of preserving tradition but also as a vehicle for renewal and transformation.

Indeed, one of the central arguments advanced throughout this volume is the strategic and transformative role of Islamic preaching (da'wah) as a bridge between ideas and practices. In the Indonesian context, da'wah emerges as a dynamic and multifaceted endeavour, operating across diverse social, cultural, and political landscapes. The discussion of *da'wah by call and outreach*—grounded in persuasion, ethical example, and community engagement—underscores the importance of communicative

sensitivity and contextual awareness. At the same time, the examination of the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya order's role in countering radicalism demonstrates how spiritual traditions can offer powerful resources for cultivating moderation, resilience, and inner discipline.

The theme of moderation in da'wah runs consistently throughout the book, presenting it not as a mere slogan but as a lived and negotiated practice. It is articulated through efforts to foster dialogue, accommodate diversity, and resist exclusivist tendencies. Equally significant is the emphasis on spiritual solidarity, particularly in moments of crisis and uncertainty, where da'wah serves to strengthen communal bonds and ethical responsibility.

This work also situates Indonesian Islam within a broader global context. Muslim communities today face a wide range of challenges, from marginalization and political pressures to internal fragmentation and the lure of pragmatic compromises. These realities demand a critical rethinking of both Islamic studies and the strategies of da'wah. The task ahead is not only corrective—addressing past shortcomings—but also constructive, envisioning new pathways for the flourishing of Muslim societies grounded in knowledge, ethics, and inclusivity.

I must acknowledge that no scholarly work is without limitations. The methodological and substantive gaps present in some parts of this volume are part of the ongoing process of intellectual growth. It is my hope that this book will stimulate further research, dialogue, and critical reflection. The fact that many of the chapters are derived from previously published academic works adds to the credibility and scholarly contribution of this volume, while also demonstrating the author's sustained engagement with the field.

Finally, I hope that this book will serve as a meaningful contribution to the ongoing discourse on Islam in Indonesia and beyond. By bringing together diverse themes—ranging from religious authority and cultural negotiation to spirituality, media, and socio-political challenges—it offers a comprehensive and insightful portrait of contemporary Muslim life. May it

inspire scholars, practitioners, and the broader community to continue striving for a more reflective, ethical, and transformative actualization of Islam in our time.

Yogyakarta, 23 April 2026
Prof. Noorhaidi Hasan, Ph.D.

Preface

Understanding the actualization of muslims in the world context, Indonesia in particular, has, at least, three interrelated central objects; *first*, actualization in the form of ideas or thoughts that emerge and take the form of thought products, both spoken and written. The ideas expressed in people's communication relations are a manifestation of the results of thought struggles in their lives which require tools in the form of language. Thought experiences and daily practices become instruments in the process of actualizing Islam until it becomes an idea. The idea of muslims, therefore, does not stand alone, but is a product of dialectics, interactions, interconnections of multiple elements and the influence of life that is obtained consciously. The ideas of muslims are spread in the form of theology, fiqh, politics, philosophy, ethics and mysticism, responding to similar ideas that grow and develop in human life dynamically and, even full of tension, discourse and polemics.

Second, the second central object is the reflective consequences and consistencies of these ideas in the form of attitudes, actualization of practices, both daily practices of muslims and situational practices, such as social actions, daily attitudes, work ethic and religious rituals. Daily behaviour or morals are central in the most visible study of muslims besides ideas. The actualization of muslims in their daily behaviour is the weakest point and gives rise to various forms, contradictions and prisms that refer to the construction of ideas as a reference. The truth

in many ideas is not as linear and straight as in the actualization of muslim practice, moreover, these ideas are wrong and lead to serious disasters that occur slowly or quickly. Instead of the actualization of the people bringing grace, what actually grows is the opposite. The practices of muslims on certain events are more dominant in their weaknesses. Corrupt behaviour, weak work ethic and the trend of pragmatism are common sights in parts of the Islamic world, including Indonesia.

The distance between idealism in the form of ideas and actualization of the people in the form of practice is so far that it has an impact on slowing down the achievement of the normative ideals of muslims. The experimental glory of muslims obtained in the early days of Islam and the periods of certain Islamic dynasties that followed still remains a kind of nostalgia when viewed from the factual perspective of muslims today. The polarization of the ummah towards momentary pragmatic interests is a common sight in Islamic regions which sometimes results in heartbreaking and sad situations. Through virtual and physical observations, muslim communities in Asia, for example, appear to be facing a reality that is far from the normative idealism of Islam which upholds human values, progressiveness and diversity. The interaction of muslims seems to be stagnant and exists in the shadow of the domination of their fellow believers, such as Jews, Protestants, Confucians, Tokugawa and Buddhists. Moreover, these muslims are a minority group which in various situations and locations is marginalized, as experienced by muslims in Kashmir, India, Moro Philippines, Rohingya in Myanmar and Patani Muslims in Thailand as well as several conditions for muslims in remote areas in Indonesia. They are a nominal muslim community, as if accompanying the fate of some of their brothers and sisters in parts of Africa and the Middle East who do not have the strength to face social, cultural and political pressures, local and global. Asking for help from people who are considered to have crucified their achievements to Europe and America, is again a pragmatic path which incidentally is not free. Concessions, negotiations, traps, deception and even manipulation are common sights experienced by muslims today. Relations amid suspicion, caution

and differences in life orientation accompany muslim relations with the west. These include countries destined by God to have abundant oil reserves, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), so they have sexy bargaining power when bargaining with the West. However, essential control remains with the society that has these achievements, especially in developing the quality of research, science and technology which in the 7th to 14th centuries AD was experienced by muslims, especially during the Abbasid Dynasty. Islamic artifacts from this period of progress can be used as important targets for the third central object of Islam, whose remains still speak as witnesses to the history of the creative actualization of Islam.

How muslims can wake up again and not sleep for too long is an important question that must be addressed. Corrective, historical and constructive work became the homework of muslims after the western renaissance, including corrections to Islamic studies and its spread (da'wa). Improving every element of the Ummah, both academically and practically, is the next stage of work that will be inseparable from the Islamic mission. Referring to the essays contained in the manuscript of this book, it appears that there is only a minimal effort related to the efforts of muslims in answering the questions above, in a social, cultural and political context, so that it will appear as a picture of a people who are looking for a good way amidst the chaos of direction. In several parts of the article, forms of Islam and its followers can be seen innovating in various ways in the form of ideas and actualization of Islamic practices. Islamic mission or da'wah turns out to have a central position in introducing human existence and its role even though it must be carried out through various approaches and methods in the context of the Indonesian people in particular. There appears to be a fluctuation in the relationship between ideal and practical Islam through the practice of da'wah, with situations of harmony, tension, confrontation and accommodation seeming to take place one after another as depicted in this book.

Weaknesses in methodology and substance in the writing of this book are unavoidable and appear here and there. Therefore, we always welcome donations in the form of suggestions and

constructive criticism. Meanwhile, one of the optimisms of the writings in this book is that most of the essays come from articles that have been published in scientific journals since 2012, so their credibility and authenticity can be more justified. Optimism regarding the publication of this book is supported by **Dr. Fu'ad Jabali**, an Islamic scholar and analyst who has read a draft of this book. We thank him. **Publisher Bimedia Pustaka Utama** (BPU) for its kindness in publishing quality books, where **Mr. Anang Solihin** has a central role like a tit for tat, is willing to publish it in the hope that this book will be useful for the people. To him, I say thank you. Of course, there are many more individuals and institutions who contributed to the birth of this book that cannot be mentioned one by one. To all parties, I thank you. May God reward everyone with goodness!

A.A.
Bandung, January 2026

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Part 1

The Concept and Operationalization of Da'wah: Learning From Indonesian Scholars¹

Islam is a religion that contains doctrine and historical values that are visible in missionary activities. This practice cannot be separated from two aspects of Islam including the development of ideas and social change. Therefore, this research aims to ensure that the practice of da'wah also encourages the development of Islamic thought patterns in the Indonesian context. By searching the literature and sharp interpretation with a hermetic approach to Nurcholish Madjid's preaching thoughts which are scattered in several of his writings and lectures. The results can be seen in the da'wah themes presented as a response to social changes that continue to develop, such as human rights, moral violations, corruption, environmental degradation, religious conflict, politics, intolerance, discrimination, the importance of quality education, and gender. equality challenges played by Muslim intellectuals. In addition, ethical values in Islamic doctrine are observed and reconceptualized to ward off moral and social violations, correlated with existing challenges as done by Cak Nur. Providing responsive and contextual da'wah practices as carried out by intellectuals appears to be more substantive and targets the conceptual and operational problems of society. Therefore, the contribution of da'wah activities is clearly visible in the change and progress of society.

¹ This joint paper is all titled *Actualization of Islam: Conceptual Analysis and Operationalization of Intellectual Substantive Da'wah by Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia* which is loaded on jurnal International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Analysis Volume 7 of 2024.

A. Introduction

Islam is considered a preaching religion as stated by Max Muller, which comprises the teaching and spread of the doctrines to humanity.² The religion was first preached by Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, but the community rejected the teachings. Consequently, the Prophet was expelled from the region and migrated to Medina to continue the teachings. Medina, originally named Yathrib, became the region where Islam flourished for approximately 23 years.³ Da'wah, also known as the preaching of Islam, was carried on by the Prophet's companions and subsequent generations, both individually and collectively. The expansion continued beyond the social and cultural boundaries of the Arabian Peninsula. Currently, da'wah has reached nearly every country or nation globally as practiced by American Muslims, either in the physical or virtual worlds.⁴

Islam was introduced to Indonesia by the Arab, Persian, and Indian (Gujarat) communities through cross-border trade routes among the countries. During the development phase, da'wah is conducted through various activities such as marriage, education, arts, and others, as well as the *ulema's* role (religious scholars).⁵ The variety and variants of da'wah continue to evolve from the pre-independence era to the current generation with all challenges.⁶

During the New Order era, modernization prompted the "reconstruction of da'wah" to remain relevant by considering the conditions of the *mad'u* (the recipient of da'wah), including cultural systems and social structures. The change was accepted by more progressive Muslim intellectuals, impacting the development

2 Thomas W Arnold, *The Preaching Of Islam A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (Lahore: SHM. Ashraf, 1965), 1.

3 Syed Ameer Ali, *Api Islam Sejarah Evolusi Dan Cita-Cita Islam Dengan Riwayat Hidup Nabi Muhammad Saw*, Terj. HB. (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1978), 92-233.

4 Thomas W Arnold, *The Spread of Islam in the World: A History of Peaceful Preaching* (New Delhi: Goodword Books, 2012), 13.

5 Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Millennium Baru* (Jakarta: PT. Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002), 24.

6 M. Bambang Pranowo, "Islam Di Indonesia: Mengusung Demokrasi Dengan Basis Budaya," *Jurnal Studia Islamika* 3, no. 1 (2006): 1-23, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v13i1.579>.

of Islamic thought patterns and strategies for the dissemination of da'wah.⁷

Da'wah movement further experiences a formulation change, including the methods.⁸ Similarly, the orientation of the movement shifted from emphasizing Sufism to contemporary social challenges, such as moral dilemmas, environmental concerns, politics, violence, and religious intolerance, relevant in the modern context of Indonesia.⁹ The question is how to find an Islamic format for da'wah that meets societal needs while preparing for future necessities, such as providing balanced opportunities for rational empowerment and spiritual fulfillment.¹⁰

The initial step adopted by Muslim intellectuals is constructive criticism, as carried out by Nurcholis Madjid (Cak Nur). The scholar perceived da'wah practice as more prominent and oriented towards the narrative of 'prohibition' (nahi munkar) rather than 'enjoining good' (amar ma'ruf) as observed in religious lectures.¹¹ Another criticism voiced by Cak Nur relates to the strategy of Muslim community, focusing on the struggle of da'wah through politics. Despite participation in human resource investment, the movement strategically neglects cultural transitions.¹² Studying the concept in this framework is significant in elucidating ideas about da'wah, thereby becoming a reference and guide for future activities.

Cak Nur is among Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders whose thoughts on Islam as well as da'wah deserve recognition. The essence of da'wah in Cak Nur's perspective includes various components such as the segments of thought, innovation, and actualization in Indonesia.

Hermeneutic (interpretation) methods and social theories are commonly used to approach someone's thought products,

7 Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986).
A. Wahab Suneth, *Problematika Dakwah Dalam Era Indonesia Baru* (Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 2000), 11.

8 Muhammad Quraish Shihab, *Lentera Hati* (Bandung, Cet.20: Mizan, 2000), 70.

9 Johan Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 167, no. 2/3 (2011): 236–69.

10 Tabroni and Syamsul Arifin, *Islam Pluralisme Budaya Dan Politik* (Yogyakarta: Sipres, 1994).

11 Nurcholis Madjid, *Islam Kerakyatan Dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1993), 200.

12 Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam Dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran Dan Praktik Politik Islam Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), 123.

as frequently practiced by Cak Nur.¹³ The interpretation method also signifies the transformation of something or a situation of ignorance into an understandable approach.¹⁴ This method aims to comprehend the text thoroughly and to understand the author's deeply. Consequently, interpretations are made by meticulously clarifying the challenges in advance.¹⁵ Another profound method used in understanding the overall concept of thought is philosophy.¹⁶ The concept of da'wah is deeply comprehended according to Cak Nur's books and journal articles relating to the preaching of Islam through content analysis.¹⁷

B. Cak Nur Biography

Cak Nur, commonly called Nurcholish Madjid, was widely known both domestically and internationally as a prominent Muslim scholar and intellectual leader from Indonesia who evolved in the 1970s. Cak Nur's thoughts were recognized for being open, inclusive, and tolerant, which were qualities acquired during the upbringing in the family environment. Cak Nur's parents were sympathizers of the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi) but also had close ties to Nahdatul Ulama (NU) through the grandfather, who was very close to the founder of NU named Hadratusyeikh Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari. Cak Nur studied at Islamic boarding schools, madrasas, and universities before becoming a religious scholar specializing in Arabic literature from Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, in 1961.

During the student years, Cak Nur, born on March 17, 1939, was active at the Al-Azhar Grand Mosque in Kebayoran Baru and became close to prominent leaders of Islam in Indonesia including M. Natsir, Andi Mapaseng Fatwa, and Haji Abdul

13 Acep Aripudin and Mudhofir Abdullah, *Perbandingan Dakwah* (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2014), 27.

14 Lauren Swayne Barthold, *A Hermeneutic Approach to Gender and Other Social Identities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 79.

15 Nashr Hamid Abu Zayd, *Hermeneutika Inklusif-Mengatasi Peroblematika Bacaan Dan Cara-Cara Pentakwilan Atas Diskursus Keagamaan* (Jakarta: ICIP, 2004), 89.

16 Fred Dallmayr, *Critical Encounters: Between Philosophy and Politics* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1987), 135.

17 Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: Introduction to Its Theory and Methodology* (Jakarta, Tr. F. Wajdi : Rajawali Press, 1991), 48.

Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka).¹⁸ Cak Nur's intellectuality and leadership skills were developed in Muslim Students' Association (HMI) after participation in the Indonesian Islamic Student (PII) before becoming branch chairman. The Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) did not exist at that time, while the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII) was a minor initiative.¹⁹ Cak Nur was also active in the Southeast Asian Student Association (Pemiat) as chairman, which allowed visitation to cities in the United States and the Middle East.²⁰ Due to the visitation across the region, Madjid became close to various Indonesian leaders in the organization including Soejatmoko, Ruslan Abdul Gani, Gus Dur, and Anwar Ibrahim, thereby broadening the insights and experiences.

On January 2, 1970, Cak Nur presented a groundbreaking study on "the liberalization of Islam" (secularization, freedom of thought, and the idea of progress) at the Taman Ismail Marjuki Building in Jakarta. Cak Nur's name became increasingly popular and valued by the media due to various ideas. An example of the experience was being a reviewer in seminars and workshops funded by the Ford Foundation through LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) in 1976, endorsed by Leonard Binder. This program served as conditioning before departing to the University of Chicago in the United States.²¹ Cak Nur pursued studies in political science at the university campus in 1978 and subsequently commenced Islamic philosophy under the guidance of Leonard Binder and Muslim neomodernist Fazlur Rahman. The education focused on the *Kalam* thought of Ibn Taymiyyah until returning to Indonesia in 1984.

Cak Nur resumed several unfinished tasks during the education period, such as teaching at the Graduate School of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, establishing the Paramadina Waqf Foundation, sponsoring the idea of founding the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI),

18 Muhamad Wahyuni Nafis, *Cak Nur Sang Guru Bangsa Biografi Pemikiran Prof. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid* (Jakarta: PT. Kompas Media Nusantara, 2014), 31.

19 M. Wahyuni Nafis, *Cak Nur Sang Guru Bangsa Biografi Pemikiran Prof. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid*, 39.

20 Jane Farlez, "Moderate Islam," *New York Times*, 2005. <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/world/asia/nurcholish-madjid-66-advocate-of-moderate-islam-dies>.

21 Nafis, *Cak Nur Sang Guru Bangsa Biografi Pemikiran Prof. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid*, 79.

establishing and becoming the rector of Paramadina University as well as Madina Education Foundation. Other activities included participating in seminars, writing articles and books, engaging in social activities, and delivering religious lectures, which was perceived as the operationalization of da'wah ideas. Cak Nur passed away on Monday, August 29, 2005, leaving a profound loss in the Ismal community.

C. Islamic Da'wah Context in Indonesia

The entry and spread of Islam in Indonesia were manifestations of the success of da'wah. Agents who contributed to the spread of Islam or da'wah included Muslim traders from various parts of the Islamic world, specifically Gujarat and India in the Middle East and South Asia, respectively.²² Furthermore, Sufism (*tasawuf*) served as a dominant strategy, both factually and conceptually,²³ for the Islamization of the archipelago due to the social and cultural considerations of the local community. This strategy distinguished the da'wah from the power-centric Islamization methods in other Islamic regions such as the Middle East and the fringes of Europe.²⁴

Indonesia as a new territory for Islamization possessed a dynamic and heterogeneous social culture posing complex cultural challenges to da'wah, particularly in terms of ethnicities, languages, religions, and cultures. An approximate of 260 million individuals inhabited about 7,000 large and small islands with 633 major ethnic groups, comprising 1,331 subgroups. Additionally, there were between 456 to 749 regional languages in the country. This diversity presented opportunities and challenges in the operationalization of da'wah, distinguishing the movement from the practices in more homogenous Islamic regions.

Various methods were used for operationalizing da'wah in Indonesia. Besides Sufism method producing prominent preachers including the Walisongo, there were organizational strategies,

22 Hamka, *Sejarah Umat Islam: Pra-Kenabian Hingga Islam Di Nusantara* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2020), 47.

23 AH Johns, "Islamization in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations with Special Reference to the Role of Sufism," *Southeast Asian Studies* 31, no. 1 (1993): 37.

24 Arnold, *The Preaching Of Islam A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, 93.

exemplified by Muhammadiyah,²⁵ Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and other Islamic organizations. Furthermore, polarization existed in diverse forms, patterns, and methods grounded in the concept of da'wah as well as Islam in general.²⁶

Sufism method in da'wah was among the earliest strategies adopted by Islamic advocates because it resonated closely with the community's social culture. In this current era, the methods persisted through various tariqas (Sufism orders) with all innovations, including in education. The methods used included *dhikr* (remembrance of Allah) and *riyadhah* (spiritual exercises), as well as therapeutic strategies targeting individuals with mental or psychological challenges.²⁷ Tariqas generally engaged in da'wah using a traditional method similar to that practiced in Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*). Therefore, tariqas and Islamic boarding schools often played similar roles that were difficult to separate.²⁸

Pesantren was a traditional Islamic institution and subsequently developed similarly to tariqas. The school was not only a place for Islamic studies but also a center for the spread of Islam in Indonesia, eventually advancing educational institutions such as *madrasas diniyah* (Islamic schools).²⁹ Before independence, the contributions of Islamic Boarding schools and religious institutions were significant in the struggle against colonialism alongside other Islamic forces under the motto "*jihad*".³⁰ This struggle further laid the groundwork for the evolvement of political Islam until the Indonesian independence period. Furthermore, the forces' influence was observed in the early and final stage of the post-independence period in Indonesian social and political change processes.^{31D}

25 Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development," 182.

26 Hamidulloh Ibda, "Thuggery and Cultural Da'wah: A Case Study of Jama'ah Pasrah Foundation, Pati, Indonesia," *Jurnal Penelitian* 16, no. 1 (2019): 1–18.

27 Sri Mulyati and Zahrotun Nihayah, "Sufi Healing in Indonesia and Malaysia: An Updated Study of Rehabilitation Methods Practiced by Qadiriyya Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order," *Esoterik: Jurnal Akhlak Dan Tasawuf* 20, no. 20 (2020): 1–32, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/esoterik.v6i1.7085>.

28 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren Studi Pandangan Hidup Kyai Dan Visinya Mengenai Masa Depan Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2011), 46.

29 Karel A Steenbrink, *Pesantren Madrasah Sekolah Pendidikan Islam Dalam Kurun Modern* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986).

30 B.J Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Netherlands: Springer, 1986), 37.

31 Alvin Noor Sahab Rizal, "Pergerakan Islam Indonesia Masa Jepang (1942-1945)," *Jurnal Indo-Islamika* 4, no. 2 (2014): 1–22, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15408/jidi.v4i2.17394>.

The shift in the orientation of Islam from the cultural to the political sphere was situational, therefore, the influence cannot be disregarded as a historical process impacting the patterns and practices of da'wah in Indonesia. The pattern of "political da'wah" was advocated by Islamic groups, such as those aspiring to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in the sense of Islamic political ideology.³² Although this political method formally failed due to the lack of historical roots in the Islamic tradition,³³ the mission to preach Islam continued individually or collectively through Muslim organizations or institutions.

Personal da'wah was largely carried out by da'is (Islamic preachers) with varying ideologies and actions. Religious lectures characterized the phenomenon of da'wah in urban and rural areas, leading to the stigma that preaching of Islam solely included lectures and tabligh da'wah (to make known about Islam) emphasizing oral skills.³⁴ Furthermore, tabligh da'wah produced popular da'is such as Kosim Nurseha, Abdullah Syafi'i, A.F Ghazali, Tuty Alawiyah, and Zainuddin MZ.³⁵ Young da'is further evolved, including Abdul Shomad, Das'ad Latif, Jujun Junaedi, and Ade Hidayat, who appeared in the popular culture media.³⁶

Da'wah practice was performed by intellectual da'is who were active in social, political, and economic spheres with cultural methods. The Islamic teachers included Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Jalaluddin Rakhmat, M. Quraish Shihab, Adi Sasono, M. D Raharjo, Alwi Shihab, and Cak Nur. These teachers were better known as Muslim intellectuals, although the preachers' thoughts and activities were deeply rooted in religious perspectives. The da'is mentioned have a significant fundamental commitment to publishing and implementing ethical values of Islam to society as well as internationally.

32 Karl D Jackson, *Kewibawaan Tradisional, Islam Dan Pemberontakan Kasus Darul Islam Jawa Barat* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1990), 72.

33 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam Dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi Tentang Percaturan Dalam Konstituante* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES), 1985), 67.

34 Julian Millie, *Oratorical Innovation and Audience Heterogeneity in Islamic West Java* (Jostor: Cornell University Press, 2012).

35 Idris Thaha, *Dakwah & Politik Da'i Berjuta Umat K.H. Zainuddin MZ* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).

36 Eva F Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa: The Visual Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia," *Jurnal ASIASCAP: Digital Asia* 1, no. 5 (2018): 1–16.

Muslim intellectuals not only delivered religious lectures but exceeded that by engaging in fundamental reconceptualization and reorientation of da'wah, in response to the evolving developments. After the fall of Soeharto and the 1998 reform era in political parties such as the Justice Party (PK), Crescent Star Party (PBB), and the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII), the teachers critiqued da'wah carried out by Salafi and ideological Muslims who remained enthusiastic.³⁷

Da'wah method was observed to be unresponsive, unsubstantive, and counterproductive, as it was irrelevant to the strategic themes for the advancement of the community. These themes included education, freedom of speech and association importance, political ethics, corruption, environmental issues, religious intolerance, and wealth disparity problems in the community.³⁸

Muslim intellectuals have increasingly justified da'wah method in the mid-New Order and the current reform era. Political da'wah faced more challenges and appeared to be gradually marginalized, while a more substantive cultural method became urgent in terms of improving the quality of community resources and welfare. Therefore, the relevance and significance of Cak Nur's ideas should be mapped in the context of Indonesian Islamic da'wah.

D. Cak Nur's Da'wah Perspective

Cak Nur's thoughts on da'wah were inseparable from general views with a specific limited study on the preaching of Islam. Studies typically addressed Cak Nur's thoughts both domestically and internationally on religious themes such as politics, human rights, democracy, civil society, pluralism, and others.³⁹ However, Cak Nur paid attention to da'wah issues in the broader framework of the thought, comprising various aspects of human life in the context of Islam, Indonesian identity, and modernity.

37 Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development," 92.

38 Madjid, *Islam Kerakyatan Dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996).

39 Mark R Woodward, "Piety and Politics: Nurcholish Madjid and His Interpretation of Islam in Modern Indonesia," *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2007): 289–94.

Da'wah was a dimension of Islam where the teachings contained doctrines calling on humanity and the community to "be Islamic," as experienced and practiced by Muhammad as a prophet and messenger (QS, Yunus (10):10, 25; an-Nahl (16):125).⁴⁰ Referring to the Qur'an, da'wah was often interpreted as a "call," "invitation," and "summons" to Islam, or in a specific sense, a call to Allah.⁴¹

Cak Nur interpreted da'wah to be similar to the interpretation by the Qur'an, derived from the Arabic word, دعا - يدعو - دعوة (da'a-yad'u-da'watan). The word suggested to call or summon, to affirm or defend, and to propagate, with the understanding of da'wah as a request filled with hope.⁴² Furthermore, Cak Nur re-interpreted the basic definition of the word da'wah and explored the term with explanations from other Qur'an verses such as the comprehensive interpretation of what was right and wrong.⁴³ This action unintentionally revised the previous understanding of da'wah as often expressed by activists and scholars.⁴⁴ The re-interpretation also categorized da'wah as providing an Islamic understanding in the context of Indonesian identity and modernity to Muslim community.⁴⁵

The idea of Cak Nur about da'wah was gleaned from articles such as "*Dakwah Dengan Hikmah*" (Da'wah with Wisdom) in Tabloid Tekad,⁴⁶ and a study titled "*Dakwah Islam di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme dan Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Plural*" (Islamic Da'wah in Indonesia: Challenges Post-Colonialism and Social Changes in Plural Society).⁴⁷ Cak Nur's role as a renewer of Islamic thought was challenging due to insufficient discussions on da'wah. However, the thoughts on Islam appeared comprehensive for all to understand.

40 Mubasyaroh, "Da'wah Model of Prophet Muhammad In Madina," *Jurnal QJIS: Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies* 2, no. 2 (2014): 1-19.

41 Ken Chitwood, "Da'wah," in *Encyclopedia of Latin American Religions* (Springer, 2017).

42 Ibn Mandzur, *Lisan Al-'Arab*, Jilid XIV (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1990).

43 Nurcholish Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1997), 172.

44 Toha Yahya Umar, *Ilmu Dakwah* (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1985), 37.

45 Nurcholish Madjid, *Khutbah Jumat Cak Nur Menghayati Akhlak Allah Dan Khutbah-Khutbah Pilihan Lainnya. Seri Legenda Ulama Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 2016), 114.

46 Nurcholish Madjid, *Cendekiawan Dan Religiusitas Masyarakat Kolom-Kolom Di Tabloid Tekad* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), 36.

47 Nurcholish Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).

The article titled “Dakwah dengan Hikmah” by Cak Nur, signifying the main idea expressed about da’wah commenced with a quotation from the Qur’an, “*It was only those who were faithful and did not tarnish faith with falsehood were guaranteed security and rightly guided*” (QS, Al-An’am 6: 82). According to Cak Nur, da’wah provided a sense of security, peace, and understanding as a manifestation of Islam to the world.⁴⁸ Unlike other ulema and intellectuals who defined da’wah in long and boring sentences with the formalization of religious language, Cak Nur explained the teaching of Islam in a short and essential statement as “an invitation or call to what was good and better”.⁴⁹ Therefore, da’wah was a continuous process that was relatively progressive and futuristic rather than being in a stagnant state.

The interpretation of da’wah by Cak Nur was dynamic, constantly increasing, and evolving according to the demands of space and time.⁵⁰ This explanation also reminded the public of the legal maxim in fiqh, “*al-muhafdzatu ala al-qadim as-Shalih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadid al-ashlah*” (retaining the good from the past while accepting even better innovations from the present), which Cak Nur often cited as the basis for the renewed movement.⁵¹ As defined by Madjid, the practice of da’wah was negative-oriented, instilling fear, opposition, criticism without providing solutions, and denigration. Essentially, da’wah depended more on resistance, but less towards goodness, unity, and ideals.⁵² Cak Nur also observed this tendency in sermons, sharing a similar orientation with general da’wah practices lacking emphasis on promoting what was right.⁵³

According to Cak Nur, this attitude consequently led to the society’s underproactiveness in participating in the development or modernization role of Muslim community.⁵⁴ The role that Cak

48 urcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kerakyatan, Dan Keindonesiaan Pikiran-Pikiran Nurcholish Muda* (Bandung: Mizan, 1993), 18.

49 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 120.

50 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 123.

51 Nurcholis Madjid, *Islam, Kemoderenan, Dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 72.

52 Madjid, *Islam, Kemoderenan...*, 92.

53 Madjid, *Islam Kerakyatan Dan Keindonesiaan...*, 200.

54 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 97.

Nur referred to was da'wah through a cultural method and not the political aspect. The slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No" in the context of the idea was relevant because political methods often resulted in suspicion of Muslim community.⁵⁵

Cak Nur referred to the idea as suggesting to Muslim community to adopt rational, modern, dynamic, scientific, and objective attitudes. Muslim community should experience secularization to achieve this objective. The secularization was not to implement secularism as understood in Western countries⁵⁶ but to change the traditional mindset of Muslim community into a modern structure, as explained in Cak Nur's ideas about modernization. Cak Nur's method was observed to approach Islam more substantially and ethically.⁵⁷ To strengthen the argument, Cak Nur referred to the Qur'an (QS, 3:104) in the sentences of *da'wah ilal khair* related to idealistic goodness, *amar ma'ruf* with practical goodness, and *nahi munkar* implying the prevention or prohibition of bad things.⁵⁸ All three sentences were interconnected and should not be separated from each other or treated alone.

Various instances of da'wah focused more on *nahi munkar*, which was emotionally easier than performing *amal ma'ruf*, frequently lacking a basis in the speaker's understanding. Emotional and sentiment-driven speeches have more probability of gaining the audience's attention, resulting in applause for the speaker. Consequently, *amal ma'ruf* required additional perseverance, analysis, problem-solving, and rationality, which may appear colder and less appealing to lay audiences and those less educated.⁵⁹

The Qur'an references to da'wah were *ila al-khayr*, *al-amru bi al-ma'ruf*, and *nahy an al-munkar*. When rendered into a verbal noun form in Indonesian, *al-khayr* and *al-ma'ruf* signified "goodness", although the word implied in the two definitions have different connotations. The initial reference expressed universal and ideal goodness applicable in all situations, conditions, as well as places. Conversely, the second reference denoted temporal

55 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam*, ..., 198.

56 Harvey Cox, *The Secular City, A Celebration of Its Liberties and an Invitation to Its Dicipline* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 63.

57 Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Kemoderenan Dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997), 97.

58 Madjid, *Islam Kemoderenan*, ..., 98.

59 Madjid, *Islam Kemoderenan*,, 99.

and contextual goodness bound by space as well as time.⁶⁰ *Al-khayr* represented normative goodness operating “as it was,” and *al-ma’ruf* signified temporal goodness operating in “how it should be”. “As it was” referred to the goodness as stated in the teachings of Allah, while “how it should be” suggested temporal goodness and how it should be implemented in space as well as time.

Operating solely in the domain of normative goodness presented challenges in the implementation due to clashes with the conditions of space and time without considering the counterproductive surrounding society, which may cause antipathy promoting virtue. Therefore, the community should consider temporal virtue such as socio-cultural context to actualize normative goodness and implement *al-khayr*. A compelling example was the obligation to protect the aurah (body parts to be covered) as a normative and applicable aspect at all times and places. However, it included customs and traditions during implementation.⁶¹

Da’wah normative goodness was necessary but grounding the teaching in reality required adaptation into practical goodness and comprised intellectual insights, such as knowledge about society, culture, and history with all variations.⁶² The orientation of da’wah towards amar ma’ruf should be interpreted ethically and not by-passing judgments such as labeling things forbidden, disbelief, hypocrisy, and misguidance. Consequently, it should be done sympathetically by offering peace and tranquility, as well as providing the audience with accurate understanding, good choices, and opening space for dialogue and reflection.

The idea of positive-oriented da’wah comprised several logical consequences in the application, including (1) should be performed with a pure, clean, and humble heart, (2) should be based on noble morals and awareness of inclusive religious manifesting Islam as a mercy to all creation, (3) providing security to humanity by exploring solutions and improving conditions for all, (4) avoiding from negative words, and (5) offering space

60 Madjid, *Islam Kemoderenan*,, 201.

61 Nurcholish Madjid, *Tradisi Islam Peran Dan Fungsinya Dalam Pembangunan Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 108.

62 Madjid, *Tradisi Islam*,, 93.

for dialogue and thought to the audience, thereby fostering a dialogical atmosphere and keeping away from fanaticism and communalism.⁶³ The objectives of da'wah were implicitly stated by Cak Nur as follows, (1) "Fundamentally, the preaching of Islam served as an avenue of teaching religion aimed at becoming a mercy for all and introducing positive values including peace (al-amn), tranquility, as well as coolness", and (2) according to the Qur'an. "Those who believed and did not taint the faith with injustice were the ones who will obtain peace" (QS, 6:82). Therefore, da'wah aimed to communicate religious teachings in correlation with Islam's compassionate stance, serving as a mercy to all creation.⁶⁴

Examining Cak Nur's thoughts about humanity was considered necessary regarding the more detailed objective of da'wah. Humans were Allah's vicegerents on Earth, gifted with knowledge and *fitrah* (natural disposition) that could not be changed including the spirit of exploring goodness, beauty, truth, and refinement (*Hanif*). Vicegerents were active, creative, and rich in wisdom, possessing broad knowledge, free-thinking, broad-mindedness, and openness. The representatives were also tolerant, forgiving, and willing to follow the truth wherever it came from. Negative tendencies, such as causing harm and hostility, excessive love for life, wealth, pleasure, idolizing desires, being constantly tempted by demons, as well as being weak, hasty, and forgetful were the attributes of the vicegerents. Consequently, da'wah was essential in enabling humans to develop significant qualities and avoid being dominated by detrimental attitudes due to the positive and negative aspects.⁶⁵

Based on religious teachings, da'wah aimed to keep humans in *fitrah* condition, fulfill the vicegerency mandate consistently, enhance moral character, and instill *taqwa* towards Allah as well as noble virtues.⁶⁶ Essentially, it was formulated that the objective of da'wah in Cak Nur's thought was to motivate

63 Madjid, *Tradisi Islam*,, 94.

64 Nurcholish Madjid, *Budaya Nasional, Masyarakat Madani Dan Masa Depan Bangsa: Jika Rakyat Berkuasa, Upaya Membangun Masyarakat Madani Dalam Kultur Feodal*, Tim Maula (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999), 97-100.

65 Nurcholish Madjid, *Indonesia Kita* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2004), 194.

66 Budhy Munawar Rachman, *Ensiklopedi Nurcholish Madjid Pemikiran Islam Di Kanvas Peradaban* (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), 97.

humans to fulfill the roles of *Abdullah* (servants of Allah) and as *khalifatullah* (vicegerents of Allah) in the context of nationhood and statehood.

E. Operationalization of Da'wah

Referring to Cak Nur's concept of da'wah, the perspective appeared highly idealistic. However, the idealism about da'wah was possible to implement because it showed consistency in administering the concept built in terms of material, message, subjects, methods, themes, and targets of da'wah (its objects). The targets of da'wah comprised social issues, as examined by the author.⁶⁷

Cak Nur's da'wah material consisted of all messages of invitation and calls with themes covering various aspects of life, including human relations with Allah and nature in vertical and horizontal methods, respectively. Barton's analysis showed that Cak Nur's thought was a convergence between the community, faith, and the nation. Cak Nur strived to obtain the truth⁶⁸ and echoed Islam through Indonesia, explaining modernity and da'wah until both understandings became inseparable.

Da'wah provision methods referred to Allah's command in Surah An-Nahl, verse 125, in summoning humans with good teachings and discussions. The content of da'wah was the teachings of Islam, which implied submission to Allah. The definition was broader and deeper than Islam in historical-sociological terms because it was the universal message of prophethood and prophecy as the core of da'wah applicable throughout time and space.⁶⁹ The explanation did not imply da'wah's message to be solely about religion but rather that faith should be human governance activities core on Earth in various fields, such as religious, political, and educational matters.

67 Ahmad Aiman Ismail, A. Munawar, Mujani, Wan Kamal, Juhaily, "Methods of Da'wah and Social Networks in Dealing with Liberalism and Extremism," *Islamiyyat* 40, no. 2 (2018): 73.

68 Greg Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 8, no. 3 (2011), 1–10.

69 Madjid, *Cendekiawan Dan Religiusitas Masyarakat Kolom-Kolom Di Tabloid Tekad*, 97–100.

Concerning religious affairs, Cak Nur started by interpreting all aspects related to modernization. According to Cak Nur, modernization should be interpreted as being or often identical to rationalization.⁷⁰ This suggested a transformation of old irrational patterns of thought and work to new rational patterns.⁷¹ The positive attitude towards modernization was subsequently correlated with the Qur'an verses, such as the truth (*haq*) and not falsehood (*bathil*) (QS. 16:3; 38:27), the dominated sunnah of Allah (QS. 7:54; 25:2), the Creator of the universe with goodness, pleasure, and harmony (QS. 21:7; 67:3), the commandment to observe and study the laws presented in Allah's creation (QS. 10:101), and to be critical (QS. 2:170, 43:22-25).⁷²

Cak Nur responded to some Muslims' ideas about modernization that religion or belief was important in modern society. Without religion, a society or nation cannot have a noble civilization. Modernization should be accepted and not synonymous with secularism, which needed to be rejected due to the rise in liberalism and Westernization as well as the separation of religion and politics. Humans were not to be free from Allah's supervision according to the measure of Islam.⁷³ However, Harry J. Benda stated that the separation of religion and politics in Islam was unrealistic as well as a temporary symptom of the religion experiencing decline.⁷⁴ In the era of Islamic revival, the separation of religion and politics cannot be sustained, either in independent or non-Muslim Islamic countries.⁷⁵

Cak Nur began a renewal of Islamic thought with two interrelated actions namely, freeing oneself from traditional values and exploring values oriented toward the future (liberalization).⁷⁶ Among the three elements of liberalization, secularization was the most important component because it comprised the other two factors, namely the process of liberation (liberating development) including *worldizing* values that should inherently be worldly and

70 Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan Dan Keindonesiaan*, 172.

71 Madjid, *Cendekiawan Dan Religiusitas Masyarakat Kolom-Kolom Di Tabloid Tekad*, 173.

72 Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan Dan Keindonesiaan*, 173.

73 Madjid, *Islam Kemoderenan*, 175.

74 Harry J Benda, *Bulan Sabit Dan Matahari Terbit Islam Indonesia Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang*, Terj. D. D (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1980), 79.

75 Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan Dan Keindonesiaan*, 177.

76 Nurcholish Madjid, *Keharusan Pembaruan Islam, Dalam Islam Keindonesiaan Dan Kemodernan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1989), 207.

giving freedom to Muslims from the tendency to desacralization of the religion “weakening the spirit of *ijtihad*.”⁷⁷

Since the 1980s and 1990s, Cak Nur began to propose various views on Islamic universalism that were not bound by exclusivity due to geographical, racial, and linguistic barriers. The main basis was the Islamic ideology concerned with humanity because barriers were not bound. The ideology existed with humans without limitation by space, time, and material qualities.⁷⁸ Islamic universalism substantively comprised the word “Islam” including the attitude of submission to Allah, signifying that religious matters were not by compulsion but by human beings. The true religion was the attitude of submission, as taught by the Qur’an and the Prophet as a natural *fitrah* that implied a tolerant and inclusive pluralism.⁷⁹

Pluralism comprised building internal interactions among and between religious communities, enabling harmonious and peaceful coexistence, as well as being willing to solve common issues actively and proactively. This signified that pluralism guaranteed both religious and social freedom simultaneously.⁸⁰ Although religious inclusivity was more prominent, it consisted of cultural interaction, ethnicity, race, and others. The interactions should be understood as genuine engagement of diversities within the bonds of civility.⁸¹

According to Cak Nur, pluralism did not suggest all religions to be equal but acknowledged each faith’s right to exist and practice freely.⁸² This attitude was interpreted as a hope for all existing religions and humanity to surrender to the One God until the truth, common platform, or ground was discovered.⁸³

Concerning the religious mission brought by each faith, there should be a spirit of mutual respect, appreciation, and tolerance. Additionally, the Prophet emphasized that the best religion in the sight of Allah was *al-hanifiyyah samhah*, implying the spirit of exploring tolerant, broad-minded, un-fanaticism,

77 Madjid, *Keharusan*, 176.

78 Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Doktrin Dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis Tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan Dan Kemoderenan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992), 425.

79 Madjid, *Islam Doktrin*, 432.

80 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi Nurcholish Madjid Pemikiran Islam Di Kanvas Peradaban*, 2694.

81 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi*, 2676.

82 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi*, 172.

83 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi*, 809.

and un-shackle truth. The important implication of this idea can be understood as the essence of being crucial in religion. While the instruments were more dynamic and not the sole avenue for advancing Islam, it became increasingly evident that Cak Nur was oriented toward substantive Islam.⁸⁴ When Islam equated with other principles including political ideology, both philosophies became equal signifying dangerous consequences.⁸⁵

Cak Nur perceived the basics of the 1945 Constitution in Indonesia as Islamic, equated with the Charter of Medina providing a foundation for tolerance among diverse communities. This constitution served as a formulation of the agreement between Muslim community in Medina under the leadership of the Prophet and various non-Muslim groups to build a common political society. In this context, religion played a role not only in politics but also broader than the intention. Therefore, the struggle for religion should serve as a source of inspiration rather than passing through political parties.⁸⁶ Political affairs should be inseparable from religion, with human jurisdiction based on *ijtihad* governing formal structures and technical aspects. Historical Islam has experienced various variations across time and region, though not all have been considered doctrinally valid (except during the time of the *rasyidah* caliph).⁸⁷

The relationships between Islam and politics, as well as Pancasila with the Charter of Medina, was an important example of realizing a civil society. This was evident in a society with three distinct characteristics namely, democracy, civil society, and civility. According to Cak Nur, democracy was the home of civil society, while civility was perceived to be an ethical quality,⁸⁸ such as tolerance, openness, and responsible freedom. Other specific characteristics included pluralism, tolerance, ethics (ethics and morality), legal order, predictability, and justice⁸⁹. Additionally, the ability to realize an egalitarian, participatory

84 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi*, 126.

85 Nurcholish Madjid, *Cita-Cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), 46-47.

86 Madjid, *Cita-cita*, 57.

87 Nurcholish Madjid, "Islam Dan Politik Suatu Tinjauan Atas Prinsip-Prinsip Hukum Dan Keadilan," *Jurnal Pemikiran Islam PARAMADINA* 1, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.

88 Madjid, *Cendekiawan Dan Religiusitas Masyarakat Kolom-Kolom Di Tabloid Tekad*, 144.

89 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi Nurcholish Madjid Pemikiran Islam Di Kanvas Peradaban*, 1746.

society, and portray a fair, open, as well as democratic society,⁹⁰ as pioneered by the Prophet.⁹¹

Cak Nur observed the significant importance of education in operational aspects in achieving the central aspirations. Education served as an investment in humans, with the outcome solely felt after passing through a generation that was motivated, empowered, and civilized⁹², including Islamic education (*tarbiyah*).⁹³ Cak Nur emphasized comprehensive education for the holistic development of individuals, comprising cognitive, affective, and psychomotor aspects.⁹⁴ As a manifestation of the operational idea, various educational institutions were established, such as Paramadina University, Madania High School, and the religious academy in the Religious Studies Club (KAA).⁹⁵

Further observation proved that Islamic education still focused on the cognitive aspect including fiqh, and neglected philosophy, Sufism, tafsir (the Qur'an interpretation), and other disciplines.⁹⁶ However, the primary and highest objective of educational efforts was the enhancement of human values sanctity in the innate nature bestowed by Allah, both *khalifatullah* and *Abdullah*. The aim was to enhance character and high skills by improving knowledge as mandated by the Qur'an.⁹⁷

Character education had two dimensions in practice, namely the dimension of divinity and humanity. The divinity dimension commenced with the fulfillment of formal religious obligations in the form of worship accompanied by individualized appreciation through the cultivation of Islam, faith, excellence, piety, sincerity, reliance, gratitude, and patience. The dimension of humanity was embodied in the divinity facet and concerned with the realization of behavior that gives rise to noble character or morals (*akhlakul karimah*), such as fostering relationships, brotherhood, equality,

90 Madjid, *Islam Doktrin Dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis Tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan Dan Kemoderenan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992), 114.

91 Madjid, *Cita-Cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi*, 10.

92 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi Nurcholish Madjid Pemikiran Islam Di Kanvas Peradaban*, 2430.

93 Nurcholish Madjid, *Pesan-Pesan Takwa: Kumpulan Khutbah Jum'at Di Paramadina* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000), 83.

94 Nurcholish Madjid, *Reorientasi Pendidikan Islam* (Jakarta: Pajar Dunia, 1999), 3.

95 Nafis, *Cak Nur Sang Guru Bangsa Biografi Pemikiran Prof. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid*, 25.

96 Nurcholish Madjid, *Bilik-Bilik Pesantren Sebuah Potret Perjalanan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992), 64.

97 Madjid, *Pesan-Pesan Takwa: Kumpulan Khutbah Jum'at Di Paramadina*, 95.

justice, good intentions, humility, keeping promises, openness, trustworthiness, chivalry, thriftiness, and generosity.⁹⁸

The secondary objective of education was the advancement of students' skills and morals strengthening. The Qur'an motivated Muslim community to be cautious about leaving behind weak offspring who could cause concerns (QS, 4:9).⁹⁹ Both the primary and secondary objectives should be the basis for fostering the spirit of Allah to obtain Allah's consent and fear.¹⁰⁰ Education for Cak Nur was continuous between processes and objectives, not overly segmented as al-Attas portrayed.¹⁰¹

Cak Nur's effort of continuity-synthesis between traditional and future-oriented education resulted in convergence. This synthesis was conducted to avoid dangerous educational dualism that would result in a split of personality, as observed in Western countries.¹⁰² Therefore, the educational curriculum should be built comprehensively, comprising the development of Islamic knowledge as well as mastery of general technology-related sciences, such as chemistry, physics, and others.¹⁰³

Cak Nur's perspective on other aspects of da'wah contributed to a clearer understanding of both the concept and operationalization of da'wah. In Cak Nur's studies, two aspects of da'wah can be distinguished but inseparable, namely concerning content, substance, and form, as well as message, essence, and method. The material or content, substance, message, and essence of da'wah were always universal and not bound by space or time. Furthermore, the second aspect regarding form, format, and delivery method mentioned in the Qur'an as *sharia* and *minhaj* have a temporal dimension varying according to space and time demands.¹⁰⁴

Regarding this issue, Cak Nur quoted the words *syi'ah* and *minhaj* (QS. Al-Maidah: 48) and (QS, 45: 18-19), with

98 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural*, 1997, 18.

99 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam Di Indonesia: Tantangan Pasca Kolonialisme Dan Perubahan Sosial Dalam Masyarakat Plural*, 1997, 19.

100 Madjid, *Dakwah Islam di Indonesia*, 20.

101 Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *The Concept of Education in Islam: A Framework for an Islamic Philosophy of Education* (Bandung: Mizan, 2018), 11.

102 Madjid, *Tradisi Islam Peran Dan Fungsinya Dalam Pembangunan Di Indonesia*, 77-78.

103 Madjid, *Cita-Cita Politik Islam Era Reformasi*, 9.

104 Madjid, *Budaya Nasional, Masyarakat Madani Dan Masa Depan Bangsa: Jika Rakyat Berkuasa, Upaya Membangun Masyarakat Madani Dalam Kultur Feodal*, 99.

Minhaj serving as the thariq (path, method) (QS, 72: 16-17). An Arabic proverb stated that al-thariq ahammu min al-maadah, the method, was more important than the material. This was further subdivided by Ibn Rusyd's perspective on the levels of human beings in receiving and achieving truth into three categories, namely those who attained the truth through the *burhani* (demonstrative), *jadali* (dialectical), and *khitabi* (rhetorical) methods.¹⁰⁵ These three levels of human beings were confirmed textually by the Qur'an in Surah an-Nahl verse 125: "*Invite all to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and kind advice, while only debating in the best method.*"

Although humans differed in intellectual levels, Cak Nur advocated the wise Arabic saying that "the language of reality was better than the language of speech". Therefore, the awareness of the importance of da'wah with this "language of reality" can be interpreted as an approach rooted in essence rather than formality. This signified that the *burhani* or *jadali* methods should be prioritized, thereby motivating individuals to prioritize essence over formality.¹⁰⁶ The variety of levels of these methods was also practiced by Cak Nur on every occasion, specifically in the regular post-Jum'at prayer dialogue in the hall of the Paramadina Foundation.¹⁰⁷

Motivating critical historical and philosophical thinking was crucial to fostering freedom of thought, promoting critical analysis and broad insight, as well as motivating openness to diverse information and positive thinking.¹⁰⁸ With this method, Cak Nur aimed to cultivate open-mindedness and tolerance among Muslims, essential for building a pluralistic and diverse civil society. The consequences of the material and methods of da'wah proposed by Cak Nur's main operational targets included students (the educated), such as Muslim Students' Association (HMI) and the Indonesian Islamic Students Association (PPI).¹⁰⁹ For students, Cak

105Ibn Rusyd, *Makalah Penentu Tentang Hubungan Antara Filsafat Dan Syari'at*, terj. Nurc (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1994), 214-1125.

106Rusyd, *Makalah*, 217.

107Ahmad Gaus AF, *Api Islam Nurcholish Madjid: Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner* (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2010), 12.

108Juhaya S. Praja, *Filsafat Dan Metodologi Ilmu Dalam Islam Dan Penerapannya Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 193-205.

109Nurcholish Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan Artikulasi Nilai Islam Dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), 80.

Nur introduced the Basic Islamic Values (NDI) and initiated the concept into the 9th HMI Congress in Malang to be formalized into the organization's official document.¹¹⁰ Additionally, other targets of da'wah included Islamic community organizations that have been criticized as being stagnant, including Islamic parties through the renewal efforts.¹¹¹

The slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No" sounded sharp in the ears of Islamic politicians and political groups as a new idea.¹¹² Cak Nur appeared disappointed because Islamic parties failed to build a positive and sympathetic image as well as the opposing groups. Simultaneously, it was a criticism of Islamic politicians who still considered an individual's faith based on party affiliation.¹¹³ Since 1971, Cak Nur advocated the idea of the need for a loyal opposition party in Indonesia to remain grounded in the constitution as a check and balance in the political sphere.¹¹⁴ During the period, there was only a single ruling party called Golkar, which was the government group in parliament.¹¹⁵ Therefore, another target of Cak Nur's da'wah was the ruling authority or government in the form of constructive criticism, including the request for the long-sitting president to step down.¹¹⁶ When Gus Dur became president and criticized various challenges caused by the leadership style, such as economic issues and the incomplete implementation of openness, accountability, and transparency, patience was considered necessary.¹¹⁷

Through the Islamic renewal movement, Cak Nur had a tremendous influence on the lives of the Indonesian nation, particularly Muslim community.¹¹⁸ The steadfast attitude, not swayed by the currents and the wise teachings, was voiced,

110 Nurcholish Madjid, *Gagasan Dan Latar Belakang Perumusan NDP HMI*, Dalam, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman (Jakarta: Gunung Kulabu, 1990), 9.

111 Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan Dan Keindonesiaan*, 204.

112 M. Syafii Anwar, *Pemikiran Dan Aksi Islam Di Indonesia. Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), 50.

113 Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Doktrin Dan Peradaban: Sebuah Telaah Kritis Tentang Masalah Keimanan, Kemanusiaan Dan Kemoderenan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992), 205.

114 Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan Artikulasi Nilai Islam Dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer*, 7.

115 Rachman, *Ensiklopedi Nurcholish Madjid Pemikiran Islam Di Kanvas Peradaban*, 2146.

116 www.tempo.interaktif.com, edisi. 28/XXXIV/05-11 September 2005, di akses 11 Mei 2011

117 Nurcholish Madjid, "Manusia Modern Mendamba Allah: Renungan Tasawuf Positif" (Jakarta: IIMaN & Hikmah, 2002), 105-106.

118 Fachry Ali, *Dialog Keterbukaan Artikulasi Nilai Islam Dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), 11.

transcending religion, age, and groups, making Cak Nur a figure of inquiry for various segments of society. The educational approach during dialogues with Cak Nur made anyone feel intelligent. Not just a scholar but an inspiration to the nation, with ideas that often preceded the time.¹¹⁹

Cak Nur's ideas about secularization, liberalization, modernization, and others have opened the minds of Muslims from the captivity of romanticized history. The thoughts of Cak Nur on pluralism, democracy, human rights, civil society, and education have placed the preacher as a national teacher, a place where any individual desires.¹²⁰ Both NU and Muhammadiyah have welcomed Cak Nur's presence, as well as non-Muslims connect and sometimes misunderstand the guardianship. Hardline Muslims considered Cak Nur to be weak and over-tolerant towards other religions. However, followers of other religions perceived Cak Nur to be a true santri (a student of Islam) who spreads Islam in a cool, intellectual, and sympathetic method.¹²¹

The cultural Islamic movement seemed to have been successfully developed by Cak Nur with the evolvement and strengthening of the Islamic middle class. Many individuals performed the Hajj pilgrimage and engaged in worship activities in places that represented pop culture. According to Robert Hefner, this movement triggered the evolvement of Islamic intellectuals in government agencies or the business world, making Muslims a group with political power alongside the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990.¹²²

The movement provided a new awareness for Muslims to advocate for Islam beyond the political domain from a cultural perspective.¹²³ The intellectuals who spearheaded this renewal, as Leonard Binder stated, "played a role as a cultural bridge between Islam and Indonesian new national culture".¹²⁴ The newest culture regained momentum when the nation was threatened

119 www.kompascom/kompas-cetak di akses 11 Mei 2011

120 www.kompascom/kompas-cetak di akses 12 Mei 2011

121 Kompas Cetak Online, Selasa 30 Agustus 2005, di akses 14 Mei 2011

122 Jamhari, *Islam Di Indonesia, Dalam Ensiklopedi Tematis Dunia Islam*, Jilid 6 (Jakarta: PT. Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2001), 345.

123 Jamhari, *Islam*, 346.

124 Bahtiar Effendy, *Masyarakat Agama Dan Pluralisme Keagamaan* (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001), 125.

with disintegration by radicalism claiming to represent Islam.¹²⁵ This was reported in several cases related to religious radicalism, acts of violence, and social unrest, such as those reported by the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS)¹²⁶ as well as incidents in Cirebon.¹²⁷

As a pluralistic nation consisting of various ethnicities, languages, cultures, customs, and religions, Indonesia showed vulnerability to numerous forms of violence, including religious, political, and economic nature. In this context, Cak Nur summoned Muslim community to unite with other communities, without theological barriers, to build the nation based on universal values of equality, freedom, and mutual respect toward realizing a civil society. To achieve the aim, it was necessary to develop attitudes of pluralism, inclusiveness, openness, freedom, tolerance, and others among religious communities, as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and followed by *Khulafa al-Rasyidin*.¹²⁸

Polytheism included various attitudes such as exclusivism, fundamentalism, fanaticism, and cultism which were to be avoided.¹²⁹ Cak Nur's thoughts on da'wah felt relevant and contextual to be appreciated by Muslims in the present era. The idea of da'wah emphasized *al-khayr* (goodness) and *al-ma'ruf* (what was right) rather than *nahy al-munkar* (forbidding evil). The aim was to motivate Muslims to play an active role in development and develop positive change. This ma'ruf-oriented da'wah will steer Muslims away from feeling self-righteous and the prevention from adopting negative as well as destructive attitudes.

E. Conclusion

In conclusion, da'wah in the conceptual framework of Cak Nur motivated Muslims to actively participate in societal, national, and state affairs. This action was accompanied due to the capacity of Muslims to be the vicegerents of God on Earth

125 M. Zaki Mubarak, *Geneologi Islam Radikal Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008), 23.

126 <http://crs.ugm.ac.id/posts/general/582/Siaran-Pers-Launching-Diskusi-Laporan-Tahunan-CRCS-2010.html>, Kompas. Com., Selasa, 21 Juni 2011, diakses 21 Juni 2011

127 <http://www.detiknews.com>, <http://magazindo.info/bom-bunuh-diri-di-masjid-polresta-cirebon/>, <http://www.republika.co.id/>

128 Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Doktrin Dan Peradaban* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1992), 18.

129 Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan Membangun Tradisi Dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2003), 134–36.

by comprehensively understanding Islamic teachings. The aim was a call oriented towards positive da'wah (commanding what was right) rather than focusing on negative Islamic teaching (forbidding what was wrong). Furthermore, the objectives were to motivate individuals to have piety, noble character, broad insight, and awareness of social realities, as well as possess knowledge, openness, and a polite and inclusive personality.

Islamic teachings formed the subject of da'wah, comprehended in the framework of Indonesian identity, Islam, as well as modernity, comprising religious, political, educational, and other themes, all based on piety towards Allah. The content included the necessity of constantly renewing Islam through secularization, liberalization, and rationalization as efforts to contextualize Islamic teachings. This laid the foundations for democracy, pluralism, human rights, the realization of civil society, the development of intellectualism, the cultivation of divine awareness, and religious devotion through education, among other aspects.

The strenuous efforts made by Cak Nur regarding da'wah and Islam were closer to the substance of da'wah and the ethical values of Islamic teachings. However, this ideal passed through stages of arduous struggle by exploring the epistemology in the Islamic tradition. The exploration included the application of dialogical methods such as *jadali* or *burhani* providing space for thought and the intellectual development of the community in a historical-sociological context. Therefore, the universal messages of Islamic teachings could be implemented contextually in a specific time and space, targeting a more elite audience such as intellectuals and educated society.

Part 2

Ulama Between Local Custom and Intellectual Tradition¹

This article traces the works of pesantren's ulama in West Java and highlights their textual and contextual characteristics. These works especially of pesantren in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar. The method utilized is bibliographic survey and uses textual and contextual analysis as well as the physical condition of the works also is described. The results reveals that these *kitab*s and manuscripts, written in local languages such as Sundanese and Javanese using Pegon script, reflect a strategic effort to make Islamic teachings accessible to non-Arabic-speaking communities. The works are methodically structured to facilitate learning, employing mnemonic devices like *nazam* (rhymed verse) to aid memorization. Furthermore, the texts demonstrate significant intertextuality, referencing classical Islamic scholars while adapting their teachings to local contexts. The ulamas' works are characterized by a blend of Islamic scholarship and local cultural practices, ensuring their relevance and influence in the religious and intellectual life of their communities. This study also underscores the ulamas' role in preserving and transmitting Islamic knowledge while innovatively responding to the needs of their time.

¹ This paper was originally a joint paper with the title The Authentic Works of Ulama in West Java Pesantren: Between Local Custom and Intellectual Tradition 2023.

A. Introduction

Many studies have been undertaken concerning the works of the Nusantara *ulamas*. In 2018, for example, a team from the Centre for Religious Research and Development (Balai Litbang Agama) Jakarta conducted research on the works of West Javanese *ulamas*. This research is an effort to appreciate and revitalize the works of *ulamas*. It is a review of contents, especially those related to their religious understanding, to enhance the vision and practice of religious harmony (Bahri et al. 2018). Many archipelago *ulamas* write their texts in their respective *pesantrens*: whether in form of original essays, *khalasas* or summaries, *sharah* or explanations, *hashiya* or a kind side margin commentary on the previous works, as well as translations. (Bruinessen 1995) Most of the works of *ulamas* are written in Arabic, but some of them also use Malay and local languages. They also use Arabic, Jawi and Pegon (Sunda and Java) scripts (Bruinessen 1995).

Mikihiro Moriyama states that in the Sundanese region (West Java), printed books only begin to appear in 1850. Until the first two decades of the 21st century, about 2200 titles of Sundanese books were recorded. However, his research did not discuss religious books, especially in Arabic or Sundanese which are written in Pegon scripts. (Moriyama 2005: 274). The general inventory on *kitab*s in Southeast Asia, including that of West Java, was carried out by Kawashima Midori *et al.* (2015: 5, 18) in 2015, recording 1817 titles of *kitab*s consisting of 2500 volumes. This project focuses on *kitab*s from Muslim networks in Southeast Asia. Based on this catalogue, we find 27 *kitab*s in Sundanese and 44 *kitab*s in Sundanese and Arabic.

Scholars from Indonesia also made their contribution. Rosadi records 20 works of *ulamas* from Tasikmalaya, including 13 *kitab*s in Sundanese, 4 in Indonesians, 1 in Arabic, and 1 in Sundanese mixed with Arabic (Bahri et al. 2018: 94-95). Saefullah registers more number *kitab*s in Cianjur and Sukabumi, consisting of 141 *kitab*s: 46 *kitab*s in Sundanese, 42 *kitab*s in Arabic, 48 *kitab*s in Sundanese-Arabic, written in Pegon script, and 5 *kitab* in Arabic and Indonesian (Saefullah 2020: 302) Gunawan finds 11 Sundanese *kitab*s in Garut regency and he studied one of

the book by Kiai Muhyidin Limbangan (1903–1980), namely *Nadoman Akhlakul Karimah* (Gunawan 2019: 118).

Furthermore, Holil traces the work of ulama in Ciamis and records 13 works. His study focuses on works of Muhammad Abdul Gaos Saefulloh Maslul (more often called Abah Gaos, born 1363 H/1944 CE). He finds six works of Abah Gaos: two in Arabic and four in Indonesian (Holil, 2018, pp. 152–156). The specific research was conducted by Rohmana, who examines three printed *kitab*s in Cairo in Sundanese language with Pegon script, all of them are the works of Shaykh Mukhtar ‘Aarid al-Bug r (from Bogor, West Java). The *kitab*s are ‘*Aq’id Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jam’a* (1340/1921), *Kifyat al-Mubtadi’n* (1341/1922), and *Hid yat al-Mubtadi’n* (1346/1927), all published by Mus afá al-B b al-alab wa Awl duh in Cairo, Egypt (Rohmana, 2022, p. 2). Meanwhile, a study by Syarif is related to the contextualization of the *kitab kuning* in everyday life. He collects the *kitab kuning* used in the Pesantren Mifathul Huda, Tasikmalaya, and focuses on *Bab al-Jihad (Jihad Chapter)* of *Fathul Mu’in* and its contextualization (Tim Peneliti Balai Litbang Agama 2015).

In 2014, Pslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah Keagamaan (Center for Research and Development of Religious Literature and Heritage [CR&D RLH]), Ministry of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, had conducted a more exhaustive inventory of the work of *ulamas* from various regions (Tim Peneliti Puslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah Keagamaan 2014). The result of the inventory have been published in the *Katalog Karya-Karya Ulama Nusantara* (Tim Peneliti Puslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah Keagamaan, 2014). The two results of these studies differ: Syarif’s research is a contextual study of the work of scholars, while an inventory conducted by CR&D RLH is a collection of scholarly works whose results are published in the form of catalogue (catalogue is available at: <https://lektur.kemenag.go.id/karyaulamanusantara/>).

Our inventory of the works of ulama significantly impacts at least three things. *First*, *ulamas* designated as *ajengan*, *kiai* and *ustad* in West Java have had a central role from early Islamization in Indonesia, during the Dutch colonialization and after the independence of Indonesia. *Ulamas* have played a significant role in education and social movement, engaged in nation-building, and

influenced social and political development until nowadays. *Second*, the West Java region has its dynamics and dialectics regarding the role and function of ulamas, as witnessed in their texts and other *tangible* works in social development. *Third*, many ulama's ideas and aspirations show the intellectual property and high civilization of Muslims.

Regarding the condition of manuscripts, Chambert-Loir and Fathurahman state that Nusantara manuscripts are spread abroad, both in countries that have historical relations, such as the Netherlands and England, (Chambert-Loir dan Oman Fathurahman 1999: 8) as well as countries that do not have direct relations with Indonesia, such as Germany, Russia, and France. However, the information on *ulama* works is still fragmentary and does not represent the quantity or quality of Indonesian ulama, especially that of West Javanese ulama. The inventory of works of ulamas is necessary to complement the writing of Indonesian historiography (Baried et al. 1985: 95).

The study of ulama works remains essential. Their works are precious as an intellectual legacy that can be passed on to future generations, containing valuable information that, to some degree, can be contextualized according to the times. In this regard, the research questions are as follows: (1) How do the works of West Java pesantren ulamas, particularly from Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar, illustrate the integration of Islamic scholarship with local cultural and linguistic practices? And (2) In what ways do the *kitab*s and manuscripts produced by West Java ulamas respond to the historical, socio-cultural, and religious educational context of their time, and how does this cultural acculturation, along with the use of intertextuality, preserve Islamic tradition while addressing the needs of local communities?

B. Method

This study on the ulamas' works of West Java pesantren is qualitative. The method utilized is bibliographic survey and uses textual and contextual analysis as well as the physical condition of the works also is described. The following steps was undertaken both in gathering and analyzing data, namely: (1)

Inventorying, recording, collecting and describing the documents and the texts; (2) Categorizing the works by region, theme, language and script; (3) Analysing the textual and contextual on these works of West Javanese pesantren ulamas, especially in the maintenance and inheritance of Islamic scientific treasures and their contribution to the local custom and Islamic intellectual tradition. Our corpus gathered the works of pesantren ulamas from four regions in West Java, namely Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar

C. The Intellectual Treasures of Pesantren in West Java

Our study has succeeded in registering 150 works of *ulamas* in forms of *kitab* and book. Among them, we chose 40 works as a corpus of analysis. Based on this corpus, we will focus on works of *ulamas* which are not widely circulated, sold only in their respective Islamic boarding schools, and not for commercial purposes.

1. Works of Garut Ulamas


The literary contributions of the Garut ulamas can be traced through notable works such as those from Miftahusa'adah Kalipaksi and Pesantren Miftahul Hidayah. One significant work from Miftahusa'adah Kalipaksi is the *Kitab Ilmu Mantiq* (Science of Logic). This text serves as a guide to correct and thorough reasoning, offering teachings articulated in a simple, accessible language. The book begins with Al-Basmala and concludes with a profound statement: when a postulate addresses a concept in *Ilmu Mantiq*, a single sentence may convey multiple meanings depending on various perspectives. This complexity is due to the necessity of considering both the substantial information and the contextual elements embedded within a sentence. Notably, several pages of this manuscript include handwritten notes in Arabic and Sundanese. These notes are italicized and positioned on various pages, suggesting they are derived from the teachings of the kyai and his students.

Another important work is *Balaga al-Qur'an* (Qur'anic Rhetoric), which delves into the science of constructing Arabic words and sentences highlighting Arabic as a language of precision and beauty. This text also explores the application of Arabic based on situational contexts and provides guidance on translating and interpreting Qur'anic verses with respect to their inherent value and majesty. This manuscript was directly transcribed by the Kyai of Pesantren Miftahus Sa'adah, reflecting its authoritative origin. *Kitab Ilmu Mantiq (Logic Science)*; Right: *Balaga al-Qur'an (Qur'anic Rhetoric)* of Pesantren Miftahusa'adah (Source: Research Team 2022).

In Pesantren Miftahul Hidayah, a unique manuscript features a collection of student compositions in the *sisindiran* genre—a form similar to Malay *pantun* written in Sundanese and Indonesian. These rhymed verses were used by teachers and students as a medium for public speaking exercises and community engagement. The compositions draw on expressions from several Arabic texts, aiming to uplift spirits, alleviate boredom, and promote positive thinking, while guarding against negative perceptions of the surrounding environment.

Another valuable work is the *Pedoman Ilmu Falaq*, a guidebook used for determining the hilal (crescent moon) marking the beginning of Ramadan in 1413 H (1998 CE). This guide facilitated an *ijma'* (consensus) among ulamas on the sighting of the hilal for Ramadan that year. The book, written in Sundanese with Pegon script on A4-sized HVS paper, features varying line counts and is inscribed in Arabic script using the Naskhi style by a scholar named Izuddin. *Sisindiran* (Satire) in Sundanese and Indonesian languages (Research Team 2022).

Additionally, there is the *Kitab Waris* (The Book of Inheritance), which begins with a discussion on the proper distribution of inheritance, presented in tabular form with explanations in Sundanese. Beyond inheritance, this book details the seven-monthly ritual observed during pregnancy, outlining the procession leading up to childbirth and addressing scenarios such as stillbirth. The final page of the manuscript bears the signature of the author or copyist, Izzudin.



Kitab Waris (Book of Inheritance) (Source: Research Team, 2022)

2. Works of Tasikmalaya Ulamas

The region of Tasikmalaya is home to a significant number of scholarly works produced by local ulamas. The data collected includes contributions from various pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), such as Pesantren Al-Mubarakiyah Suryalaya (5 works), Pesantren Miftahul Huda Manonjaya (63 works), Pesantren Cipasung Singaparna (1 work), Pesantren Sukahideung (1 work), Pesantren Amanah Muhammadiyah (3 works), and Pesantren Mathla'ul Anwar Awipari (1 work). In total, 74 works from Tasikmalaya have been identified. Previous research by Rosadi recorded 20 works, bringing the total number of works by Tasikmalaya ulamas to 94.

One of the most famous charismatic kyai in Tasikmalaya is Abah Anom, whose full name is A. Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin. His works contain spiritual advice on the way of treatment of drug and narcotics crime. In the book *"At-Tanbih" dari Masa ke Masa* (*"At-Tanbih" from Time to Time*, ۲۰۰۵) by R. Mamat Rachmat, it is explained, «The will of the founder of Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya about the Guidance of Life Attitudes that Must Be Carried out by All Components of the Big Family of Pesantren Suryalaya in a Real Way in the Daily Life.» (Rachmat MT, 2005). As Harold Dwight Lasswell shows in his communication model, a message is considered essential and valuable. The communication will depend mainly on related elements, such

as: who is the message giver (*who*), the source of the message (*sources*), what is the message channel (*which channel*), what the message is (*what*), how the message is given (*how*) and *to whom* the message is addressed, *when* and *where* the message is conveyed, as well as through what media the message is delivered (*media*), and what is the effect (*effect*) (Lasswell 1938, 1948: 117).

The title “*Tanbih*” can be linguistically interpreted as “reminder” (Sundanese: *pépe'ling*), intended to remind adherents of the noble values in Islamic life. The *Tanbih* contains the will of the founder of Pesantren Suryalaya, starting from Ahmad Mubarak (Abah Sepuh) to A. Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin (Abah Anom). Structurally, the *Tanbih* written by Abah Anom resembles a letter (testament) addressed to the brotherhood of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah Order (QNO) and to Muslims in general. The QNO, an official order embraced by both Abah Sepuh and Abah Anom, is particularly emphasized in this testament, which succinctly outlines the practices for achieving happiness and goodness in the afterlife. The *Tanbih* testament represents a significant contribution to the Islamic thought of West Javanese ulamas, particularly Abah Sepuh and Abah Anom. The Book of *Miftah al-Sudur* by A. Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin (Abah Anom) (Saepuloh 2021 and Sya'ban 2021; Saepuloh 2021; Sya'ban 2021).

In addition to the testament in *Tanbih*, another prominent work by Abah Anom is *Miftah al-Sudur* (The Key of the Heart). This *kitab* (book) is intended for QNO members both domestically and abroad, providing them with clarity and ease in learning and practicing the teachings, ultimately leading to peace of mind in this life and victory in the hereafter. Among the reference sources for this *kitab* are classic works such as *Sirr al-Asrar*, *Khazina al-Asrar*, *Al-Gunya li Talib Tariq al-Haqq*, *Qalaid al-Jawahir*, *Al-Fuyudat al-Rabbaniya*, and *Fath al-'Arifin*, along with the teachings of deeply knowledgeable and pious ulamas who are well-versed in the knowledge of God.

Some other notable works from Tasikmalaya include:

- a. *Mift as-Sur r Li at-Tabarruk fi ar q ar-Rabb al-Gaf r al-Majm ' min Kal m al-'Ulam ' al-Kib r ma'a al-Faq r il 'afwi Rabb al-Qad r*, Juz 1 and 2, by A. Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin,

- in Arabic, published by PT. Mudawwamah Warohmah, Suryalaya Tasikmalaya, 1990 AD/1411 H.
- b. *Ibadah Sebagai Methoda Pembinaan Korban Penyalahgunaan Narkotika dan Kenakalan Remaja Khusus untuk Ikhwah TQN* (Worship as a Method of Fostering Victims of Narcotics Abuse and Juvenile Delinquency Specifically for the QNO Brotherhood), by A. Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin, in Indonesian, published by PT. Mudawwamah, 2015.
 - c. *Pengajaran Aq'id al-m n* (Teaching on Aq'id al-m n), by Choer Affandy, Pesantren Miftahul Huda, Manonjaya, Tasikmalaya, in Arabic and Sundanese with Arabic and Latin scripts. Contains an explanation of twenty characteristics of God: obligatory qualities for Allah and His Messenger.
 - d. *al-Mas'il al-Fiqhiyya*, by Faqih Zainuddin from Pesantren Amanah Muhammadiyah, 1442 H/2021 AD, in Indonesian and Arabic. This text offers explanations of fiqh related to purification, prayer, zakat, fasting, Hajj, and Umrah, as well as prayers and postulates from the Qur'an and hadith.
 - e. *Praktek Hisab Sistem Ephemeris dengan Scientific Calculator*, by Asep Zainy Arief, in Indonesian. This book covers the science of determining the qibla direction, calculating the beginning of the Hijri month, the start of Ramadan, Shawwal, and Zulhijah, and predicting lunar and solar eclipses.
 - f. *Kitab Na am Sunda: Ilmu Tasawuf*, by Asmaul Husna, Pesantren Mathla'ul Khoer, Cintapada. This work discusses Sufism in the form of verse (na m) using Pegon script in Sundanese. It addresses the prevention of bad behaviors and despicable qualities, and at the end, mentions several *kyai* who have corrected the contents of the *kitab*.

3. Works of Ciamis Ulamas

The ulamas of Ciamis have a long-standing tradition of writing that continues to thrive. This tradition has been passed down from the founders of pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) to their descendants and students. The pesantrens in Ciamis with such rich traditions include Darussalam, Nurul Ilmi, Raudhatul Irfan, Cikanyere, Miftahul Khoir, and Al-Huda. Through recent

research, 56 works have been identified from these pesantrens. Unfortunately, some manuscripts from Pesantren Nurul Iman have been lost or destroyed due to inadequate preservation. These works encompass prayers, religious texts (*kitab*s), and teaching materials (Abdul Jalil 2022).

Pesantren Darussalam Ciamis is located on Jl. K.H. Ahmad Fadlil No.1, Dewasari, Cijeungjing District, Ciamis Regency, West Java. Founded in 1929 by Ahmad Fadlil, the leadership has since passed down through three generations. After Ahmad Fadlil, his son, Irfan Hielmy, a well-respected ulama, took over. Following Irfan Hielmy's passing, the pesantren came under the Board of Trustees, which includes Fadlil Munawwar, Euis Fadhilah Jauhar Nafisah and Fadhil Yani Ainusyamsi (Admin 2022).

Among the significant works from Pesantren Darussalam, there is one manuscript, four *kitab*s published by the pesantren, one sheet containing prayers and *zikir* (remembrance of God), and two pocketbooks. According to Fadhil Yani, there exists a manuscript titled *Majmu' al-Wa y*, which delves into Sufism ethics (Ainusyam, 2022). This manuscript, along with other works in the form of *kitab*s, is primarily written in Arabic. The pocketbooks are written in both Indonesian and Arabic, and the nationally published works adhere to the guidelines set by publishers within the Indonesian Publishers Association (IKAPI). The language used in these published works is Indonesian, written in Latin script.



Manuscript of *Majmu' al-Wa y* (Source: Research Team 2022)

The *Majmu' al-Wa y* manuscript is particularly notable. It remains under the care of Fadhil Yani, the third-generation leader of the pesantren, and continues to be used for specialized

recitations for prospective pesantren leaders. These recitations are directly led by Fadhil Yani and are attended by students from both the Ciamis area and beyond. Locally published *kitab*s serve as references for these recitations, particularly during Ramadan, while the nationally published books are used as reference materials at the Darussalam Islamic Institute.

Pesantren Nurul Iman, located in Lumbunggirang, Lumbungsari Village, Kawali District, Ciamis Regency, was founded by Kyai Endang Kosidin in 1972. This is a traditional *salaf* pesantren, meaning it adheres strictly to classical Islamic teachings and does not offer formal schooling. According to Kyai Maman Abdul Jalil, the pesantren is currently led by Kyai Iyus Saepuddin. The *kitab*s studied here include *Saf'na al-Naj*, *Fat al-Mu'n*, *Tijan Darari*, *La 'if al-Isy ra*, *Tafs r Jal layn*, *Bid ya al-Hid ya*, and *Iy' 'Ulm al-D n*.

From Pesantren Nurul Ilmi, three manuscripts and two *kitab*s have been discovered. These *kitab*s, not published but reproduced through photocopying, include texts such as prayers and *zikr*, commonly practiced among students and the local community. The manuscripts feature a variety of themes, including a Qur'anic *mushaf* (copy of the Qur'an), the history of the Prophet Muhammad, and a manuscript containing *dangdanggula*, a type of Sundanese poetry.

The language used in these manuscripts and *kitab*s is Sundanese, written in Pegon script. Pegon, a script combining Arabic letters with Sundanese phonetics, was widely used in pesantrens during the 18th and 19th centuries and remains in use today. The use of the Sundanese language and Pegon script reflects the broader intention to make these texts accessible not only to students within the pesantren but also to the general public, particularly in the context of religious outreach (*da'wah*).

Two of the *kitab*s from Pesantren Nurul Ilmi are written in Arabic with additional explanations in Indonesian, indicating that they were intended for both pesantren students and the general public. These *kitab*s were not formally published but were reproduced by photocopying.

The Qur'anic manuscript originally served as teaching material for Arabic calligraphy, while the manuscript containing

dangdanggula was used for student recitations. Although the *dangdanggula* manuscript is no longer in use, it remains stored in the home of Mr. Maman Abdul Jalil.

Pesantren Raudlatul Irfan, located at Jl. General Ahmad Yani No. 257, Kertasari, Ciamis, aims to produce Islamic entrepreneurs students who are both knowledgeable in religious matters (*faqih*) and skilled in entrepreneurship. To achieve this, the pesantren has established a formal education system known as Pesantren Irfani Quranicpreneur Bilingual School (QBS).

From Pesantren Raudlatul Irfan, six works have been identified, including one book, two books translated into Sundanese, Indonesian, and English, and three published books. The *Book of 'Aq da al-'Aw m* contains *nadoman* (rhymed verse), written in Arabic, and is commonly used in recitations. The book focuses on the creed or belief in God. Two other *kitab*s, translations of *Safina al-Najat* (a book on Islamic jurisprudence) and *Tijan al-Darari* (a book on Islamic theology), have been translated into Sundanese, Indonesian, and English. The remaining three *kitab*s are popular Islamic studies texts; *Kitab Aqidat al-'Awwam*, *the Translation of Tijan* *the Translation of Safinah* (Research Team 2022).

Except for *'Aq da al-'Aw m*, all these works serve as teaching materials. In contrast, some of the popular books authored by Irfan Soleh, such as *Tijan Ad-Darari* (Irfani Method), *Safinah* (Irfani Method), and *Konsep Pendidikan Berbasis Adab (Menurut Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas)* (Concept of Adab-Based Education [According to Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas]), are intended for academic use by scholars and the general public.

From Pesantren Cikanyere, we have cataloged 26 manuscripts and ancient *kitab*s that serve as historical evidence of the enduring scholarly tradition within this pesantren. Some of these *kitab*s include:


- a. *Ilmu Fara'i (The Science of Inheritance)*: Written in Arabic script and language, this manuscript discusses the division of inheritance according to Islamic law. Although the text is legible, the author's name and date of writing are not provided. The cover bears the inscription, "nuzul l-Qur'an ta'wil nusub l-faraid," written on additional paper.

- b. *Wasiat KH Jalalusuyuthi (Testament of KH Jalalusuyuthi)*: This manuscript, written in Sundanese and Arabic with a mix of Pegon, Latin, and Arabic scripts, documents financial accounts from 1981 to 1982. The cover includes the title “Wasiat of Jalalusuyuthi” on additional paper and the inscription in Pegon script: “Pembukuan syahriah asup kaluarna duit tahun 1981-1982” (Sharia Accounting of money debit and credit in 1981-1982). The text includes various financial records, ranging from expenditures to debits.
- c. *Tarbiyatul Awlad (Children’s Education)*: This work, written in Sundanese and Arabic with Pegon and Arabic scripts, discusses children’s education, focusing on the rights and obligations of both children and parents.
- d. *Al-Qur’an Tarjamah Logat Sunda (Qur’anic Translation in Sundanese)*: This work, written by Jalaluddin Suyuthi on June 28th, 1951 CE, in Sundanese and Arabic with Pegon and Arabic scripts, contains the translation of the Qur’an, specifically Surah al-Baqarah, verses 61-121. The ulamas of Pesantren Miftahul Khoir, located in Pasirkadu, Baregbeg District, Ciamis, have also contributed significant works:
- e. *Kitab Aq’id Al- m n (The Principles of Faith)*: Written in Sundanese with Pegon script, this manuscript was copied by Barul Irfan from Kyai Mali Ibrahim and is currently stored in Pesantren Miftahul Khoer Pasirkadu. The *kitab* covers the principles of *tawhid* (Islamic monotheism), discussing the obligatory attributes of God, the impossible nature of God, and various theological concepts. It is divided into three parts, addressing the attributes of Allah, the obligatory and impossible qualities of the prophets, and the details of the twenty attributes of God. Unfortunately, the text is incomplete.
- f. *Walimatul ‘Urs (Wedding Ceremony)*: This printed edition, found in Pesantren Miftahul Khoer Pasirkadu, is written in Latin and Arabic scripts. The text provides a concise guide to marriage contracts (*‘aqad al-nikah*), including marriage sermons and traditional Sundanese marriage customs.

4. Works of Banjar Ulama

In the district of Banjar, several prominent ulamas and their pesantrens have produced significant scholarly works. These contributions reflect a deep engagement with Islamic sciences and practices, many of which continue to be used in educational and religious settings today.


- a. *Nahwu Jawan* by Abdurrahim, Pesantren Miftahul Huda al-Azhar, Citangkolo: This *kitab* is a collection of Nahwu (Arabic grammar) science presented in the Javanese *nadoman* (verse) form. It covers various chapters including *kalam* (sentence structure), *i'rab* (inflection) and its signs, *fi'il* (verb) divisions, *nakirah-ma'rifah* (indefinite-definite), *fa'il* (subject), *mubtada-khabar* (subject-predicate), and many other essentials to the study of Arabic grammar.
- b. *Amaliyah Thoriqoh Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyah* (*The Practices of the Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyah Order*) by Hasan Habibie, Pesantren al-Riyadloh as-Sanusiyyah, Pasir Lening: This work is a guide for the practices followed by the members of the Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyah Sufi order, recited during the *Jam'iyah Thariqah* (gatherings of the Sufi order).



Kitab Amaliyah Thoriqoh Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyah (Source: Research Team, 2022)

- c. *Khutbah Jum'at* (*Friday Sermon*) by Kholil Ayah Banjar, Pesantren Minhajul Karomah, Cibeunteur: This Arabic *khutbah* emphasizes the importance of consuming halal food and avoiding haram food, reflecting on the spiritual significance of dietary laws in Islam. *Khutbah Jum'at* (*Friday Sermon*), by Kholil Ayah Banjar (Research Team 2022).

- d. *Bait Mahalul-Qiyam* by Kholil Ayah Banjar, Pesantren Minhajul Karomah: This work includes verses of *qasidah* recited during the Barzanji (a traditional recitation in praise of the Prophet Muhammad), used in religious gatherings.
- e. *Na am Na wu Jawan Mu fa a al-ibyn* by Kyai Muhaimin, Pesantren Tabridul Qulub, Cibonte, Situbatu, Banjar City: This Javanese *nazam* (verse) on Nahwu was written in 1991 with assistance from Ust Zainuddin Tamsir from Jombang. It continues to be used by students today for learning Arabic grammar.



Nazam Nahwu Jawan Muhāfazah al-Sibyan (Source: Research Team 2022)

- f. *Penegakan Syariat Islam 1-4* by Abal Fuqoro (pseudonym of Muhtadin), Mekarsari, Banjar District, Banjar City: This series of pocketbooks, published in 2003, outlines the foundations of Islamic law and leadership, focusing on the unity of the Muslim community, political Islam, Islamic leadership, and the application of Islamic law, drawing extensively on the Qur'an and Sunnah.
- g. *Langkah Nubuawah Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Politik* (*Prophetic Steps Towards the Victory of Political Preaching*) by Umung Anwar Sanusi: Published by Hidayat Ilahi Publishing in 2008, this book by the founder of Pesantren Al-Kautsar, Banjar, explores the strategies for achieving success in political preaching, reflecting his experience as a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Other notable works by him include *Rahasia di Balik Rukun Islam Rukun Iman*

(2021) and *Hayatul Mukmin: Konsep Hidup Ideal Seorang Mukmin* (2022).

- h. *Mengenal Gerakan Ahmadiyah (Introduction to the Ahmadiyya Movement)* by M Nasir Gazaliy, Pataruman, Banjar City: This treatise offers a historical explanation of the Ahmadiyya movement and its teachings, aimed at countering its influence. Another related work is his Friday sermon text titled *Menyikapi Ujaran Kebencian Seorang Pendeta* (Responding to a Pastor's Hate Speech), addressing religious intolerance.

5. Textual Content of the Pesantren's Ulama of West Java

The kitabs authored by pesantren ulamas in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar exhibit a deep engagement with Islamic scholarship, blending traditional sciences with local wisdom to make Islamic teachings accessible and relevant to their communities. The choice of language and script, particularly the use of Sundanese and Javanese in Pegon script, reflects an intentional adaptation of Islamic teachings to the local linguistic context, making these texts more accessible to the non-Arabic-speaking population (Erihadiana 2019: 44; Morrow 2013). For example, the *Kitab Aq'id Al-m'n* from Pesantren Miftahul Khoir uses Sundanese with Pegon script, integrating local linguistic practices with Islamic theological teachings.

These kitabs are often structured to facilitate learning, employing clear headings and systematic organization to address various aspects of religious knowledge, such as theology, jurisprudence, and grammar. The *Kitab Ilmu Fara'id* by Muslih Abdurrahman and Ade Mansur, which deals with inheritance law, exemplifies this methodical approach, ensuring that students can navigate complex topics effectively (Berkey 1992).

Pedagogically, these texts utilize traditional Islamic educational techniques, such as the use of *nazam* (rhymed verse), which aids memorization and oral transmission a crucial aspect of Islamic education (Prasetia 2024; Rosenthal 1961). For instance, *Na am Na wu Jawan Mu fa a al- iby n* by Kyai Muhaimin, written in *nazam* form, helps students memorize the rules of Arabic

grammar. Intertextuality is another defining characteristic of these kitabs. They frequently reference classical Islamic texts and scholars while incorporating local interpretations. This practice situates the kitabs within the broader Islamic scholarly tradition and adapts teachings to the local context. *Nahwu Jawan* by Abdurrahim, for example, integrates Javanese linguistic elements with principles of Arabic grammar, linking local learning with the wider Islamic intellectual heritage. It is said that “Utilizing local wisdom aids in the successful implementation of community empowerment...” (Sutomo et al. 2024: 146).

The kitabs also demonstrate an acculturation of Islamic teachings with local cultural practices, particularly in rituals and social norms. For instance, Kholil Ayah Banjar’s *Bait Mahalul-Qiyam* includes verses from *qasidah* recited during the Barzanji ceremony, reflecting the integration of Islamic rituals with local cultural traditions (Geertz 1968; Nurdin 2016).

The theological and jurisprudential content of these kitabs underscores the ulamas’ roles as scholars and legal authorities. These texts delve into Islamic law, theology, and ethics, offering authoritative guidance on their interpretation and practice. The *Kitab Ilmu Fara’id*, for instance, explains the rules of inheritance, grounding them in the Qur’an and Sunnah to ensure a comprehensive understanding of Islamic law (Sunardi 2013; Tendi et al. 2019).

Finally, these kitabs are tailored to meet the specific needs of their local audiences, addressing topics, languages, and issues relevant to their communities. For example, *Walimatul ‘Urs* from Pesantren Miftahul Khoir aligns Islamic legal practices with Sundanese marriage customs, facilitating the integration of religious and cultural practices (Geertz 1968).

6. Historical, Social-Cultural, dan Religious Educational Contexts

Apart from their textual content, the kitabs of West Java ulamas must be understood within the broader socio-religious, cultural, and historical contexts in which they were produced. These texts reflect not only the religious scholarship of the ulamas but also

the ways in which Islamic teachings were adapted to meet the needs of local communities.

The period during which these kitabs were written is significant for understanding their content and purpose. Many of these works were produced during a time of considerable social and political change in Indonesia, particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This era was marked by the consolidation of Dutch colonial rule, the spread of modern education, and the rise of nationalist movements. The ulamas responded to these changes by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic knowledge and values, often through the production of religious texts that reinforced traditional Islamic teachings as well as Islamic principles and values (Mawardi & Ruhayah 2022: 165). Understanding the historical context in which these manuscripts were produced is crucial for interpreting their content and purpose, particularly in relation to socio-political changes and the spread of Islam, such as teaching Islam in Pesantren (Ali 2014; Ricklefs 2006). For example, the kitab *Penegakan Syariat Islam 1-4* by Abal Fuqoro (pseudonym of KH Muhtadin) reflects the socio-political concerns of its time, particularly the struggle for the application of Islamic law within a modern state. The text's focus on unity, political Islam, and leadership demonstrates the ulamas' engagement with the challenges of modernity and their desire to preserve Islamic values in a rapidly changing world.

These kitabs were also written in a context where Islam was deeply intertwined with local cultural practices. Recognizing the importance of cultural relevance, the ulamas often adapted Islamic teachings to align with local customs and traditions. This cultural acculturation evident in how Islamic rituals and teachings were integrated with Sundanese and Javanese cultural practices. The use of the Pegon script, a modified Arabic script used to write in local languages, exemplifies this cultural adaptation. *Kitab Aq'id Al-m'n* from Pesantren Miftahul Khoir, written in Sundanese using the Pegon script, reflects this cultural adaptation. By writing in a script and language familiar to the local population, the ulama ensured that Islamic teachings were accessible and could be integrated into the everyday lives of their communities. The interaction between Islam and local

cultural practices in West Java is a key factor in the adaptation of Islamic teachings to local contexts (Ricklefs 2007).

In the religious educational context, pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in West Java played a crucial role in the preservation and transmission of Islamic knowledge. These institutions were centers of religious education where students learned not only the fundamentals of Islam but also the Arabic language, classical Islamic sciences, and local religious practices. The kitabs produced by the ulamas served as essential educational tools within these institutions, helping to standardize religious instruction and ensure the continuity of Islamic learning. The role of pesantren as centers of Islamic learning in West Java is central to the preservation and transmission of Islamic knowledge (Azra 2013; Dhofier 2011; Hasanah 2015). For example, the kitab *Nahwu Jawan* by Abdurrahim, which deals with Arabic grammar, was used as a textbook in pesantren to teach students the foundational elements of the Arabic language. This reflects the importance placed on mastering Arabic as the language of the Qur'an and Islamic scholarship, even within a predominantly non-Arabic-speaking community.

Furthermore, the intellectual tradition in West Java, as reflected in these kitabs, was deeply rooted in classical Islamic scholarship while also being responsive to local needs and contemporary issues (Hooker 1984). The ulamas drew upon the rich heritage of Islamic jurisprudence, theology, and Sufism, often referencing classical scholars and texts in their works. However, they also adapted these teachings to address contemporary issues and the specific concerns of their communities. For example, the kitab *Ilmu Fara'id* by KH. Muslih Abdurrahman and Ade Mansur, which discusses Islamic inheritance law, not only draws from classical Islamic jurisprudence but also addresses practical issues relevant to the local context. The detailed explanation of inheritance laws reflects the ulamas' role as legal authorities and their responsibility to ensure that Islamic law is applied correctly within their communities.

The kitabs written by West Java ulamas from Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar are deeply embedded in the socio-religious, cultural, and educational contexts of their time.

These texts not only preserve and transmit Islamic knowledge but also reflect the ulamas' responses to the challenges and opportunities presented by their environment. By adapting Islamic teachings to local customs, addressing contemporary issues, and using accessible language and literary forms, the ulamas ensured that their writings remained relevant and influential in their communities. These *kitab*s are a testament to the dynamic interplay between Islamic scholarship and local culture in West Java, illustrating the ulamas' pivotal role in shaping the religious and intellectual landscape of the region

D. Conclusion

The works of ulamas of West Java *pesantren* in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, and Banjar offer deep insights into the region's Islamic scholarship and its interaction with local culture. These *kitab*s and manuscripts, reflecting a blend of Islamic knowledge and local traditions, were designed to preserve and transmit religious teachings in a way that was accessible to local communities. By using local languages like Sundanese and Javanese in Pegon script, the ulamas made Islamic teachings understandable to non-Arabic speakers. The structured organization and use of mnemonic devices like *nazam* facilitated learning and memorization, aligning with traditional Islamic educational practices. Contextually, these works are rooted in the socio-religious, cultural, and political landscapes of their time. They served as educational tools and responses to the challenges faced by the ulamas and their communities. Through cultural acculturation, the ulamas adapted Islamic teachings to fit local customs, ensuring their relevance and continued practice. The *kitab*s also exhibit intertextuality, referencing classical Islamic scholars while integrating local interpretations, highlighting the ulamas' roles as both preservers of tradition and innovators. The works of West Java ulamas represent a rich tradition of Islamic scholarship that is deeply rooted in classical knowledge while being responsive to local cultural contexts. These texts exemplify how religious knowledge can be adapted to meet the needs of diverse communities, ensuring the continued relevance and influence of Islamic teachings in the region

Part 3

Idealism and Practices of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia¹

This article describes a new method of viewing a historical phenomenon based on its social significance. This method enabled us to classify and analyze a group in a context simultaneously and chronologically. Using historical phenomenology, the authors found a polarization of Chinese Muslims' thoughts and practices in the Indonesian context. As an example, we illustrate the technique of classification of Islamic thoughts to discover Chinese Muslim figures' religious activities. Our method allows us to improve social investigation deeply into Chinese Muslim formal religious life. The new method effectiveness evaluation is confirmed by the calculation of the polarization of Chinese Muslim religiousness leading to the fragmentation and diversification of Indonesian Chinese Muslims, either in the realm of politics, economic practices, or Islamic rituals. New research results improve understanding on how a social history of an ethnicity could grow and assimilate in a context. The assimilation could contribute to religious harmony in such a pluralistic country as Indonesia and can be used for making a social decision better. Especially related to the lives of minorities who urgently need by policymakers and stakeholders in accommodating the rights of those who are still in the process of towards fairer recognition.

¹ This paper was originally a joint paper with the title *The spiritual experience of Chinese Muslim minorities post-1998 reformation: A study of Chinese Muslims becoming Indonesians* published in the HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies journal in 2022

A. Introduction

The existence of the Chinese minority in Indonesia has returned to hot discourse after some violence, property destruction, looting, and expulsion of them occurred, causing many concerns around the relationship between communities in Indonesia, as happened in Jakarta in 1998 (Panggabean 2018). This incident reminds us of a similar incident in 1912, when ethnic Chinese rioted in Indonesia. In Indonesian society, battles between ethnicities, races, and religions are quite open if they are not carefully managed (Anggraeni 2017). Ethnic Chinese have played an essential role in political and even religious life in Indonesia. The role of Chinese ethnicity is almost in every element of social structure (Blackburn 2013). However, negative stereotypes and prejudice against them have not stopped until now (Marista 2019). Issues related to Chinese ethnicity are not dim but are getting stronger and become a state discourse in the national, even international discourse regarding their rights as citizens and nation.

The study of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia is arguably still lacking. Studies related to Chinese Muslims are generally still a “reactive” record to political events due to conflict and are usually followed by acts of riots and violence against ethnic Chinese (Panggabean 2018), (Raharjo 2005) and (Titulanita 2015). Due to too much emphasis on historical studies, what was revealed by previous studies was about tragic social events such as conflicts in society (Alfarabi 2010), (Judita 2015), Chin and Tanasaldy 2019), (Panggabean and Smith 2011) and Coppel 1994). Phenomenological studies can bring up other things besides conflict incidents, such as the conversion of Chinese people, the assimilation of Chinese culture into Indonesian culture, and the like (Suryadinata 1978), (Purdey 2010), (Wulansari 2015). But with this phenomenological historical study all events can reveal themselves so that they can speak to the public. This is the aim of this article, namely to expose phenomenologically what happened to the history of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. With this aim, it is necessary to openly read history from the point of view of its phenomenon, which is not always political, group, or structural; but it can be ethnic, personal, or cultural.

Thus, the presentation of what happened to the Chinese entering Islam, as the religion of the majority of the Indonesian nation, is important to reveal the existence of this in Indonesian history. And with the phenomenological disclosure of history, the inevitable fact will be opened up that the Chinese have become part of the Indonesian nation from a cultural perspective, and not merely from an economic perspective (Die 1981), (Karmela and Pamungkas 2017), (Musianto 2003), (Mahfud 2014), (Booth 2011) and (Mackie 1993).

B. Materials

This research is based on the paradigm of qualitative research methodology with deductive analysis (Filius, De Kleijn, Uijl, Prins, Rijen, Grobbee 2018). The purpose of this research is also qualitative in the sense that it is to understand certain situations, events, groups, or social interactions of Chinese Muslims in Indonesian milieu (Lane, Rohan, Sabeti, Essex, Maddess, Dawel, robbins, Barnes and Kone 2018). This was an investigative process in which researchers gradually understand social phenomena by differentiating, comparing, reproducing, cataloging, and classifying research objects (Malik, Jalal, Rahim and Kahal 2020). The nature of the problem itself requires the use of qualitative research (Thirsk & Clark 2017). Here knowledge and interpretation of the meaning of relevant facts or facts can be obtained through literacy, observation and documentation (Rahman & Saebani 2018). Research objectives to be achieved are to gain an understanding of the meaning of the local community and its current application. Historical phenomenology provides a systematic view of the phenomena, which in this case is the Chinese Muslim community in Indonesia (Mitchell 2020) and (Wassler & Kirillova 2019).

C. Research and Discussion

The political attitude of the Chinese ethnics, in the sense of a political movement, came to the fore when they carried out 'defiance' against the Dutch colonial government in Jakarta, which was known as 'geger pacinan' (Blackburn 2013). They are

more focused on business, although this has implications for politics. Chinese ethnicity's general political strategy is bottom-up in the context of politics and culture, and not the other way around, or at least it is 'hybridized' (Efferin & Hopper 2007). Anti-Chinese sentiment, which was dominated by political factors accumulated, occurred in May 1998. The Chinese ethnic group was affected (Hutahaeen 2014). They have to rebuild from scratch, including the renovation of shopping buildings and traumatic aspects that must be restored. Referring to the latest findings, the Chinese ethnic group's economic activities have been around for a long time. They have become part of the financial group in the archipelago. They are hardworking ethnic types, have a positive, disciplined, and pragmatic attitude (Kahn 1974) and (Hch'ng 1995). Some experts suspect their religious beliefs contribute to their economic activities, namely Confucianism (Suryadinata 2002)

They have various businesses, such as trading, large and small, grocery, wholesalers, pawnshops, and mobile debtors. (Faber 1931) They have a positive attitude, so that their economic activities have social and political implications in economic life, as happened in Surabaya (Musianto 2003). Their tendency to do business activities does not occur casually but is inherited continuously, which then forms the character of a high work ethic (Feber 1931) and (Komari 2019).

Ethnic Chinese received recognition through a long process, especially mention in the public area during the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur (Wahid 1991). This moment is an entry point for the Tionghoa ethnic group's political change, which has been culturally long, including Chinese Muslims (Fredman 2003). The Chinese identity is increasingly visible and freely expressed in the public arena after the 1998 reform and the Soeharto regime's fall (Turner and Allen 2007). This momentum is a response to democratization and freedom for the Chinese minority who were previously locked up. Changes in regulations related to foreigners and the political will are the government's claimed to be an effective way to develop ethnic Chinese, including Muslim Chinese, as happened in Yogyakarta (Maulana 2011).

Other studies related to Chinese ethnicity focus more on the strategic process of how Chinese people become “Indonesian” as a whole, such as the assimilation strategy. The politics of assimilation to integration are carried out through various methods and approaches by ethnic Chinese minorities, such as assimilation through religious and belief approaches, politics and cultural practices (Maulana 2011) and (Purdey 2011). Even the political activities of ethnic Chinese Muslims existed before independence through Kho Tjeng Bie in 1913 through Sarekat Islam (SI). SI is a social organization and a political organization, so it has close ties with the Muslim Chinese ethnic group. Personal Chinese Muslim political activities are concentrated at the national level, such as Jakarta and the regions. Chinese Muslim businessman Budi Sarwono has advanced to become the regent of Banjarnegara. Mochamad Anton in Malang, East Java, is also a Chinese Muslim who is active in politics (Muzzaki 2010).

The political reforms in Indonesia in 1998 that had ended the New Order regime had opened wider opportunities for the Indonesian people to aspire to politics. The participation of ethnic Chinese in politics in the case of the election for the Governor of Jakarta, for example, exceeded 41.9% (Hew 2017). There is no ‘Chinese way to become Muslim’ in Indonesia, according to Hew. Chinese identity and Islamic religiosity need not imply racial segregation and religious exclusion. Chinese Muslims spread to various socio-religious organizations and political parties (Hew 2018). Hew’s study helps better understand the cultural politics of Muslim and Chinese identity in Indonesia and offers a unique insight into Muslim cultural politics and Chinese identity in Southeast Asia today. Hew’s study above goes beyond the previous analysis regarding transnational connections, trans-local imaginations, and local Chinese Muslim identity negotiations in contemporary Indonesia (Hew 2014).

Chinese Muslim leaders have forged a distinctive trans-local identity through transnational relations with Muslims in China. The global imagination attempts to redefine Chinese Muslims. There has been a polarization of understanding of Chinese Muslim Islam both within and outside the Indonesian Chinese Islamic Association. The symptoms of polarization and

fragmentation need to be addressed. The ‘older generation’ and the current generation of Chinese Muslims on a different side.

The Chinese are immigrants from China and have been around for a long time. They have lived in Java around the 1600s. They work as traders, travelers, farm laborers, and manage small businesses, such as coffee, cocoa, tobacco, and rubber (Hew 2014). The colonial government controlled every community activity by breaking and creating strict rules. The Governor-General of the Netherlands in 1825 divided the population into non-Asian, ethnic Chinese, European, Indian Arabs, and natives (Bailey and Lie 2013). Separating between “native” and non-native. Non-Asians are prohibited from living in Java, including ethnic Chinese in their native environment. This racial classification lasted until after Indonesian independence. Indigenous or not differences occurred until the next generation during the Old Order period until the new regulations in the 1950s (Phoa 1992).

In general, ethnic Chinese adhere to Chinese culture (Wilmott 1961). The Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) in the last population census shows that Indonesia consisted of 1,128 ethnic groups. Ethnic Chinese is one of the ethnic minorities totaling around 11 million people. Their ancestors came from mainland China, especially from the Guangdong, Hokkien, and Hainan areas, who later settled in Indonesia through marriage (Chen 2015).

In 1628 the number of ethnic Chinese residents in Batavia was only 3000 people. Then in 1739, it increased to 10,574. Of the total population in Java in 1815, namely 4,615,270 people, there were 94,441 people (2.04%) who were ethnic Chinese. In 1999, the number increased by 3.0 percent of the total Indonesian population at that time of 209,255,000, or around 6,278,000 who were of Chinese descent divided into several subgroups (Suryadinata 2002), (Wijayakusuma 2005).

Based on dialect, ethnic Chinese are divided into Hakka Chinese, Hokkian, Tiochui, Cantonese, and Hainanese Chinese, mostly from four ethnic groups, namely Hokkian, Hakka or Kheh, Tiu-Chiu, and people from Cantonese cities. The Hokkian group generally lived in trade, while the Cantonese were also

active in carpentry and technology and trade. Hakka groups work in mining, so many of them live in mining areas, such as Bangka Belitung and Palangkaraya. The Tiochiu group is generally active in the plantation business (Suryadinata 2002), (Purcell 1987).

Based on their domicile area, ethnic Chinese are divided into Medan Chinese, Javanese Chinese, Kalimantan Chinese, Bangka Chinese, and others. Based on the origin of their ancestors or clans, Chinese people are divided into Cia / Tjia family, Gouw / Goh clan, Kang / Kong clan, Lauw / Lau clan, Lee / Lie clan, Oey / Ng / Oei clan, Ong clan, Tan clan, Tio / Thio / Theo / Teo clan, Lim clan, and others. From the dialect, domicile area, ancestral origins, or clan, each sub-group culture, customs, characteristics, and noble values are reflected. Ethnic Chinese are generally named consisting of clan and name. Marga is located at the front, and the name is located behind the clan. In 1996, the total number of Chinese families was 11969, while in 2007, there were more than 22,000 clans. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Chinese Marga Social Association recorded 160 Chinese families in Jakarta and 320 Chinese clans throughout Indonesia (Purcell 1987), (Christian 2017).

The fragmentation of Chinese ethnics, in general, did not make them separate, let alone carry out “separatism” from Indonesian territory, including fragmentation in adhering to the religion. On the contrary, they integrate themselves into being part of the Indonesian nation and adhere to various faiths. The form of their activities as part of Indonesia’s citizens and the nation is evidenced in social and political activities. The Indonesian Chinese Party (PTI) was founded in 1932 as a form of declaration of Chinese ethnicity as part of the nation and supporting Indonesia’s independence. Indonesian Chinese ethnics reject Chinese nationalism. This fundamental decision increasingly shows the existence of Chinese ethnicity to be part of the Indonesian nation and participates in the movement’s history until Indonesia recedes (Purcell 1987), (Suryadinata 2002).

The minority of the Chinese community in Indonesia is only around 3.6%, which is still dynamic and continues to grow, so their numbers are debatable. An historian mentioned that only

about 2 to 3 percent (6-8 million people) of the approximately 260 million Indonesian population (Azra 2019). Some say around 11 million inhabitants. According to Info Tionghoa, of that number, about 2,832,510 people, or 1.20%, are Muslims. However, referring to the latest census published in the media, the majority of Indonesians are based on religion, Buddhists (around 45%), Protestants (35%), Catholics (9%), Confucius (7%), Islam (3.6%), and others (0.4%). Islam as the religion practiced by some ethnic Chinese is small compared to, for example, Protestantism. Historical factors and teaching pragmatism in life seem to be one of the reasons. Apart from the accuracy of the number of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, what is clear is that they will continue to grow and spread, as will the spread of other ethnic Chinese religious communities, such as Chinese Christians, Buddhists, and Catholics (Chen 2015).

Regarding Chinese Muslims, Yuanzhi said, it has been around for a long time. One of the central leaders is Cheng Ho (Zheng He) from Yunan. He is claimed to be the Prophet's 37th descendant through Ali bin Abi Talib and has been a Muslim since childhood (Kong 2000). These claims, although denied by Yu Ke because no convincing facts were found, Cheng Ho had come to Indonesia, to be precise in Semarang, then Cirebon (Ashraf 2019). The relationship and expansion of commerce is still an essential motivation in his goodwill. The Islamic style that Cheng Ho brought was Hanafiyah, which was considered more rational. Meanwhile, in general, the Indonesian population is characterized by Shafi'i in fiqh, Ashari in theology, and Al-Junaid and Al-Ghazali in Sufism (Kong 2000).

On this basis, Chinese Muslims tend to adopt a traditional Islamic religious attitude as often attached to traditions among the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) (Kong 2000). It means that Chinese Muslims, as can be seen in their diverse life, tend to be traditional-moderate. Their moderate attitude is not even limited to religious issues, but also Islamic economic and cultural issues. Islam has tolerance towards Chinese culture. Recognition of their culture can foster solidarity in the relationship between ethnic Chinese Muslims and non-Chinese Muslims (Rosmini and Haniah 2016).

Although their existence is old in Indonesia, Chinese Muslims still raise the debate to need historical evidence. Some findings

indicate their presence for Chinese Muslims in Singkawang, such as Chinese jars, drums, and the Eight-Sided Mosque roof (Hasanah 2014). They are Chinese from the Hakka clan who tend to be more independent-minded. They are free to adopt Western ideas compared to other Chinese (Murtadlo 2013). The difficulty in revealing how Chinese Muslims got to Indonesia is due to the weakness of scientific evidence. Religious conversion and marriage are still the most traditional ways ethnic Chinese become Muslims (Hew 2018) and (Fachrurrazi 2019).

Becoming a Muslim was a strategic decision for the acceptance of Chinese people as whole citizens. Also, Malays, Minangkabau, Javanese, Sundanese, who are generally Muslim, will accept Muslim Chinese more than non-Muslim Chinese. A similar situation distinguishes it from the interaction of Chinese Muslims in Malaysia who are more enthusiastic about benefiting despite their different beliefs. Chinese Muslims' image seems to have various tendencies within the Chinese ethnic group in general and within the Chinese ethnic Muslims. Here, Chinese Muslim identities are not single, so their diversity is very diverse (Azra 2019), (Afif 2012), (Ngeow & Hailong 2016).

Indonesian Chinese Muslims are divided into several Islamic tendencies and orientations, which can be observed in their preferences of religious understanding and attitudes. Fragmentation of religious. Understanding and practice occurs with mutual acculturation with identification strategies, such as. changing identities in names (Putro 2014). The politics of changing names among Chinese ethnic groups has become a trend and booming and is not limited to Chinese Muslims. Ethnic Chinese in general adapted to the general public. This was a response to the New Order politics that suppressed Chinese ethnicity (Bailey and Lie 2013), (Chua 2004). These strategic decisions in communication are categorized as acts of formative communication (Schoeneborn, Morsing & Crane 2020).

The change in the identity of the Tionghoa ethnic group is clearly based on ideas that also influence the pattern of diversity, such as happened to Chinese Muslims who are members of the Indonesian Chinese Islamic Association (PITI), which became more popular with the title Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam (PITI)

which was founded on April 14, 1961. Although it does not have a direct relationship with social or political organizations, however, there is a non-homogeneous religious style (Lindsey & Pausacker 2005). In fact, the change in the organization's name has shown that there is a difference in orientation related to its strategy to become Indonesian Muslims. There is a view to remain a Chinese Muslim 'without merging' with the natives; there are those who argue that being a Chinese Muslim 'merges' with the natives (Afif 2012).

Is the assimilative demonstration of the Chinese Muslim community a whole religious direction and orientation or a strategy? A more explicit approach of cultural politics so that the Chinese community's culture is accepted or that the Chinese Muslim minority has another orientation that is considered more modern? It is because the Chinese Muslim minority has made efforts towards a more serious direction in the spread of Islam by using literacy technology devices, thus allowing a different orientation with a description that emphasizes more on the old cultural traditions (Rahmawati, et. el 2018). Chinese Muslims, as said Junus Yahya (Lauw Tjhwang Thio), one of the Chinese Muslim leaders, are trying to assimilate the "native" Indonesian Muslim community with all its tendencies and problems in the social life of Muslims (Mahfud 2014). Junus Yahya's view tends to be "moderate" even modern religious thought and understanding when viewed from a more inclusive Islamic way. Yunus Yahya's ideas and attitudes are an open and realistic attitude in breaking the deadlock regarding the existence of Chinese in Indonesia and Islam on the other hand. This attitude is one of Indonesia's Muslim modernists' characteristics (Ali and Effendy 1986).

In contrast to the tendency of Islamic understanding, Yunus, Yusuf, and Felix Siauwan prefer a version of Islam salaf or say "Salafi-modernist." Yusuf is active and affiliated with Jamaah Tablig (JT). Likewise with Felix Siauwan, a dynamic Chinese preacher and affiliation with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Felix has more "extreme" and Salafi religious thoughts and passion, but his thoughts are still based on traditional Islamic values. Regarding the concept of Khilafah, for example, Felix said that it is an Islamic idea that can be discussed. The democratic

culture has provided room for the exchange of ideas, including the issue of the caliphate (Siauw 2013).

In the case of Basuki Cahaya Purnama alias Ahok related to “Al-Maidah Gate” and the incumbent candidate for the Governor of DKI, Siauw was one of those who had an oppositional view of Ahok. He is a preacher who spreads textual Islamic understandings that tend to be ideological-Salafis. Publications of Siauw’s Islamic thoughts were scattered on social media, such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and established publications, such as AlFatih Press (Hew 2017). Siauw, like HTI, rejects democracy, socialism, liberalism, and secularism. On the contrary, he supported the trans-national movement caliphate and even became a central leader of Chinese Muslim internals (Siauw 2013).

Siauw’s Islamic understanding and movement contrasted with Islam’s choice and knowledge of his senior Anton Medan. The founder and leader of the Attaibin Bogor Islamic Boarding School took a more moderate understanding and movement; even in some instances, it was more “pragmatic” and “liberal.” In the DKI Pilkada, he supported Ahok and naturally did not mind non-Muslims becoming leaders. His view is more substantive in seeing the relationship between politics and religious attributes. This picture also shows that religion can be “negotiated” with the development of the socio-cultural life of society. Anton, as well as Siauw, further spread Islam through social media, in addition to managing the pesantren (Islamic Boarding School). His position as chairman of PITI also gave Anton more space to balance the movement and textual Islamic understanding within the Chinese Muslim community (Hew 2018).

Anton Medan’s views as written in his letter to Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok) are right in contrast to Siauw’s understanding, particularly the opinions related to Islam regarding politics, nationality, and tolerance between people of different religions. For Anton, Islam needs to be understood and lived in a just domain. Regarding Islam (in the meaning of ‘guidance’), it is God’s prerogative. Meanwhile, beyond that, such as brotherhood relations with others (*ukhuwah insaniah*), relations as fellow Muslims (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*), and relations as citizens of

the nation (ukhuwah wathaniyah), which he calls the Islamic trilogy rahmatan lil'alamin are very dynamic (Hoerudin 2010). Furthermore, according to him, Islam as a religion must be contested or grounded, such as a political approach. So, for Anton Medan, politics is a tool and means for successfully implementing religious values. Anton Medan also made brilliant breakthroughs in the field of da'wah. Reconceptualization of the propaganda was done by Tabliq (Islamic Oratory) Also, there were solutive actions such as opening schools that are more oriented to improving the people's material and spiritual welfare. Medan's decision regarding the solution to the social problems above cannot be separated from his da'wah conception. For Medan, da'wah is not only "oral," as a lecture, but also a real action (da'wah bi al-Hal). Da'wah bi al-Hal , is a da'wah approach that is oriented towards empowering the people, especially in solving basic problems, such as the fulfillment of clothing, food, and education (Aripudin 2012). Medan criticizes da'wah's implementation, which has been going on for ceremonial tendencies and without a clear direction (Hoerudin 2010). The principle of preaching Medan to its students refers to the signs of Shaykh Abdul Qodir Zaelani, as follows; " When you face the poor, the poor, don't open a book, but open a pot. Fill her stomach first then you take the Koran". Da'wah's orientation in Medan is an Islamic approach practiced by modernist Muslim Indonesia (Ali And Effendy 1986). The difference is that the concept and the Da'wah movement in Medan appear smoother because it is segmented, namely the marginal class Muslim community, former criminals, and convicts. Meanwhile, modernist Muslims' concepts and movements were more institutional and political, covering a broader segment.

The polarization of Islamic understanding is not only on issues of political Islam and national issues but also on religious rituals. Chinese Muslim leaders Holilullah and Ali Karim have different views regarding religious practices. The Chinese New Year celebration in the Chinese tradition by the head of the Haji Karim Oei Foundation is considered to have no foothold in the Koran or Hadith. Although it must be admitted that many Chinese Muslims still practice Chinese New Year. Ali

even replaced the celebration with a gathering. The cultural acculturation between Chinese and Islamic traditions by Chinese Muslims has been treated in various ways and refers to their respective views that show their tendency to understand Islam. Ali Karim's view is closer to the understanding of thought Salafi puritan in Islam as is the current of similar arrangement among Muslim modernists (Ali And Effendy 1986).

The polarization of Chinese Muslim diversity can also be seen in religious practices, as observed by Geman Yusuf, a Chinese Muslim leader in South Kalimantan. Although they do not openly disclose their spiritual understanding, their daily rituals show various things. This fact can be seen, for example, in the procession of someone's death among Chinese Muslims. Some go straight home after burying the corpse, but some pray before leaving the tomb. According to him, this fact is evidence of the existence of diverse Islamic understandings and practices among Chinese Muslims in Indonesia (Ali And Effendy 1986). Moreover, the space for expression has become more open after the 1998 Indonesian political reform. The actualization of freedom of religion and culture has become more relaxed. The completion of Chinese Muslim Islam is also formalistic and more substantive because Islam is *ramhmatan lil'alamin*, or compatible with the Chinese tradition.

Social, political, and economic factors and even culture are factors in Chinese Muslim Islam's dynamics. Being a Muslim for ethnic Chinese is no longer a form of compromise, but a competition to gain opportunities for a better future. What is done by the Chinese Muslim ethnic as a strategy to stay survival from all forms of social and political pressure from the community outside them (Muzzaki 2010).

The evidence that the Chinese Muslim opponents have entered into the substantive Islam is represented by Syafi'i Antonio (Nio Gwan Chung). He is more concentrated on responding to the development of the Islamic economic system. Syafi'i responds to Islamic financial practice issues, such as *shari'ah* banks, building theoretical solutions for Islamic Economics (IES), and founded the TAZKIA Islamic Economics College. Regarding the presence of Islamic banks amid problems with conventional banks and

the monetary and financial crisis, Syafi'i said that it was a very appropriate solution for Muslims (Muzzaki 2010).

Syafi'i said that the practice of usury in interest equivalent to conventional banks is a source of danger and crime. A problem that triggered the polemic was experienced by Muslims, including modernist Muslims in parts of the Islamic State in the early 1970s. In the practice of usury, there are elements of oppression and injustice that affect a human character. The method of usury will torment and destroy society. Shari'ah banking exists to meet the needs of banking services for people who cannot accept the concept of bank interest. Islam, according to him, always encourages the practice of profit sharing, partnership and prohibits usury. The existence of the Islamic banking system's practice alongside conventional banking is considered to mobilize public funds more broadly, especially segments of society that have not been touched by the traditional banking system (Antonio 2001).

Syafi'i's view regarding the practice of shari'ah banking does not necessarily eliminate conventional banking practices that have been practiced so far. According to him, Islamic banks and traditional banks' practices have similarities in some issues, especially in terms of the technical side of receiving money, the transfer mechanism, the computer technology used, and the general requirements for obtaining financing. Fundamental differences between the two are mainly related to legal aspects, organizational structure, the business being financed, and the work environment. Islamic banks, in practice, also only make halal investments. Regulating the collection and distribution of funds must be by the Sharia Supervisory Board. The Sharia Supervisory Board is very central, has a control function, and is independent. The right to supervise all the operations and products of sharia banking, and the fatwa was to comply with the teachings of sharia in banking (Antonio 2001), (Abidin 2011).

Syafi'i's view regarding bank interest rates based on the Quran's ethical basis is based on his belief in the concept of 'kaaffah' (holistic) Islam. However, in his view, Islam kafah developed by combining economic practices in the Islamic tradition-oriented divineness and partner relationships to achieve

happiness parallel world and the next while developing economic thinking in the West. Syafii Antonio's optimism regarding the practice of shari'ah banking in Indonesia is not without reason. The reasons referred to, namely, first, the support of Muslims as the majority population in Indonesia. Second, there is support from world Islamic financial institutions. Third, commitment and support from Bank of Indonesia and the Financial Services Authority (OJK) as regulators.

Internal Chinese ethnic groups are generally more tolerant and traditional in terms of spreading Islam. The strategy through the conversion of religion to Islam is considered more effective than Christianity or Buddhism. In adapting to the acceptance of Chinese minorities in general, some of them take ethical steps in maintaining solidity as fellow Chinese (Lubab 2018).

In other cases, findings related to Islam's relationship with the Chinese minority took various forms, down to fundamental issues. In the case of Chinese Muslims in Palembang it tends to be a dilemma. The Chinese identity with Islamic identity is different and is two opposites, so it is difficult to obtain an Islamic identity. Chinese culture seems incompatible with Islam. Apart from having to face the tradition of being married to the same ethnicity, Chinese Muslims also have to deal with the view that the Chinese community is not adherent to Islam (Pahrozi 2018).

Therefore, the religious attitude of the Chinese minority in several cases in Indonesia has a non-monolithic tendency. Apart from these historical factors, it is also due to the socio-cultural factors present, or the "where" factor. Also, there was the "how" factor, that is, the factor with whom they were first introduced to Islam and their tendency after converting to Islam. Referring to information and information from several informants and Chinese Muslim organizations, such as PITI, there are symptoms that Chinese Muslims are fragmented into several Islamic tendencies, both in ideas, organizational affiliation, and understanding.

A potent Chinese cultural background with a great tradition of its people vis-a-vis Indonesian Islam manifests itself in an emotional struggle. Therefore, Islam must accept a position as

a secondary culture or little tradition. Islam and Chinese culture in Chinese Muslim religiosity in Indonesia are complementary; there is even a real cultural relationship, as the symptoms occurred in Makassar (Kunu (2018)). However, in the context of Chinese culture, in general, it is sub-related to Chinese life.

The expression of Islam of Chinese Indonesian Muslims is not entirely. They tend to see the general parameters of Indonesian Muslim life, which are already established. Chinese Muslims have their expression in the tremendous Chinese culture. The relationship between the three elements: (1) among Chinese culture; (2) between Chinese culture and Chinese Muslims; and (3) the archipelago, on the other hand, presents a breakthrough in a new cultural form that strengthens Islam in the archipelago. This innovation did not make them leave the spirit of Pancasila as the foundation of the national philosophy. The structure of Chinese Islam proves that Pancasila's spirit is very welcome in accepting its citizens' diversity from various races and ethnicities of the world (Fealy and White 2008).

Therefore, Muslims in Indonesia were not only limited to those influenced by Arabic, Western and Malay cultures, but it was also influenced by Chinese. Chinese influence had already built relations with the archipelago. These observations are quite different from when exposing political ideas as pointed out by Siau, and economic problems shown by Syafii tend to lead to an understanding of 'modernist Islam.' The two Chinese Muslim leaders can represent how Chinese Muslims take more specific roles. It can also be seen in the media and the development of Islam through modern organizations and institutions. It included establishing Islamic religious institutions, such as Islamic centers, mosques, schools, foundations, and associations of Chinese Muslim organizations, such as PITI and Chinese-owned Islamic foundations, such as the Haj Foundation. Karim Oei (YHKO) was founded by a Chinese Muslim figure who was also an activist of Masyumi Abdul Karim Oei Tjeng Hien in 1961, written by many experts. Religious understanding tends to be modern. He made YHKO an information center for Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, a center for religious formation, and a place of worship. Also, the MUSTIKA (Chinese Muslim and Family)

foundation was founded in 2007. The foundation was established to strengthen the ties of brotherhood between Muslim Chinese, local Muslims, and non-Muslim Chinese. To become a bridge of renewal between Muslim Chinese and non-Muslim Chinese and between Muslim and local Muslims (Bruinessen 2018).

The closeness of Chinese Muslims with Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two largest socio-religious organizations in Indonesia, is also an indicator, although not wholly, of their general orientation of understanding and diversity in addition to the PITI organization. PITI is considered more open, and the media effectively builds communication and relations among ethnic Chinese, especially Muslim ones, compared to other Chinese Islamic institutions. Role as a bridge or link between Chinese elements, the existence of PITI is increasingly central as a social institution. As an organization of the Chinese Muslim community, PITI tries not only to become a bridge but to play a social and cultural role in the process of integration of Chinese ethnicity in Indonesian society, including non-Muslim Chinese, as happened in the regions.

D. Conclusion

There is a stream of spiritual understanding that tends to be moderate as attached to Chinese Muslim leaders. They tended to be moderate by letting them to be contextualized through imitation and assimilation. Some have the opposite view without having to imitate the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Here the Chinese tradition remains “intact” with Islam as a religion without having to be assimilated. The polarization of Chinese Muslim diversity has led to the fragmentation and diversification of Chinese Indonesian Islam in the future. This polarization and fragmentation of social life and Chinese Muslim religion in the future, adapting to the Indonesian context, are generally accepted.

What is new in this research is its historical phenomenological approach. From this it was found that the Chinese, who were usually considered foreigners in Indonesia, had become part of the Indonesian nation. This is because now many Chinese are embracing Islam, the religion of the majority of Indonesia’s

population. Also, Chinese Muslims participated in the development of Islam itself, to become Muslim public figures.

This study contributes to the consideration of Indonesian political practitioners to think about how to deal with the Chinese Muslim problem so that they can grow together in Indonesia's development program. This phenomenological historical study can be continued with sociological and public administration studies, especially regarding the harmony between religious communities in Indonesia.

Part 4

Countering Radicalism in Indonesia: Learning from Qadiriyya wa Naqsabandiyya and Sammaniyya Sufi Orders

This topic elaborates religious deradicalization movement by Sufi order (*ar qa*) conceptually through the doctrine of the seven dignities called *tanb h*. *Tanb h* is religious advice given by a *murshid* in the form of *wa iyya* (commandments) disseminated to all his students, and the practice of reciting *dhikr* and *r tib* in the Sammaniyya Order and the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya Order (TQN/*ar qa* Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya). The result is that religious radicalism is considered a deviation and violation of religious ethics and religious belief and practice. Religious deradicalization is done by the followers of the orders through the intensification of Sufism values and rituals, interpretation of the sacred scripture and hadith, and the study of special handbooks on religious deradicalization. Religious deradicalization was expanded through non-Sufism rituals and reinforcement of national values by habitually singing the national anthem and patriotic songs at every religious event and state defense training in TQN. The values of local wisdom in the rituals of Sufism, *dhikr*, and social interaction, such as social etiquette, inculcation of the values of compassion and tolerance for others, are adopted so that the community of Sufi orders avoids radicalism naturally and has a moderate attitude among themselves and in their social life.

A. Introduction

Religious radical movements emerged openly in Indonesia, especially after the political reforms in 1998. The movements, in practice, tend to lead to political movements that are perceived to undermine the stability of the life of the people and of the nation, especially since the movement seeks to rigidly implement sharia. Religious radicalism also gets support from similar movements in other parts of the world or transnational movements, such as the propagation of Wahhabism, the movements of Islamic State for Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taliban in Afghanistan, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and Intifada in Palestine, and several other Islamic radical movements in Asia, such as the Muslim National Liberation for Moro (MNLF) in the Philippines and Islamic separatism movement in Patani, Thailand ¹.

Many efforts have been made by religious organizations, governments, and individuals to counter these radical religious ideas and movements. The government of Indonesia is strengthening the superstructure, for example, by issuing Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Terrorism, which is reinforced by Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 77 of 2019 concerning Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Religious radicalism, especially those that lead to the terrorism movement, is seen as a dangerous act that can undermine the foundations of the life of the nation and therefore, it must be eliminated.

However, the initiatives to de-radicalize religious belief, as done by the government, focus on legal action that has not addressed the substantial aspects of the issue of religious radicalism. Nevertheless, it does not mean that these religious deradicalization initiatives have failed miserably because the “religious deradicalization project”, at least in the short term, is sufficient to suppress the development of radical ideas and movements in Indonesia. In the long term, however, these initiatives may not necessarily be able to stem radicalism for several reasons. The first reason is that the issue of religious radicalism is identical to the issue of ideology that is labeled as

¹ Ilik A. Mansurnoor, “Revivalism and Radicalism in Southeast Asia Islam: A Pattern or an Anomaly?,” *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009): 222–62, https://www.nzasia.org.nz/uploads/1/3/2/1/132180707/19_iik_3.pdf.

religious teaching. This ideology can only be overcome through a counter ideology, such as new ideas that are considered relevant for strengthening a more tolerant ideology.

The second reason is that the usual approach is too formal and bureaucratic. The capacity of several government institutions, such as BNPT, Ministry of Religion, Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology, and MUI, to reduce religious radicalism is inadequate because these institutions have not addressed substantive aspects, which require continuous guidance. The third reason is that it is necessary to look for “alternative and substantive approaches” outside the official approaches in order to counteract religious radicalism, for example, approaches based on Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and local traditions (local wisdom). The existence and contribution of Sufism-based institutions, in the context of Indonesia need to be considered because they have historical roots in the process of Islamization in the archipelago and even in the Islamic world ².

The first of the two approaches, namely the Sufism-based approach, has actually been explored as an Islamic approach and practice. In fact, in the Western world, Islam has succeeded in attracting local people through Sufism ³. However, it must be admitted that Sufism-based movement is not always considered friendly to mainstream politics and seems revolutionary, as was the case with the peasant’s revolt in Banten ⁴. It means that the socio-political context also influences the perspective of religious deradicalization done by Sufism-based institutions.

It is not just a coincidence that religious radicalism comes to the fore and becomes a kind of new “lifestyle” and becomes solid in unison with the rapid pace of modernization with all its consequences. Several religious elements, such as

2 William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under the Ottoman Control, 1840-1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984).

3 Jamal Malik and Saeed Zarrabi-Zadeh, eds., *Sufism East and West: Reorientation and Dynamism of Mystical Islam in the Modern World* (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2019).

4 Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76vfh.Sartono>. (1966

religious leaders and intellectuals ⁵, religious organizations ⁶ and religious communities ⁷, have proven to play a role in religious deradicalization by spreading religious belief and movements that are more inclusive and friendly to socio-cultural backgrounds in Indonesia ⁸.

In order to obtain information and data related to this theme, observations and in-depth interviews were conducted, especially with religious leaders, both Muslim and HKBP followers, and local government officials. The goal is to construct meaning in a particular topic ⁹. Observation and direct participation in activities provide separate experiences to reveal data related to deradicalization in conversations that are more specific and less open to the public ¹⁰. Several documents in the form of freelance writing contributed to the enrichment of the data and its strengthening, so that the data could be interpreted according to the research target.

B. Sufism as a Moral dan Spiritual Movements

Sufism, both as a religious practice and as a spiritual theory, has developed in Indonesia as an approach to spread Islam. Sufism is the earliest approach and method introduced by

5 Novebri Novebri and Resdilla Pratiwi, "The Role of Religious Leaders in Indonesia's Multicultural Society in Preventing Conflict," *Khalifa: Journal of Islamic Education* 5, no. 2 (August 6, 2021): 198–210, <https://doi.org/10.24036/kjie.v5i2.185>.

6 Muhammad Adlin Sila and Greg Fealy, "Counterterrorism, Civil Society Organisations and Peacebuilding: The Role of Non-State Actors in Deradicalisation in Bima, Indonesia," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 97–117, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2022.2041076>.

7 Ardianto Bayu Wibowo, Bambang Dwi Hartono, and Suprpto Suprpto, "Reinforcement of Religious Moderation Through Role of Chaplain in Community Police Partnership Forum from Management Perspective," *Attarbiyah: Journal of Islamic Culture and Education* 6, no. 2 (2021): 145–56, <https://doi.org/10.18326/attarbiyah.v6i2.145-156>.

8 Team of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Religious Moderation*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Research, Development, Training, and Education Agency The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2021).

9 K. Esterberg, *Qualitative Methods in Social Research* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002).

10 James P Spradley, *Participant Observation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980).

Islamic preachers in Indonesia ¹¹, even in Southeast Asia ¹², following its origins in the Middle East, especially Baghdad ¹³. Adaptation of the belief and practice of Sufism also correlates with the belief and practice of other religious traditions, such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and theology, so that religious belief and practice also adapts to social traditions and culture. Referring to Azra ¹⁴, the practice of Islamic traditions in the context of society in Indonesia tends to be moderate in terms of *fiqh*, Sufism, and theology. Moderate Sufism in question is Sufism which refers to the concepts and practices of the Al-Junayd and Al-Ghazali traditions, which are widely adopted by the Sunnis or *ahl as-sunnah wa l-jam ah* ¹⁵. The practices of Sufism were then institutionalized as recognized Sufi orders (*al-ar qa al-Mu'tabara*) such as the Sufi orders incorporated in *Jam'iyah Ahlith Tariqah al-Mu'tabarah an-Nahdliyyah* (JATMAN) ¹⁶.

Sufism as one of the Islamic approaches, in practice, is not limited to the sphere of intensity for obtaining spiritual experience through the practice of *riyadha*, which means «spiritual exercise», both the physical *riyadha* and *riyadha nafs* (with soul). Physical *riyadha* is performed by a Sufi by reducing eating, drinking, etc., while *riyadha nafs* is practiced by always worshipping in a clean state of *hadas* (impurity) and promoting *nafl* prayer (optional practice) and other prayers, and practicing *dhikr* and *wirid* (standardized prayers to recite) ¹⁷.

The dynamics of the role and contribution of Sufism as a moral movement are increasingly significant in the modern

11 A.H. Johns, "Sufism in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26 (1995): 346.

12 Alwi Shihab, *Antara Tasawuf Sunni Dan Tasawuf Falsafi; Akar Tasawuf Di Indonesia* (Bandung: Pustaka Iman, 2009).

13 A.H. Johns, "Tentang Kaum Mistik Islam Dan Penulisan Sejarah," in *Sejarah Dan Masyarakat; Lintasan Historis Islam Di Indonesia*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1987).

14 Azyumardi Azra, *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII & XVIII* (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2013).

15 Alwi Shihab, *Islam Sufistik: Islam Pertama Dan Pengaruhnya Hingga Kini Di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 2001).

16 Abubakar Aceh, *Pengantar Ilmu Tarekat (Kajian Historis Tentang Mistik)* (Solo: Ramadani, 1996); Sri Mulyati, *Mengenal Dan Memahami Tarekat-Tarekat Mu'tabarah Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Prenada Media Group, 2005).

17 Agus Samsul Bassar and Aan Hasanah, "Riyadhah: The Model of the Character Education Based on Sufistic Counseling," *Journal of Advanced Guidance and Counseling* 1, no. 1 (June 11, 2020): 23–38, <https://doi.org/10.21580/jagc.2020.1.1.5763>.

era with various patterns as introduced by several opponents and practices of modern Sufism that adapt social and political developments in Indonesia ¹⁸ and also in other parts of the world with Islamic civilizations, such as in Tukey, through reNursism that advocates moderate Sufism ¹⁹. Modern Sufism, which emphasizes moral principles and commitments, is actually nothing new in the Islamic intellectual traditions. Ibn Bajjah, a well-known Muslim philosopher, who in the West is called Avempace, argued that Sufism does not merely mean ascetic attempts to isolate oneself from social life by practicing *'uzlah* (isolation from the crowd), but it can also be practiced without avoiding social life.

The Sammaniyya Order has the concept of combining practices from the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya Order, the Shadhili Order, and the Khalwati Order which first existed in the practice of *dhikr* and prayer ²⁰. Sammaniyya teachings spread to various countries, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, and Indonesia ²¹. The name of the Sammaniyya order was adopted from the name of its founder, Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Karim as-Samman (d. 1775).

The Sammaniyya Order developed in Indonesia towards the end of the 18th century, mainly because of its role in the resistance against the Dutch Colonial Empire ²². The Sammaniyya Order was introduced by Shaykh Muhammad 'Aqib Ibn Kgs. Hasan al-Din, Kemas Ahmad bin Abdullah, Muhammad Muhyiddin bin Syihabuddin, and Abdul Shomad Al-Palimbani (d. 1788) and supported and facilitated by the Palembang Sultanate, especially

18 Martin van Bruinessen, "Studies of Sufism and the Sufi Orders in Indonesia," *Die Welt Des Islams* 38, no. 2 (1998): 192–219, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1570060981254813>.

19 Muhammad Faiz, "Konsep Tasawuf Said Nursi: Implementasi Nilai-Nilai Moderasi Islam," *Millah* 19, no. 2 (February 14, 2020): 199–224, <https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol19.iss2.art2>; Cemal Sahin and Asroor Zaimul, "Reinterpretation of Tarekat and the Teachings of Sufism According to Said Nursi," *Millah: Jurnal Studi Agama* 20, no. 2 (2021): 355–84, <https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol20.iss2.art7>.

20 Muhamad Basyrul Muvid and Nur Kholis, "Konsep Tarekat Sammaniyah Dan Peranannya Terhadap Pembentukan Moral, Spiritual Dan Sosial Masyarakat Post Modern," *Dialogia* 18, no. 1 (June 18, 2020): 84, <https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v18i1.2038>.

21 Ahmad Purwadaksi, "Ratib Samman Dan Hikayat Syaikh Muhammad Samman" (Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1992); Azra, *Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah Dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII & XVIII*.

22 Martin van Bruinessen, "Tarekat Dan Politik: Amalan Untuk Dunia Atau Akherat," *Jurnal Pesantren* 9, no. 1 (1992): 3–4.

during the reign of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin, until it became an official tradition of the sultanate and is practiced by the people until now ²³, although formally, is not very prominent ²⁴. After being firmly ingrained in Palembang, the Sammaniyya Order spread to various places in the Southeast Asian Archipelago ²⁵.

The most popular sources of practicing the teachings of the Sammaniyya Order are *bayah* (oath of allegiance), *suluk*, *ijazah* (authorization to teach), thanksgiving and dowry, and *dhikr* and *ratib samman*, in addition to the doctrine of seven dignities. *Dhikr* in the Sammâniyya Order consists of *dhikr nâfi itsbât*, which is taught to beginners by reciting it 10-100 times every day, which can be increased up to 300 times every day, as well as *dhikr* of other categories according to one's position in the Sammaniyya Order ²⁶. The most popular practice of the Sammâniyya Order besides *dhikr* is the ritual of reciting *Râtib Sammân*, *manaqib*, and *tawasul* ²⁷. The recitation of the *ratib Sammân* is still practiced, including in urban areas such as Bekasi, Pondok Pinang (Jakarta), and Bogor. The ritual of reciting *ratib* among followers of the Sammâniyya Order can take six to seven hours. Although this ritual must be led by a *salik* (followers of Sufism who have pledged allegiance), people who participate in this *ratib* recitation may not be members of the order ²⁸.

Meanwhile, the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order (TQN) was first introduced by Sheikh Ahmad Khatib Sambas (1803–1875) in Kalimantan who combined two Sufi orders,

23 Zulkifli, "Tarekat Sammaniyah Di Palembang: Sejarah Dan Perkembangannya, Makalah Seminar Jabileum Ke-30 Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia," 6-8 Mei (Depok, 1999).

24 Martin van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, Dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam Di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1995).

25 Maulin Nastria, "Mengintip Dekatnya Kesultanan Palembang Dengan Tarekat Sammaniyah," 2022, <https://www.genpi.co/berita/11025/mengintip-dekatnya-kesultanan-palembang-dengan-tarekat-sammaniyah?page=2>; Zulkarnain Yani, "Sejarah Masuk Dan Berkembangnya Tarekat Sammaniyah Di Palembang," 2013, <https://zulkarnainyani.wordpress.com/2013/03/22/sejarah-masuk-dan-berkembangnya-tarekat-sammaniyah-di-palembang/>.

26 Munir, "Dinamika Ritual Tarekat Sammâniyah Palembang," *Madania* 20, no. 2 (2016): 197–214, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/madania.v20i2.168>.

27 Syekh Muhammad. Azhari, *Manaqib Syekh Muhammad Samman Al-Madani* (Palembang: Zuriat Datuk Azhari, 2012); Andi Syarifuddin, *Risalah Ratib Al-Samman, Riwayat, Fadhillah Dan Silsilahnya* (Palembang: Anggrek, 2010).

28 Munir, "Dinamika Ritual Tarekat Sammâniyah Palembang."

Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya, to create a new order ²⁹. This order was introduced in Java by the successors of Khatib Sambas, such as Sheikh Tolhah and Sheikh Ahmad Hasbullah bin Muhammad al-Maduri ³⁰. It was spread through business and trade and the transmission of the intellectualism of the imam and the teachings of the Sufis themselves ³¹. In the case of TQN Suryalaya, TQN contributes to religious teaching and rehabilitation for drug addicts ³². The two Sufi orders are well received by Indonesian Muslims because their teachings are in harmony with the heterogeneous culture in Indonesia so that they are easy to spread and contribute to maintaining the conduciveness of religious life in Indonesia ³³.

C. The Power of Sufism in Countering Religious Radical Movements

Sufism, as stated earlier, has an emphasis on solutions to life problems through remembrance and prayer to God. Of course, the remembrance and prayer in question are developments outside the basic Islamic rituals, such as the five daily prayers. *Dhikr*, or remembrance, in Sufism, as can be seen in Sufi orders, has various types, forms, and levels: *jahar* (loud), *khafi* (in a very low tone), and *sirr* (soft). The recitation of *dhikr* varies, some are short, medium, or quite long, such as *talqin* and *tawashul*.

Dhikr and prayer in Sufism, especially in Sufi orders, are inherent in almost every ritual. In fact, there are *dhikr* and prayers that are done repeatedly called *wirid*. *Wirid* is a *dhikr* and prayer contextualized in the Sufism tradition in Indonesia

29 Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, Dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam Di Indonesia*.

30 S. Mulyani, *Mengenal Dan Memahami Tarekat-Tarekat Muktabarah Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Prenada Media Group, 2005).

31 Endang Turmudi, "The Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah in East Java and Islamic Politics in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 26, no. 2 (1998): 65–84, <https://doi.org/10.1163/030382498X00166>.

32 Sri Mulyati and Zahrotun Nihayah, "Sufi Healing in Indonesia and Malaysia: An Updated Study of Rehabilitation Methods Practiced by Qadiriyya Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order," *ESOTERIK: Jurnal Akhlak Dan Tasawuf* 6, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 1–33, <https://doi.org/10.21043/esoterik.v6i1.7085>.

33 Maghfur Ahmad et al., "The Sufi Order Against Religious Radicalism in Indonesia," *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 77, no. 4 (May 18, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v77i4.6417>.

during the spread of Islam. *Wirid* is used as a word to describe the procedure for reciting *kalma tayyab* (*‘La ilaha illa Allah*), which is done repeatedly at certain times with a specific purpose (*hajat*)³⁴. In the book *“Risalah Do’a dan Salawat”* by Ahmad Chalwani, one of the adherents of TQN in Barjan, Purwerejo, for example, it was found no less than 115 specific prayers and hundreds of *wirid* and various *salawat*³⁵. It indicates that the centrality of human activities, hopes, and desires in the Sufism tradition rests on *dhikr* and prayer, as implied by the Quran (Surah 33:41). In fact, in the Shadhili Order, *dhikr* and prayer can be done without any time limit or in other words, at any time³⁶.

In the Sammaniyya Order, the emphasis on prayer is also strong and focuses on the five main pillars, namely *tawbah*, *bay’ah*, *suluk*, *rabitah*, and *dhikr*, as derivatives of the concept of the seven dignities. *Tawbah* in the Sufi tradition is not only repentance, but also drawing nearer to the Most Holy³⁷. However, in the Sammaniyya Order, the practice of *dhikr* is not as oral centric as it is in TQN. In the Sammaniyya Order, *dhikr* is inherent in rituals, as is evident in the practice of *ratib* and the Samman dance³⁸. Prayers in these rituals function as a means of reminder as well as education to strengthen the teachings of the order which are generally favored by the Sammaniyya community³⁹.

Prayer in Sufism is not an ordinary recitation, but is a core ritual with different goals and emphases according to to

34 Widaningsih, “Antara Do’a, Zikir Dan Wirid, Ini Perbedaanannya,” 2022, <https://kalam.sindonews.com/read/113974/72/antara-doa-zikir-dan-wirid-ini-perbedaannya-1595765254>.

35 Ahmad Chalwani, *Risalah Do’a Dan Salawat* (Purwerejo: Pondok Pesantren An-Nawawi, 2021).

36 Alexander Knysh, “Unity and Diversity in Sufism. The Rise of The *Ṭāriqas*,” in *Islamic Mysticism*, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 169–244, <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004194625.i-358.46>; Rosi Islamiyati, “Tarekat Syadziliyah Dalam Dimensi Kesalehan Individual Dan Kesalehan Sosial Serta Pengaruh Modernisasi Dan Globalisasi,” *Refleksi Jurnal Filsafat Dan Pemikiran Islam* 22, no. 1 (March 11, 2022): 137–56, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ref.v22i1.3256>.

37 Wahyudi Buska, Yogia Prihartini, and Ali Muzakir, “Abdusshamad Al-Palembani; His Thoughts and Movements in the Spread of Islam in Indonesia,” *Al-Fikra : Jurnal Ilmiah Keislaman* 19, no. 1 (August 7, 2020): 144–54, <https://doi.org/10.24014/af.v19i1.10020>.

38 “The Samman Dance Is a Sequence of Specific Movement While Sitting or Standing and While Reciting the Verses of Diba’ and Barzanji and Some Local Odes (Live Observation on October 8, 2022),” n.d.

39 “Interview with Munir and Syarifuddin, 2022,” n.d.

the needs of the worshiper and the function of the prayer. Prayer has various types, forms and levels. In fact, there are prayers that people are not arbitrarily allowed to recite them, unless they have passed a certain stage or degree in the order system through an *ijazah* or “oral diploma”⁴⁰. The procession of granting *ijazah* is usually done by certain teachers who have indeed previously obtained *ijazah* with continuous backings (*sanad*), as is the case in some Islamic traditional boarding schools or pesantren⁴¹.

Religious deradicalization in Sufism is contained in the prayers both implicitly and explicitly. This reality is in accordance with the nature of the Sufi orders where prayer, *dhikr*, and *salawat* are central esoteric practices. This fact also distinguishes it from religious de-radicalization with social and political approaches that are rehabilitative and preventive, which are commonly used and facilitated by the authorities or the government. Meanwhile, Sufi order institutions take not only preventive actions, but also curative and even rehabilitative actions to address humanitarian issues⁴².

Preventive work on religious deradicalization is done by Sufi order institutions to individuals since they join as *ikhwan* (Sufi order members) when they are introduced to *maklumat* in the form of *tanbih*, as practiced in the Suryalaya Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order (TQN). Referring to Baidhawi, *tanbih* is a tradition in TQN that contains Islamic values that are transformed through local culture, such as views on human nature, always being mindful in acting, not doing anything contrary to the rules of religion or the state, being obedient to the command of Allah and the state, continuing in the faith, manifesting willingness to the presence of Allah by proving it through the embodiment of religious and state orders⁴³.

40 Munir and Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, “Characteristics of Preserving Salafiyah Islamic Boarding School Traditions: Lessons from Indonesia and Malaysia,” *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 10, no. 1 (2021): 67–88, <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpi.2021.101.67-88>.

41 Ahmad. Suhendra, “Transmisi Keilmuan Pada Era Milenial Melalui Tradisi Sanadan Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Hasaniyah,” *Jurnal SMART (Studi Masyarakat, Religi, Dan Tradisi)* 5, no. 2 (December 23, 2019): 201–12, <https://doi.org/10.18784/smart.v5i2.859>.

42 Karomat Kilicheva and Gavkhar Klicheva, “Sufism and Spiritual Healing,” *ACADEMICIA: An International Multidisciplinary Research Journal* 10, no. 11 (2020): 995–99, <https://doi.org/10.5958/2249-7137.2020.01452.4>.

43 Achmad Baidhawi and Muhammad Kholil, “Tanbih Dalam Kehidupan Bermasyarakat (Studi Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Kautsar Pademawu Pamekasan),” *Jurnal Penelitian*

The religious deradicalization in the Sammaniyya Order is relatively more natural as a consequence of the epistemology it constructs, referring mainly to the conception of the seven dignities that Ibn ‘Arabi introduced, especially at the level of «*ajsam*» and «*insan al-kamil*».

Ajsam is the state of the corporeal body that begins to take shape and is then ready to accept the existence of the outer and inner senses. Such a body is called a bare corporeal body. This dignity describes Allah’s creation that has been neatly structured and can be divided or has received every structure, especially humans. Meanwhile, *insan al-kamil* is a dignity when Allah breathes spirit (*ruh al idafi*) into the human body ⁴⁴.

In the sixth and seventh stages of the seven dignities, human beings, in the view of the Sammaniyya Order, have interacted with fellow human beings who are all measurable and relative, but still exist in the shadow of God. Only God owns the truth (*haq*). Everything other than God has a degree of relativity and can be conditioned. It is this degree of relativity that can manifest tolerance, mutual respect, and mutual recognition within the Sammaniyya Order community and in relation with people outside the Sammaniyya Order ⁴⁵.

Referring to the statement above, religious values and state regulations are equivalent in TQN. Disturbing religiosity is the same as disturbing the state, and vice versa. Religious radicalism, which is often a challenge and even a nuisance to the government as the executive power of the state, can therefore also be considered as a disturbance to religiosity in the *tanbih* doctrine in TQN. Meanwhile, in the Sammaniyya Order, the relationship with the state is not a problem because it has become part of the implementation of «*insan al-kamil*» dignity based on the assumption of structure and function. The state functions to maintain society without limitations and exceptions, but it leads to a process of “returning to God” called the *taraqqi* process, which is the result of a person’s

Dan Pemikiran Keislaman 7, no. 1 (March 24, 2020): 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.31102/alulum.7.1.2020.1-13>.

44 “Interview with Munir, 2022,” n.d.

45 “Interview with Munir and Syarifuddin, 2022.”

spiritual struggle (*mujahada*) which causes them to soar into High Place (God) ⁴⁶.

Another teaching that can be used as a preventive basis for religious deradicalism in *tanbih* of TQN is the value of the teachings of humanism and pluralism that are relevant in the context of nationalism and Islam. Humanism in *tanbih* is the doctrine of ethics in the context of interaction with fellow human beings from different groups, such as elders, peers, and the younger generation, which is contextualized in local social culture like *undak usuk* and etiquette in Sundanese culture ⁴⁷. Another most fundamental value of humanism in *tanbih* is attention to the oppressed and poor groups (*mustazafin*), which is manifested by compassion for the needy and poor ⁴⁸.

Meanwhile, the teachings on pluralism, especially religious pluralism, which are expressed in *tanbih* refer to the instructions in the Quran, Surah Al-Kafirun. Surah Al-Kafirun contains the firm stance of Islam towards people who have different beliefs. In fact, it is forbidden to conflate religious teachings (Qur'an Sura 109:1-6). The *ikhwan* of TQN are taught to respect religion and beliefs other than those of their group, foster tolerance and freedom to practice religious teachings, avoid disputes, and live in harmony and peace in the practice of religious life. Meanwhile, in the Sammaniyya Order, values and attitudes of tolerance are a consequence of the relativity of truth as stated above.

What is used as the value of pluralism in TQN and the Sammaniyya Order clearly shows an attitude of tolerance towards various religious and social groups in Indonesia. Therefore, the values embedded in TQN and the Sammaniyya Order are very relevant as part of natural religious deradicalism through compromise with religious elements, or at least, giving freedom without having to make revolutionary changes to the already established social order ⁴⁹.

46 Mohammad Fathi Royyani, "Apa Itu Al-Asfar Al-Arba'ah (6): Tanazul Dan Taraqqi," 2022, <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nkf7kc/apa-itu-alasfar-alarbaah-6-tanazul-dan-taraqqi>.

47 Baidhawati and Kholil, "Tanbih Dalam Kehidupan Bermasyarakat (Studi Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Kautsar Pademawu Pamekasan)."

48 Supandi Supandi and Ahmad Ahmad, "Pembelajaran Aqidah Akhlak Dalam Perspektif Humanisme Di MA Miftahul Qulub Galis Pamekasan," *Edureligia: Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam* 3, no. 1 (2019): 115–27, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.33650/edureligia.v3i2.1002>.

49 A.I. Dawisha, *The Arab Radicals* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1986).

The preventive approach by TQN in religious deradicalism is also emphasized through more moderate understandings of Islam that avoid religious extremism ⁵⁰. Such efforts are parallel to the theological belief and *fiqh* embraced by the adherents of Sunni Islam or *ahl as-sunnah wa l-jam ah* in Indonesia, especially the members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, although the latter did not express it directly. The theology in question is the theology of Ash'arism and Maturidism, which are the synthesis of the Mu tazila rationalism and the Khawarij Islamic conservatism. Meanwhile, in *fiqh*, Muslims in Indonesia adhere to one of the four schools, namely M lik , anaf , Sh fi , and anbal ⁵¹.

For the *ikhwan* of TQN, who are concentrated in Pesantren (Islamic boarding School) An-Nawawi Barjan and several pesantren in East Java, such as Pesantren At-Taqwa in Pasuruan and Pesantren Darul Ulum in Jombang, religious deradicalism has become a central program to handle radical religious beliefs and movements and “illegitimate” mystical sects with reference to the book of Hizib Bukhari. The book was recommended to be a kind of “hand book” by the leader of the pesantren, Ahmad Chalwani, since 2011 in the religious deradicalism program within TQN community and among *ahl as-sunnah wa l-jam ah* in general. The teachings of religious deradicalism in Hizib Bukhari are also programmed by alumni at pesantren where they serve after graduation so that religious deradicalism in pesantren and among the *ikhwan* of TQN in particular becomes more intense and spreads as a result of the role of these alumni.

Religious radical groups are described in the book of Hizib as “those who transgress the boundaries of freedom” or “deviants of freedom” (*jabbabira*), arrogant people (*mutakabbir*), and unjust (*zalim*) and misguided people (*dzilun*) ⁵². Strict action that must be taken against these radical groups is to destroy them, stay

50 Chalwani, *Risalah Do'a Dan Salawat*; Mahfud MD, “Solusi Atas Ekstremisme Adalah Mempraktikkan Moderasi Beragama,” Merdeka.Com, 2022, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/mahfud-md-solusi-atas-ekstremisme-adalah-mempraktikkan-moderasi-beragama.html>.

51 Ahmad Chalwani, *Funika Risalah Tuntunan Khalwat 'ala Thariqah Al-Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsabandiyah Yuthlabu Bi Ad-Din Al-Islami Al-Syafi Al-Anawai* (Purwerejo: Barzan, n.d.).

52 Syekh Muhammad bin Ismail bin Mughirah Al-Bukhari, *Hijb Al-Bukhari* (Magelang-Muntilan, n.d.), 12–13.

away from them, close their hearts, destroy their group, punish them with affliction (*fitnah*), and even label them as infidels⁵³. However, these actions are manifested only through prayer, recitation among the followers of TQN, and limited discussion as a traditional approach in Sufism, TQN in particular. Meanwhile, the actuality of the teachings of religious deradicalism in actions, for example, via protests, does not exist. So, prayer in the model of religious deradicalism by the Brotherhood of TQN becomes very central as a solution to humanitarian issues.

Religious deradicalism in the Sufi groups, although only through prayer, has a strong impact on the daily religiosity of the *ikhwan* of TQN, as can be proven by the absence of news about radical behavior within the TQN community. They remain moderate in their religious life and live in peace and tolerance. The conservation of the tolerant attitude of the *ikhwan* applies not only to fellow *ikhwan* of TQN, but also to those who are not *ikhwan*, including people of different faiths⁵⁴.

The preservation of moderate attitudes in religious life is confirmed and developed through various approaches and methods. Therefore, the inculcation of moderate religious attitude among the *ikhwan* of TQN cannot be considered apathy and stagnation because it develops through various space and time with full awareness. Some of these approaches and methods are by developing understanding and internalizing the concept of *mahabbah* or love of God through *dhikr*. In fact, *dhikr* and *mahabbah* are the basis of teaching and practice in countering religious radicalism and other ideologies so that a tolerant attitude grows towards people of different beliefs⁵⁵. *Dhikr* and prayer in the Sufism tradition, TQN in particular, have an impact on spiritual exercise (*riyadha*) not only in order to understand the meaning of majesty and knowledge of God as it is customary, but also the majesty of His creatures, as is common in the practice of education in Sufism. Good manners toward fellow creatures of God becomes the effortless way of obtaining the majesty of God.

53 Al-Bukhari, 14–17.

54 Ahmad et al., “The Sufi Order Against Religious Radicalism in Indonesia.”

55 Ahmad et al.

Another approach taken by the *ikhwan* of TQN with the help of their murshid is to inculcate a moderate attitude through the interpretation of the doctrinal texts of the Quran and other religious texts. Sufism generally interprets religious texts subjectively based on individual experiences and even provocatively by applying a hermeneutic approach in modern times ⁵⁶. Such an approach sometimes contrasts with the approach commonly used by mainstream Islamic scholars. The methodology of interpretation by Sufis emphasizes more on esoteric spiritual meanings ⁵⁷ and sometimes creates a sense of strangeness for the general public due to their unfamiliarity with it.

However, in its experience in Sufism, the differences and controversies can be minimized by TQN by doing the practice of “Sufism plus Sharia” which is more integrated and mutually reinforcing. This practice is a linearity of the Sufism concepts of Imam Junayd and Al-Gazali with the four schools of jurisprudence, especially Shafiism, in the context of Sufism that developed in Indonesia. Moreover, in the context of TQN Suryalaya and the Sammaniyya Order, the interpretation of Sufism can be contextualized with the local culture of the local community, namely Sundanese culture and Samman art ⁵⁸ so that a Sufism-based approach, in acting toward humanitarian issues, including religious deradicalism, appears to be more humanistic and becomes a solution as well as a correction to political and legal approaches ⁵⁹.

Contextualization of Sufism practices in the TQN and Sammaniyya Order covered by local culture can also be found

56 Musharraf Maryam, “A Study on the Sufi Interpretation of Qur’ān and The Theory of Hermeneutic,” *AL-BAYAN JOURNAL* 11, no. 1 (2013): 33–47, <https://doi.org/10.11136/jqh.1311.01.03>.

57 MA Achlami HS and Isnaini, “Sufi Exegesis of the Qur’an and Its Public Controversy,” in *Dvances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, Volume 492, Proceedings of the 1st Raden Intan International Conference on Muslim Societies and Social Sciences (RIICMuSSS 2019)*, 2019.

58 Shohibulwafa Tajul ‘Arifin, *Ala Inna Auliya’ Allah La KhaUfun ‘Alaihim Wa La Hum Yahzanun, Tanbih, Tawasul, Manaqib Bahasa Sunda* (Tasikmalaya: Patapan Suryalaya, 1956); Syafieh, Saifuddin, and Mawardi Siregar, “Sufism and Its Artistic Creativity: The Role of the Sammāniyya Sufi Order in the Da’wah Activity in Sumatera,,” *Teosofi Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam* 11, no. 1 (2021): 142–67, <https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2021.11.1.142-167>.

59 Ilyas Mohammed, “Critical Reflections on De-Radicalisation in Indonesia,” *Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* 10, no. 1 (December 26, 2020): 43–57, <https://doi.org/10.26618/ojp.v10i1.3097>.

in other locations, such as in Sumatra, Sambas, Purwerejo, and Jombang ⁶⁰. Such practices further strengthen the spread of Islamic belief and practices that are more friendly to local traditions and further strengthen the power of religious deradicalization and the spread of more friendly and tolerant Islam.

Religious deradicalization program is implemented by the *ikhwan* of TQN through the inculcation of national values. Meanwhile, in the Sammaniyya Order, the program is not very formally noticeable. At every religious event within the community of TQN, such as at Pesantren an-Nawawi in Purwerejo, which is affiliated with TQN, the national anthem and patriotic songs are sung sequentially in addition to recitation of verses from the Quran and *salawat* upon the Prophet Muhammad, a flag raising ceremony is held on the independence day of the Republic of Indonesia, and the history of the contribution of Islamic scholars in formulating Pancasila is presented. National anthem, “Indonesia Raya”, composed by Wage Rudolf Soepratman, and patriotic songs such as “Syukur”, “17 Agustus”, and “Hari Merdeka” composed by Major Muhammad Husein Mutahar are sung solemnly and eminently at religious events.

In the context of Sufism practiced by TQN and the Sammaniyya Order, religious deradicalization is strengthened by their general affiliation to the traditional socio-religious organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Nahdlatul Ulama carries the concept of moderate (*wasatiyyah*) Islam or Nusantara Islam through their traditional religious leaders with the aim of neutralizing the flow of radical Islamic beliefs and practices, especially on social media (Schmidt, 2021).

Regarding NU and TQN in acting toward religious radicalism, Chalwani said: “...if we expect to see Islam that brings peace, it is Islam that is promoted by NU, which has a commitment to fight religious radicalism and even offers and spreads Islam that is friendly, not violent...” ⁶¹. He, as ulama,

60 Chalwani, *Funika Risalah Tuntunan Khalwat ‘ala Thariqah Al-Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsabandiyah Yuthlabu Bi Ad-Din Al-Islami Al-Syafi Al-Anawai*; Syafieh, Saifuddin, and Siregar, “Sufism and Its Artistic Creativity: The Role of the Sammaniyya Sufi Order in the Da’wah Activity in Sumatera.”; Damanhuri Damanhuri et al., “Implementasi Nilai-Nilai Pancasila Sebagai Upaya Pembangunan Karakter Bangsa,” *Untirta Civic Education Journal*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.30870/ucej.v1i2.1890>.

61 Chalwani, *Risalah Do’a Dan Salawat*.

leader of pesantren, and at the same time an *ikhwan* of TQN, has his own influence as a religious leader as well as the next generation of charismatic ulama. In fact, in general, male and female ulama have been shown to play a responsive role in countering religious radicalism that is developing in Indonesia through the study of relevant classical and modern religious texts ⁶².

A song titled “*Ya Lalwatan*» composed by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figure, Wahab Hasbullah, is ritually sung at every religious event held by TQN, especially in Central Java Province and East Java Province. The song reinforces the view of Hadratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari as one of national heroes of Indonesia and the founder of NU ⁶³. The lyrics of the song tell about the importance of loving the homeland that was inspired by the slogan “*hubbul watan minal iman*” (love for one’s homeland is part of faith), which was inspired by the Prophet’s prayer in his love for the land of Medina ⁶⁴. Love for the homeland is one of the doctrines of instilling and developing national values in Muslims, especially among *nahdliyin* (NU followers), which aims to foster national values or nationalism that are contrary to religious radicalism. The doctrine of ‘love for the homeland’ is strengthened by other doctrines, such as ASWAJA, namely the notion of *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jam’a* that is full of teachings on moderation (*taw su*) and balance (*taw zun*), which are preserved in the tradition of madrasa education ⁶⁵.

62 Fathimatuz Zahra Anis, “Roles of the Turats Ulama Nusantara Groups on the Counter Radicalism in Indonesia,” *Santri: Journal of Pesantren and Fiqh Sosial* 3, no. 1 (June 29, 2022): 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.35878/santri.v3i1.369>; Septi Gumindari and Ilman Nafi’a, “The Role of Cirebon Women Ulama in Countering Religious Radicalism,” *QJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)* 8, no. 1 (June 22, 2020): 33, <https://doi.org/10.21043/qjiss.v8i1.6430>.

63 Muhammad Asad Shahab, *Al’Alamah Muhammad Hasyim Asy’ari Wadi’ Lubnat Istiqlal Indunisiya* (Beirut: Dar Al-Shadaq, 1971).

64 Muhammad Syakir, “‘Hubbul Wathan’ Bukan Hadits, Tapi...,” NUOnline, 2022, <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/hubbul-wathan-bukan-hadits-tapi-VwDOa>.

65 Muhammad Kosim, Martin Kustati, and Duski Samad, “Deradicalization-Based Aswajasi Education and Minangkabau Local Wisdom in Syaikh Sulaiman’s Thought,” *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 21, no. 1 (May 18, 2021): 73–103, <https://doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v21i1.2703>. religious radicalism needs to be anticipated by the deradicalization of education. The aim of the study is to analyze the thoughts of Sheikh Sulaiman Arrasuli, as one of the influential scholars in Minangkabau, focusing on the deradicalization through education based ASWAJASI and Minangkabau local wisdom. Although the term deradicalization of the education is not found in his books, his thoughts that juxtapose religious education and local wisdom of Minangkabau have relevance in efforts to deradicalize education. In his several writings, Sheikh Sulaiman

D. Conclusion

Sufism in the form of Sufi order practices, such as in the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya Sufi Order (TQN), has doctrines, practices and even programs for religious deradicalization. Meanwhile, the Sammaniyya Sufi Order is based on the ritual of *dhikr*, *ratib Samman*, and the doctrine of seven dignities, especially at the level of “al-Ins n al-K mil” dignity, namely the level of the process of actualizing structures and functions so that religious deradicalization does not require a special program. Correction and control of the spiritual journey in the Sammaniyya Sufi Order is done through the *ratib Samman* ritual and *taklim* for the public, both within and outside the Sammaniyya community.

The process of religious deradicalism is done starting with basic teachings, such as *tanbih*, contextual and moderate interpretation of Quranic texts and hadith or sunnah, implementation of concepts in the Sufi order, such as *mahabbah* and *muhasabah*, and teaching certain books, which are relevant to the context

Arrasuli argued that the deradicalization of education in Minangkabau was carried out by developing the understanding of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah wa Syafi'iyah which is full of moderate and balanced teachings. In the educational process, teachers are required to have ulama-based competencies, who are ready to be role models and enlighteners for the umara, the importance of collaboration between ulama and umara, prioritizing tafaquh fi al-din studies in madrasas, strengthening the morals of students who are devout and cultured, and implementing education without violence. The education process is based on religion and local wisdom.

فرطتال ببستي: صخلملم
قلخي. ةنيذدلا ميلعتلا مساب يدسجل ريغو يدسجل باهرلا دض فنع لامعأ باكتراب ام صخش مايق يف ينيذدلا ةنيذدلا ةيلكيدارلا روهظ عفاود دجأ. نيملمأل قمر يه يتلا لاسلال ميلعت دض ةيلبس راع ةمصولم عل اذه ميلعتلا نع فرطتال عزن لالغ نم ينيذدلا فرطتال عقوت بجي. لذل. ةنيذدلا ميلعتلل قيضلا مهفل وه عزن لوح. وبكغنانيم يف آرثؤم اثحاب هنا عم. يلوسرلا ناميلس خيشلا راكفأ ليجت يلإ تحبلل اذه فدهي يف دوجوم ريغ ميلعتلا يف فرطتال قلازل حلطصم نأ نم مغزلا عل. وبكغنانيم يف ميلعتلا نع فرطتال قلوذبملا دوجولاب قلص تاذ وبكغنانيم قيلم قيلملا ةمكحلل او ينيذدلا ميلعتلا نراقت يتلا هراكفأ إاف. مباتك وبكغنانيم يف ميلعتلا يف فرطتال عزن نأ دجو. مباتك نم ديدعل يف. ميلعتلا يف فرطتال قلازل يف. قنزاوتملال ولدتعمل ميلعتلاب ءيلملا ةيفاسلاو ةعامجلال ةنسلال لهأ مهف ريوطت لالغ نم مت دق يذتحي حجامن اونوكيل دادعتسا عل قيلمع تلافك مهيدل نوكتي نأ نيململ نم بلطي. ةيميلعتلا قيلملا

author: «{{dropping-particle}}»family: «Kosim»
given: «Muhammad»non-dropping-particle: «»parse-names: false, suffix: «»
dropping-particle: «»family: «Kustati»given: «Martin»non-dropping-particle: «»parse-names: false, suffix: «»
dropping-particle: «»family: «Samad»given: «Duski»non-dropping-particle: «»parse-names: false, suffix: «»
container-title: «Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam»id: «ITEM-1»issue: «1»issued: «{{date-parts: [[2021, 5, 18]]}}»page: «73-103»title: «Deradicalization-Based Aswajasi Education and Minagkabau Local Wisdom in Syaikh Sulaiman's Thought»type: «article-journal»volume: «21»uris: «http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uiid=2f74a372-d043-49f1-9fbd-77c0ee8e10d6»
mendeley: «{{formattedCitation}}»Muhammad Kosim, Martin Kustati, and Duski Samad, “Deradicalization-Based Aswajasi Education and Minagkabau Local Wisdom in Syaikh Sulaiman's Thought,” <i>Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam</i> 21, no. 1 (May 18, 2021

of religious deradicalism, to both novice and veteran *ikhwan* of TQN, combined with the practice of *dhikr* and prayer in the Sufism tradition ⁶⁶. The emergence of religious radicalism in certain cases, such as the peasant's revolt in Banten ⁶⁷, was closely related to the actions of resistance against injustice and pressure from the authorities, which in that context was the repressive action of the Dutch East Indies Government.

Another practice of strengthening religious deradicalism implemented by the *ikhwan* of TQN is to instill, preserve, and strengthen national values. Some of the traditional rituals that are usually done are singing the national anthem and patriotic songs in every religious or social event involving TQN community. The national anthem "Indonesia Raya" composed by Wage Rudolf Soepratman and patriotic songs such as "Syukur", "17 Agustus" and "Hari Merdeka" composed by Major Muhammad Husein Mutahar were performed sequentially along with the recitation of verses from the Quran and *salawat* upon the Prophet Muhammad, then ended by singing the song "Ya Lalwatan" which was composed by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figure, KH Wahab Hasbullah. The lyrics of the song tell about the importance of loving the homeland that was inspired by the slogan "*hubbul watan minal iman*" (love for one's homeland is part of faith), which was inspired by the Prophet's prayer. Love for the homeland is one of the doctrines of inculcating and developing national values for Muslims, especially the *nahdliyin*, in order to counteract religious radicalism. Therefore, religious deradicalism can also be achieved through the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia in addition to the teachings and programs of religious deradicalism through a more holistic approach.

66 Ahmad et al., "The Sufi Order Against Religious Radicalism in Indonesia."

67 Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia*. Sartono. (1966)

Part 5

Moderation In Dawah: The Experience of Religious Organizations in Indonesia*

Islamic socio-religious institutions and organizations in Indonesia have existed for a long time.¹ This is a consequence of Indonesia being the largest Muslim country in the world (the biggest of the Muslim countries).² and has also placed it as the third largest democracy in the world.³ There are large organizations such as Muhammadiyah (b. 1912), Persatuan Islam (b. 1920), Al-Irsyad in Jakarta (b. 1913) and Nahdatul Ulama (b. 1926).⁴ There are also Islamic social organizations concentrated in areas with certain characteristics, such as Nahdatul Wathan (NW) in Lombok NTB (b. 1953), Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI) in West Java (b. 1912), Aljam'iyat Al-Khairat in Jakarta (b. 1905) and Al Jam'iyatul Washliyah in Medan (b. 1930). Referring to the latest findings, the number of socio-religious organizations in Indonesia as of 2023 reached hundreds and continues to grow, [Martin van Bruinessen, *Overview of Muslim Organizations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia, in Contemporary Developments*

1 * Inauguration speech of Professor of Da'wah Science at UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 2024.

@ Professor in the field of Da'wah Science, Faculty of Da'wah and Communication, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati

Regarding the discussion of da'wah institutions and organizations, see, A. Aripudin and Zaenal Mukarom, *Da'wah Institutions*, Bandung: Rosdakarya, 2023.

2 Biro Pusat Statistik Indonesia (BPS) pada tahun 2010, jumlah penduduk muslim di Indonesia adalah 207.176.162, yaitu 87,2% dari seluruh penduduk Indonesia.

3 *The third largest democratic country in the world*, Diplomat Magazine, Wednesday, November 22, 2023.

4 NU was founded by Kyai Hasjim Asj'ari, KH. Abdul Wahab and KH. Bisri in 1926, as a response to the growth of previous Islamic modernists, especially Muhammadiyah.

in Indonesian Islam Explaining the “Conservative Turn”, ISEAS Publishing 2013. plus Islamic organizations affiliated with political parties and other mass organizations.

It cannot be denied that the large number of religious social organizations has created a competitive climate regarding ideas, values and religious orientations for “sale”,⁵ which influences the dynamics of Islam (read: da’wah). There are organizations with religious views that tend to be exclusive, conservative and political and there are also those that are more moderate, so they grow and grow because they are more “friendly” to the Indonesian socio-cultural context.⁶ This group of religious organizations has contributed a lot to strengthening moderate understanding in religion in Indonesia as represented by NU and Muhammadiyah. These two Islamic religious organizations generally play a role in improving the quality of public education, such as establishing Islamic boarding schools, madrasas/schools, universities, foundations and hospitals. In fact, in the practice of social life, these two religious organizations play a role in maintaining political balance as a civil society force and a moral force in national and state life, as well as contributing to national leadership candidates as recorded in history.⁷

Its role as civil society in the context of plural and heterogeneous Indonesian society will continue to be tested. The test in question, especially when facing contemporary social challenges, both at the local and national level, includes its contribution in responding to global issues, such as environmental damage, religious radicalism, the rise of fake news on social media (hoaxes), religious intolerance and international geopolitical issues.

Regarding the problem of religious intolerance in the Indonesian context, Islamic religious organizations have shown their contribution in various forms conceptually and operationally.

5 Carol Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia the Contest for Society Ideas and Values*, London: C. Hurst & Company, Ltd, 2015.

6 Hasse Jubba, Jaffary Awang, Zuly Qodir, Hannani & Mustaqim Pabbajah, *The Contestation between Conservative and Moderate Muslims in Promoting Islamic Moderatism in Indonesia*, Cogent Social Sciences, Volume 8, 2022, issue 1.

7 Herbert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam, Islam dan Demokrasi di Indonesia*, trj. A. Baso, Yogyakarta: LKis-The Asia Foundation, 2001. Especially pages 100-186.

The idea of “Islam Nusantara”⁸ promoted by NU and “Progressing Islam”⁹ by Muhammadiyah, regardless of the differences and dynamics of interpretation regarding it, is evidence of the contribution of thought based on Islamic ideology promoted by NU and Muhammadiyah. This idea will then become the dominant vision and mission of da’wah practice in the Indonesian and global context in the future by the two mass organizations.

In the idea of “Islam Nusantara”, for example, it is actually an inductive logic strategy based on the concept once put forward by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) regarding “Indigenization of Islam”.¹⁰ An attempt to incorporate Islam into the traditions of the archipelago, [‘Islam Nusantara’ is a term that has recently become popular, especially after the PBNU made it the theme of the 33rd NU Congress in Jombang, East Java, on 1-5 August 2015.] so that Islam and the local traditional context become one. Islamic missions can enter and be accepted, while traditions can be maintained, [Fitriah,39], one of the effective strategies and intelligent missions that is visible in the thoughts of Gus Dur.¹¹

Gus Dur’s idea of indigenization serves not only to make the practice of da’wah more friendly to local traditional contexts, but is also a response to the trend of globalization, even westernization, which dominates trends in society’s understanding, including understanding of religion. Such a response, in a social context, is a symptom, borrowing Th. Ericson, as a “paradox of globalization”, where the more global a person becomes, the more obsessed they are with the uniqueness of their local traditions and small differences are increasingly emphasized.¹²

In another form, efforts to ground Islam are played by Muhammadiyah. The Islamic religious social organization founded by Kyai Ahmad Dahlan, since its founding, has been

8 The spirit of the idea of Islam Nusantara NU in Indonesia actually came from Abdul Wahid (KH. Wahid Hasyim), the father of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the formulator of the first principle of Pancasila. K.H. Wahid Hasyim *Berpulanganya Ulama Penggagas Islam Nusantara*. <https://tirto.id/cmZ7>, diakses, Nop 2023. Mohammad Rifai, *Wahid Hasyim: Biografi Singkat 1914-1953*, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Garasi, 2017.

9 Ahmad Najib Burhani, *Muhammadiyah Berkemajuan Pergeseran dari Puritanisme eke Kosmopolitanisme*, Bandung: Mizan, 2016.

10 Abdurrahman Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama dan Kebudayaan*, Jakarta: Desantara, 2001, h. 111.

11 Greg Barton, *Biografi Gus Dur The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011, h. 63-70.

12 Ahmad Najib Burhani, *Muhammadiyah...* h. 59.

a mission/preaching organization to overhaul the social order of the people which tends to be stagnant and sluggish.¹³ One of the indicators is “the mentality of inferiority is still adhered to”, especially in the charity (action) of the people. Islam is a religion that focuses more on charity, not on rituals, let alone ceremonies.¹⁴ Muhammad Iqbal’s opinion is often quoted by Muhammadiyah leaders and has become one of the spirits in the practice of his da’wah movement.¹⁵

The Muhammadiyah mass organization is the “operator” (in the sense that its supporters and citizens are the main targets) of implementing the idea of “Progressing Islam” just as the NU organization is the operator of “Islam Nusantara” with all its socio-cultural units and stakes. Both have their own orientation and character in offering and implementing Islamic ideas. The differences between the two are more visible in strategy and stressing in the formulation regarding “main priorities”. So, what are the priorities for da’wah that are relevant to the current context and urgently carried out by religious mass organizations, so that their contribution to social and national life can be seen? Of course, in addition to its role in guiding the people as mentioned above.

The existential fact of religious organizations will only be sustainable if religious organizations are responsive to the social changes that are and will be faced by the people. Breaking away from the essential ties with the people, religious organizations have no meaning and will then be abandoned. Muslims constitute the majority in Indonesia, without denying the existence of non-Muslims. If Muslims progress, the government and state will also progress, where the Ministry of Religion is the operator in the development of the religious sector. Likewise, vice versa, if the people and nation face problems, it is the majority of

13 Fauji Koda, *The History of Muhammadiyah’s Thought and Movement, Study on Personality and Idea of The Founding Figure* (KH. Ahmad Dahlan). International Journal of Scientific & Technology Research, 25 August 2017. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-History-Of-Muhammadiyah%E2%80%99s-Thought-And-Movement%2C-Koda/e9e7f502f6367622fbegf21d28a6ed51d5f0c640>.

14 Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *the Recontruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: J. Iqbal-M.M Ashraf, 1962, h. 3.

15 Misalnya, Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, *Al-Qur’an Realitas Sosial dan Limbo Sejarah (Sebuah Refleksi)*, Bandung: Pustaka, 1985.

people who get the most of it. This is where the social morals of religious organizations are tested.

In several cases of acts of religious intolerance, both within and between members of different religions, Muslims (in their position as the majority) are the ones who have more responsibility than minority religious groups. Minority believers need “space” and social justice from the majority group, including on issues related to religion, such as the establishment of places of worship and “limited protection” through regulations as control. Freedom of religion and its actualization are every human’s basic rights, and are even guaranteed in our country’s constitution. However, this freedom is also limited by the freedoms and rights of other groups of people. There are many cases related to the importance of raising awareness about social and cultural limitations in the context of religious freedom. This kind of understanding should be realized by every religious community as part of their religious mission, so as to avoid experiences like what happened in Burma and several other parts of the world.¹⁶

Referring to several experiences of nations in other parts of the world, the majority community generally tends to behave “unfairly” and tyrannically towards minority communities, as in the case of the expulsion of the Rohingya Muslim minority by Buddhists in Myanmar,¹⁷ expulsion of the Ahmadiyah community in Cikesik Baten,¹⁸ intimidation of Muslims in Tolikara Papua,¹⁹ religious riots in Kupang, NTT in 1998,²⁰ to the tensions between Muslims and Hindus in India,²¹ which until now, does not seem to show any signs of abating.

16 Muhammad Wildan, *The Persecution of Rohingya Muslims and the Path to Democratization in Myanmar*. Studia Islamika, Vol 28, No. 1 2021.

17 Iqthyer Uddin Md Zahed, *The State against the Rohingya: Root Causes of the Expulsion of Rohingya from Myanmar*. Politics, Religion & Ideology Volume 22, 2021.

18 Rizal Panggabean dan Ihsan Ali Fauzi, *Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia*, Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD)-Paramadina Foundation, 2015, h. 63-90.

19 Tolikara, Idul Fitri 2015: *Tentang Konflik Agama, Mayoritas-Minoritas dan Perjuangan anah Damai*. https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/pembakaran_masjid_papua_memicu_konflik-07202015182625.html. Diakses, 2023.

20 Tim Kemanusiaan Kupang Sub-Tim Pencarian Fakta, *Laporan Investigasi Awal-1 tentang Kerusuhan Kupang dan Sekitarnya (30 November-1 Desember)*, Kupang: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), 1998.

21 Violette Graff Juliette Galonnier, *Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots in India I (1947-1986)*, SciencesPo. <https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/hindu-muslim-communal-riots-india-i-1947-1986.html>, diakses, 21 Nopember 2023.

In the case of the riots in NTT, religious organizations from each religion (Islam, Christianity and Catholicism), for example, were very visible in their contribution to resolving religious conflicts. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), NU, Muhammadiyah, PGI and the Indonesian Catholic Bishops' Conference (KWI) play their roles through various methods and approaches, including strengthening cultural approaches, such as conducting advocacy, intensifying the role of FKUB, the culture of "marrying and marrying" to form a social consensus.²²

The contribution of mass organizations apart from being a supplier of ideas and enlightenment regarding the importance of upholding the values of humanism and socialism as a connecting bridge between power and religious communities,²³ as seen in economic development, politics, health and education.²⁴ This relationship can take the form of a contribution to improving the spirituality and level of practice of the people, both personally and communally.²⁵ Likewise, at the spirit level, religious organizations provide the strongest religious (spiritual) foundation for the movement.²⁶

Religious institutions can enforce their competence, performance and influence on society by involving lower institutions and organizations. Religious organizations have proven themselves to be the best agents of social change. Apart from Indonesia's achievements in the field of social welfare, religious organizations play an active role in carrying out their commitment to participate in development.²⁷

22 Acep Aripudin, Dadan Anugrah, Zaenal Mukarom, Imron Rosyidi, Khoiruddin Muchtar. *Struggles of Religious Communities: A Study of Relations and Communication Among Diverse Religious Communities in Maintaining Religious Harmony in East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia*. Research Journal in Advan Humanities, 2023. Proses!

23 Zaenal Mukarom, Acep Aripudin, Imron Rosyidi dan Dadan Anugrah, *Social Harmony: The Construction of Relations and Communication Among Religious Leaders for Conflict Resolution in Bali*, Scientific Culture, 2023. Proses terbit.

24 Miftakhul Munir and Nurul Aini, *Community Participation in Efforts to Develop Islamic Religious Education Pasuruan City*. Journal of Islamic Education, Vol. 6 No. 2 November 2021.

25 Jennifer Epley Sanders, *Development Issues and the Role of Religious Organizations in Indonesia*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284162550_Development_Issues_and_the_Role_of_Religious_Organizations_in_Indonesia/citations.

26 Ahmad Irfangi, *Indicator of Religious Muslim Entrepreneurs*. Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Islam, 8 (1), 2022, h. 1072.

27 Hariawan Adji, *The Role of Religious Institutions in Promoting Social Welfare in Indonesia*. Mozaik Humaniora, Vol 21 (2), 2021. h. 169-177.

The contribution of religious organizations in other religious missions is as agents and media in spreading moderate and inclusive ideas and attitudes in religion. Religious organizations have a central role, both personally and organizationally. The participation of religious organizations in responding and developing the community is very real, structured and systematic, distinguishing it from similar efforts if carried out individually.²⁸ Schools, madrasas, universities, majlis taklim, sermons in mosques and events within internal religious organizations are used as media for momentum to convey the importance of moderate attitudes in religion.²⁹

Moderation (Arabic: wasathiyah) is actually familiar in Islam,³⁰ although it cannot be monopolized as only “belonging to Islam”. This moderate understanding and attitude is demonstrated by Indonesian Muslims who are based on Pancasila as manifested in their religious traditions which are reflected in religious organizations. Referring to A. Azra’s observations, in religious traditions, Indonesian Muslims adhere to Asy’ariyah kalam (theology), or Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah.³¹ Then in fiqh adheres to Shafi’i or Shafi’ism, or at least follows one of the four schools of fiqh. Then in Sufism it tends towards the more moderate Sufism of Al-Ghazali.³²

The main values of Wasathiyah Islam which include tawasuth, tawazun, i’tidal, tasamuh, shura, islah, muwathanah and Qudwah (exemplary) are closely embedded in our society,³³

28 Umiarso and Muhammad Qorib, *The Practice of Religious Moderation Based on Theo-anthropocentric in Indonesian Islamic Boarding Schools: A Phenomenological Study*. Jurnal Iqra': Kajian Ilmu Pendidikan, Volume 7, Number 2, December 2022.

29 Muhammad Rais, *Religious Moderation Education According Scholars in Gowa Regency, South Sulawesi*. Educandum: Volume 7 Nomor 1 Juni 2021.

30 (QS, 2:143) اَتَتْكُمْ مُّثَقِّلَتٌ لِّوَسْرًا ذَوَاتُ سَائِلَا عِلَاحٌ عَادَمَتْ اَوْتُوْكَتَلِ اَطْسَرُوْكُمْ مِّنْ مِّنْ لِّوَسْرًا عَجَلًا لِّقَلْبِكُو
The meaning of wasathan is the part that is between two sides, namely the middle. The word ummatan wasathan means that the people of the prophet Muhammad are a people who are moderate in religion, neither excessive nor deficient (*la gulwun wa la taqshirun*). Abi Ja'far Muhammad Ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, *Jami' al-Bayan fi Takwil al-Qur'an*, Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 2009, h. 142. Kata wasathan juga bisa dimaknai 'pertengahan dan adil'. Abu al-Qasim Mahmud Ibn Umar Al-Zamakhshari, *Alkasasyaf 'an Haqiq at-Tanzil wa Uyun al-Aqawil fi Wujuh at-Ta'wil*, Beirut: Daar al-Fikri, 1429 H/ 2008 M.

31 One of the characteristics is that he quickly surrenders to fate.

32 A. Azra, *Moderasi Islam di Indonesia dari Ajaran, Ibadah, hingga Perilaku*. Jakarta: Kencana.; 2020. Lihat juga, *Islam Nusantara adalah Islam Toleran*. <https://www.beritasatu.com/news/289331/azyumardi-azra-islam-nusantara-adalah-islam-toleran>

33 A. Azra, *Islam Wasatiy*. <https://www.uinsyahada.ac.id/islam-wasatiy-dalam-paparan-azyumardi-azra-di-seminar-ilmiah-iain-padangsidimpuan/>

so that Indonesian Islam feels friendly, the smiling and colorful Islam, even more inclusive in politics. Islam is one, but its operational guidelines and technical guidelines are different.³⁴ Such religious attitudes and understandings also influence the introduction of a more varied and moderate Islam. Referring to the results of my search, there are at least three strategies of religious mass organizations in strengthening religious moderation in Indonesia, as follows:

First, internalization of understanding values in Islamic texts (Intim). Islamic religious organizations, as can be observed, generally play a role through public education, such as establishing Islamic boarding schools, madrasas/schools, universities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Islamic texts, both classical and modern, have their values of moderation constructed and used as a reference through a process of study and repetition. The advantage of this strategy is that it has a strong and long-lasting *atsar/former* in forming the character of the people. Meanwhile, its weaknesses, as stated by Benard, appear to have given rise to the ideology of Islam and traditionalism on the other hand, as one of the roots of the emergence of extremism in Islam (Benard, 2023).

Second, the strategy of “Islamic Nationalization” in the Indonesian context (Niki). The formula for Islamic-Indonesianness and modernity presented by Nurchlosh Madjid (Cak Nur) in the 1970-80s is the best example of how Islamic values were “nationalized” in the Indonesian context. Islamic traditions are still maintained, while carrying out progressive innovations to be compatible with current developments.

Islamic organizations carry out similar strategies as seen in Islamic studies and publications. Likewise, in the practice of social life, they play a role in maintaining political balance as a civil society force and a moral force in national and state life, as well as contributing to future national leaders as recorded in history (Hefner, 2001). As a civil society in the context of a plural and heterogeneous Indonesian society,

34 A. Azra, dalam, Ayu Purwaningsih, *Islam di Indonesia Islam yang Rileks*. <https://www.dw.com/id/profesor-azyumardi-azra-islam-di-indonesia-adalah-islam-yang-rileks/a-48575784>.
Politik Islam yang Inklusif di Indonesia, <http://ppi.unas.ac.id/prof-azra-politik-islam-yang-inclusive-di-indonesia/>.

its contributions continue to be tested, especially when facing contemporary social challenges, both at the local and national levels, including its contribution in responding to global issues, such as environmental damage, religious radicalism, the rise of fake news on social media (hoaxes), religious intolerance and international geopolitical issues.

Third, the globalization of Islamic values in the Indonesian context (Genit). The core of the Genit Strategy is an effort by religious mass organizations to “market” the ideas and practices of tolerant Islam unique to Indonesia. The main agents for spreading Indonesian Islamic ideas are mainly played by Muslim intellectuals and Islamic leaders, whether they are in the structure of religious mass organizations or not. Through the Genit strategy, it is not only a typical Indonesian Islamic dialogue with the global space, but also fosters adaptation in aspects of tools and approaches and methods in the spirit of participating in building a world order that is friendlier to humanitarian aspects and other global issues. Some examples are in the form of programs facilitated by the government, including through the World Conference on Religion for Peace (WCRP), The ASEAN Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue Conference (IIDC), or such as those initiated by regional governments such as the English for Ulama program (Syafei, 2021).

Moderate in religion, both understanding and practice appear in the ideas of individuals and religious organizations. In NU, for example, religious moderation is constructed in many aspects, such as relations between religious believers, creating a harmonious society, playing roles according to duties and functions in society, moderation in education, legal aspects and understanding of religion, as well as moderation in economic equality.³⁵ The aspect of relations between religious believers appears more substantive in the narrative of religious moderation in the Nahdlatul Ulama preaching discourse which includes three dimensions; moderation in religious thought, moderation through movement, and moderation in religious traditions and practices.³⁶

35 Serin Himatus Soraya and Wahyu Tri Wibowo, *Construction of Public Opinion about Religious Moderation on NU Online Instagram Accounts (@nuonline_id)*. Komunika: Jurnal Dakwah dan Komunikasi Vol. 15, No. 1, 2021, h. 111-123.

36 Umi Musyarrofah, *Religious Moderation in the Discourse of Nahdlatul Ulama's Dakwah in the Era of Industry 4.0*. Millah: Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, August

The moderate dictum in religious practice, in essence, religion must protect religious freedom.³⁷

Meanwhile, religious moderation in the Muhammadiyah context places greater emphasis on intra-Muslim dialogue and developing understanding of religious differences. Emphasizing the spirit of not depending on the economic development of capitalism and socialism through zakat institutions for economic growth and building an independent and prosperous society. Opposing deviations from social and political norms, such as oligarchic interests and group politics.³⁸

Three Muhammadiyah concepts in understanding moderates, among others, were conveyed by Abdul Mu'ti on the official website Muhammadiyah.or.id, one of the phases of which is to behave in accordance with science and law, which is a fair attitude by putting things in their place.³⁹ Fairness in law is something that is in accordance with applicable rules and regulations.⁴⁰

NU, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic religious organizations appear to have similar goals and ideals regarding the importance of religious moderation in the Indonesian context.⁴¹ These ideas and ideals are not limited to the elite in the organization, but must be able to reach the people, especially the grassroots which consists of many members of society who are still wallowing in poverty and backwardness as proven by data from observers.⁴²

Building a moderate, inclusive and pluralistic society requires intelligent effort and hard work, in addition to a commitment to

2023.

37 Thomas C. Berg, *What Do Religion's Social Contributions Have to Do with Religious Freedom?*. Berkley Forum. <https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/what-do-religion-s-social-contributions-have-to-do-with-religious-freedom>. Diakses, 4 Des 2023.

38 David Efendi, Bachtiar Dwi Kurniawan, Alam Mahadika, dkk., *Mainstreaming Religious Moderation in Preventing Radicalisms in Contemporary Indonesia: A Case of Muhammadiyah*. file:///C:/Users/PC%20MASTER/Downloads/125985173.pdf.

39 David Efendi, Bachtiar Dwi Kurniawan, Alam Mahadika, dkk., *Mainstreaming Religious Moderation*, h. 367.

40 Abdul Mu'ti, Lima Makna Ummatan Wasathan, <https://muhammadiyah.or.id/lima-makna-ummatan-wasathan/>. Diakses, 27 Nopember 2023.

41 Ervina Putri Wulandari, Fadiah Annisa, dkk., *Moderation of Religion Between Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Christian in Tegal Rejo Village, Medan Perjuangan Subdistrict*. International Journal of Cultural and Social Science IJCSS 2 (2) 2021, h. 112-117.

42 Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia*. Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 42, No. 1 2020, h. 58-84.

the importance of living together within a national framework. Efforts towards realizing these ideals are not haphazard, let alone just an “imaging effort” and a tool for policy legitimization.⁴³ which is in sharp contrast to reality, as found in several cases of extreme attitudes shown by sympathizers of religious organizations.⁴⁴

The moderation thinking of religious mass organizations, within a national framework, has similarities, even the same as the spirit of moderation in maintaining national resilience and preventive efforts in warding off exclusivism, extremism and terrorism.⁴⁵ Creating a moderate community that is free from extremism will not be successful if efforts in other fields are neglected. Therefore, a comprehensive effort is needed, especially in equalizing access to quality education and economic justice.

The various opportunities and evidence of religious organizations' service in da'wah (read: community development) are not without challenges and obstacles. Especially if it is related to his contribution to practical political practice which is an interesting view of the context of relations between Islam and Indonesian Muslims. Referring to Benedict Anderson, Islamic organizations face three main obstacles related to political relations.⁴⁶

First, stability in religious social organizations has a different nature from politics, because politics “has not yet become a habit.” Society is sharply divided when religion has to regulate political organization. While Islamic organizations hold the view that religious services and social welfare activities should be carried out together, they believe that politics should serve to enhance religious and social activities, not the other way around.

Second, differences in understanding about the role of Islam in politics make it difficult to mobilize members. Leaders

43 Dikla Yogev, *Community-Society Equilibrium: Religious Organizations in the Service of a Secular State*. Contemporary Jewry, 2021. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12397-021-09397-9>.

44 Jauhari Fatkhul Muzakki, *Upaya Pembangunan Citra Ormas Islam Moderat Organisasi Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); Studi Tentang Motif Perilaku Moderasi Beragama Para Kader Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Di Kecamatan Trawas Kabupaten Mojokerto*. Paradigma, Vol. 11 No. 1 2022.

45 Pipin Armita, *Religious Moderation as a National Defense Effort to Exclusivism, Extrimism, and Terrorism: Concept and Implementation*. Al-Wasatiyyah: Journal of Religious Moderation, Volume 1 No. 2. 2022, h. 194-216.

46 Benedict Anderson, “Religion and Politics in Indonesia since Independence”, in Benedict Anderson, Mitsuo Nakamura and Mohamad Slamet (eds.), *Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia*. Clayton: Monash University, 1975.

and members of Islamic organizations differ on whether Islamic organizations should be involved in electoral politics or not. They must support a particular candidate or party. Meanwhile, several Muslim leaders and members believe that Islamic organizations must be actively involved in politics. There are also those who believe that they should refrain from electoral politics to avoid tensions and divisions that might arise as a result of supporting party A or a particular candidate, so that differences of opinion can limit mobilization capacity.

Third, the fragmentation of Islamic civil society authority has reduced the capacity of Islamic figures, such as to influence elections. There appears to be no centralized authority in Islam in Indonesia, and no new source of religious authority has emerged. Indonesian ulama do not have the same authority as before, because they face internal and external challenges to become more pragmatic and materialistic. At the same time, many of them are affiliated with political parties, people will abandon these religious figures if they do not agree with their political affiliation.

Facing the reality of the political constraints of the people, as stated by Anderson above, there are problems with da'wah. Several solutions to the thoughts and attitudes of religious organizations were put forward by several Muslim leaders and related mass organizations, such as promoting the concept of ethical and moral politics, anti-corruption and violence and justice.⁴⁷

Looking Forward!

What are the urgent efforts to ensure that the contribution of religious organizations to the development of the people remains current and relevant today? Referring to the results of observations, the following objectives need to be paid attention to:

First, be responsive to issues that are developing among the people, such as being a leading locomotive in the implementation of halal economic business through positioning, differentiation and branding strategies for halal products or brands. The aim is none other than to help improve the social welfare of the

47 M. Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, Bandung: Mizan, 1996. Terutama, h. 74.

people, especially the poor, as is prominently practiced in parts of Africa. Religious organizations are often chosen by the government in developing welfare because they have their own value, as in the case of Covid-19, although further study is needed.⁴⁸

Second, optimizing the role in mediating and communicating positive values and scientific progress to the people, as well as contributing to socialization and participation in public actions. There is already evidence that communication that is not based on religion fails. Religion and religious elements are central to the success of progress agendas, although there is data in non-Islamic religions in the opposite case, where religion does not have a significant impact. Belief in religion contributes to moving society towards sustainability through the Framework for Strategic Sustainable Development (FSSD) or strategic sustainable development framework perspective.

Third, carry out more serious research regarding religious mass organizations. Questions such as, how strongly are religious organizations committed to the progress of the people? still often heard. Moreover, the empirical perception among the people still maintains dualistic thinking. Religion is special and cannot be commercialized (private), while the affairs of the people are very closely related to commercial organizations which are “profane”. When social organization is combined with religion, it still remains homework and is an area for future research, said Paul Tracey.⁴⁹

48 Jennifer Epley Sanders, *Development Issues and the Role of Religious Organizations in Indonesia*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284162550_Development_Issues_and_the_Role_of_Religious_Organizations_in_Indonesia. Diakses, 4 Desember 2023.

49 Paul Tracey, *Religion and Organization: A Critical Review of Current Trends and Future Directions*. *The Academy of Management Annals* 6(1), 2012, h. 1-48. DOI:10.1080/19416520.2012.660761.

Part 6

Religious Community Struggles: Islam, Ads, and Catholicism in West Java in Indonesia¹

Religious harmony is a fundamental challenge in societies that embrace a variety of religions and beliefs. Religious diversity has given space for mission competition and cooperation, though it is vulnerable to conflict. This article discusses religious struggles at a small town in Kuningan, West Java. The different views of the two religious leaders internally within the Muslim community have led to the understanding of new religions considered deviant, particularly Djawa Sunda (*Agama Djawa Sunda/ADS*). Pressure and intimidation against ADS followers developed a sense of leadership and adherents' frustration which triggered efforts to save their religious beliefs. These efforts also led to the emergence of Catholicism as a new religion. The relationship between Islam and the ADS was not intense by the time a new challenge emerged. Catholic relations with ADS were affected by several challenges. For instance, some who converted to Catholicism did not want to be baptized because of holding to their old belief. Three followers of religion could gather and create various dynamics of interaction, communication patterns, and collaboration between them.¹

A. Introduction

The Indonesian religious community is mainly made of Muslims, followed by other groups such as Hindus, Buddhists, Protestants

and Catholics (Suryadinata et al. 2003: 105; Suryadinata et al, 2003). There are adherents of faith in every ethnic group as members of the original religion, including the “religion” of minorities who live dynamically (Subagja 1981; Atkinson 1983: 684-96). As a political tool, Pancasila is a philosophy of national and state of life in Indonesia which plays a significant role in managing the lives of religious people. Its role is evident in the five points of the Pancasila precepts, which illustrate the important elements of heterogeneous and diverse social, cultural and political structures.

Managing religious life in communities with diverse cultural backgrounds faces various challenges, obstacles, and disturbances, which sometimes lead to vertical or horizontal conflicts (Dahrendorf 1973: 101). Furthermore, economic disparity, political interests, and limited employment often trigger horizontal conflicts of religious nuances, and this is called conflicts of racial nuances (ethnicity, religion, race, and intergroup) (Seo 2012). Technological advancements, especially information technology, transportation, and media contribute to conflicts in pluralistic societies and facilitates communication and interaction with the globally. Consequently, access to global information has given rise to new challenges, especially due to the emergence of transnational movements that affect domestic social, cultural and political dynamics (Hefner 2013).

Some scientists, both on the global and local scale, try to predict how the pattern of human interaction relates to what might happen in the future, although there seems to have inter-design. Samuel P. Huntington (1993: 22-49; 1996) predicted that human relations after the collapse of Soviet communism could shift to face-to-face between civilizations, leading to a condition called the clash of civilizations. Japanese scholar Fukuyama (1993) proposed his thesis of the situation as the end of human history (Fernandez-Armesto 1995). Also, Muslim scholars give their analysis from a more substantive perspective, such as Azyumardi Azra's (1999: 131) thesis of postmodernist tendencies which leads to Sufism, or neo-Sufism. Radhar Panca Dhahana (2004: 7) with a trend towards cultural polarization and Franz Magnis Suseno (2005: 229) criticized postmodernism

too anything goes ("anything is OK"), represents the views of local scholars predicting the tendency of society in the future.

Since the Muslim is the largest community in Indonesia, it has significant demographic potential, though it is not yet proportional to the economic and political forces in a linear fashion, making it vulnerable to conflicts, both in cities and rural areas. The political democratization which gained momentum in 1998 has not yet fully implicated cultural structures and religious tolerance. There is a challenge of religious tolerance which needs to be resolved in the realm of the superstructure and cultural development as mandated by the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Colbran 2010). For instance, the challenges experienced include the establishment of mosques in Papua and churches for Protestants in Bekasi, West Java, as well as discrimination against minorities as experienced by the Ahmadiyya and Shi'a.

Exploration revealed in the article involves the construction of the dynamics of religious life in West Java. It entails the relationship between Islam, Catholicism and local religion represented by the Djawa Sunda Religion community (ADS), which is concentrated in a small town in Kuningan. Muslims, through the leadership of Muhamad Rais and Ahmad Tohir, cannot maintain their power as the group embracing an inclusive understanding or as Sundanese tolerating the diverse differences of understanding and orientation. Rais is pro "Sufism" while Tohir goes to "fiqh", the two orientations of religious understanding in Islam which has been difficult to reconcile (Aripudin 2011; Nasr 1966: 940).

The "victory" of Rais contra Tohir strengthens Azra's thesis on religion in Indonesia. The traditional and modern Muslims responded to the victory of a more esoteric understanding, strengthening the thesis on "Islamization" in Sufism-style Indonesia (Johns 1961: 10-23). The reaction of the dhahiriyah textualists which often rely on fiqh-oriented Muslims also strengthens. The reactive pressure is carried out in the form of psychic and physically becomes the reason for dispute between religious people, specifically among the followers of Dhahiriyah and bathiniyah.

The exoteroterism represented by Tohir spirit was later found in local Muslim elements, such as from Muhammadiyah, NU

and local groups outside the two Islamic religious organizations, exerting pressure through social or political channels. Demonstrations against social alienation of Rais' followers took place until the end of the 1990s or shortly after the death of Mohammed Rais who developed “madraism’ (Aripudin 2011: 46). The politics is carried out by Islamic religious groups to suppress Madraism through formation of several government regulations that prohibits its teachings. Various efforts to save the teachings and founders’ community involves changing the name and the development of educational institutions to patronize the Catholic religious community (Palgunadi 2005). Instead of diminishing, the “resistance” of Muslims to madrais community increased, especially after the rise of Catholicism.

The religious struggle is concentrated in Cigugur, a sub-district near Mount Ciremai, the highest mountain in West Java. The population at the location in the beginning of the struggle of religious communities was estimated to be around 3000 households with the calculation based on the number of births and deaths in 2010. The total population in the sub-district is around 38, 594 people, consisting of 9213 households currently. The population is mostly concentrated in Cigugur Village which is also the administrative center of the sub-district. In some places, Islam is a major religion, though Catholics and ADS are also concentrated. Residents at this location were originally Muslim. Borrowing the typology of Islam, C. Geertz classifies Islam into 3, including students, *priyayi* and *abangan* (Geertz 1976). Therefore, the presence of Madraism or ADS, Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as Hinduism is a more recent development of “the miniature of Indonesia” in religious life. Religious are mainly concentrated in Cigugur, Cisantana, and Sukamulya, while the minorities were in Cipari and Cileuleuy, out of 10 kelurahan in Cigugur Subdistrict. The emergence of non-Islamic religions greatly influenced the development of the number of houses of worship, religious leaders and people in general as shown in the following table.

Table 1: The number of religious adherents in Kuningan²

2 Source: Processed from various sources (sub-district profile, urban village profile and direct data collection) in 2009.

No	Villages	ADS	Islam	Catholic	Protestant	Hinduism	Buddhism
1	Cigugur	155	3800	3913*	206 **	2	9
2	Cisantana	30	4710	1600	18	-	-
3	Sukamulya	16	2441	571	21	-	-
4	Cipari	74	2995	40	-	-	-
5	Cileuleuy	25	3860	31	-	-	-
6	Babakan Mulya	48	3084	15	-	-	-
7	Cigadung	-	6500	4	-	-	-
8	Winduherang	-	3340	-	-	-	-
9	Puncak	-	4044	-	-	-	-
10	Gn. Keling	-	1675	-	-	-	-
		348	36449	6174	245	2	9

- (*) There are many Catholics and ADSs (around 12%) of all Cigugur Catholics.
- (**) All Protestants claim to be adherents of Madraism or ADS (100%).

Table 1 shows the struggle of people of different religions and their tangible dynamics which have implications on communication patterns and religious interactions. Muslims do not fully accept the differences and are almost mired in a hard and rigid relationship, especially in ‘deviations’ or ‘heresy’ teachings. Similarly, the minority ADS is too conspicuous in presenting ideas related to religious understanding. This leads to an instant reaction from Muslims, especially the Islamic leaders. Catholicism emerged when these two religious’ communities clashed. It developed as an alternative to ‘introduce’ religion. Although Catholics came at the right time, they connected with other communities and built relationships between them.

B. Religious Life in West Java

Religious life in West Java is portrayed uniquely. Before major religions emerged, Sundanese society, which is the second-largest ethnic group after Java, had a local belief called Sunda Wiwitan, or Sundanese Jati religion. It is still followed in some

community groups, especially in Baduy, Kampung Naga and with certain combinations in Cigugur Kuningan. Islam entered the Tatar Sunda and its peak was introduced by an Islamic leader, Syarif Hidayatullah or Sunan Gung Djati. This was a sultan and one of the nine guardians (Walisongo). Cirebon refers to the concentration of Islam introduced by Sunan Gunung Djati. Through his son Maulana Hasanudian, it was brought to Banten. At the same time, the last kingdom of Padjadjaran in the Sunda Tatar was in decline, and therefore many Padjadjaran court leaders converted to Islam, including King Siliwangi.

Table 2: The number of religious adherents in West Java³

Islam	Protestant	Catholic	Hinduism	Buddhism	Confucianism	
41,763,592	779,272	250,875	19,481	93,551	14,723	43,053,732

Table 2 shows religious life in West Java is not homogeneous, even though Islam is still the major religion. This situation often triggers friction and conflicts between people of different religions, especially due to the issue of conversion. Moreover, the relationship between people of different religions leads to bad relations. The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Bandung presented findings related to conflict and intolerance. From 38 case reports, 20 related to the issue of Freedom of Religion and Belief (KBB). The rest focused on the issues of Papua, LGBT and HIV, women and children, as well as the freedom of expression.

The issues include assault, misdirection, raids, discrimination, intimidation, sealing of houses of worship, dissolution of religious activities, freezing, provocation, and expressions of hatred and prohibition of worship. The religious groups most targeted by the intolerance cases were the minority such as Christians, Ahmadis, Shiites, Djawa Sunda Religion (ADS) and the splinter groups. The distribution of acts of religious intolerance is not limited to “green” areas, such as Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Ciamis, and Bandung as reported by the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development. According to the report, these regions are centers of concentration in the development of

3 Source: 2010 Population Census Data of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of the Republic of Indonesia

religious radicalism (Takwin, Mudzkkir dkk 2016). However, the issue of intolerance has spread to Bekasi, Bogor, and Depok. Surprisingly, Kuningan was not included among the affected areas in the report, yet according to observational data, it has a stronger religious plurality level than the regions mentioned above. Ahmadiyah is concentrated in the Manis Lor region, though different religious communities are also in Cigugur, right at the foot of Mount Ciremai. In this region, there struggle between the three large religious communities, including Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism as well as the Djawa Sunda Religion community (ADS), though some family heads are also Hindus. They lived together after going through a long process to become an integrated community in the cultural area of the Sundanese people.

C. ADS versus Islam

The crescent rising in Sunda Tatars is attributed to the coronation of Syarif Hidayatullah in 1479 as the king of Sunda and the head of the Cirebon region with the rank of Tumenggung. Islam entered Kuningan, particularly Cigugur, around 1525 AD due to the influence of the expansion of Islam from the Sultanate of Cirebon through an emissary of the sultan Rama Haji Ireungan (Ekadjati 2005: 2). No detailed information about Ireungan was obtained. However, it is claimed that Ireungan is among the first Muslims to spread Islam in the region before the emergence of two religious leaders, Muhamad Tohir and Muhamad Rais (Ekadjati 2003: 1; Hernawan 2005: 171).

The style of Islam brought by the Islamic propagators in the area is not much different from the pattern of religion in general. Shafi'i fiqh is a school of law, while theology is closer to the understanding of Ashariyah or Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah. Similarly, Sufism follows al-Ghazali and Junayd al-Baghdadi. Culturally, these religious notions are not only suitable for the majority of Indonesian Muslims but it is a school of worship for Muslims in Southeast Asia. The tropical climate in the Indonesian archipelago also contributes to the development of moderate understanding. According to Ibn Khaldun's thesis,

climate influences the character of society, including the character of religious people in Indonesia.

Islam near Ciremai in the Cigugur district follows an Islamic style similar to the one described above. Madrais came in the year 1911 and colored religious patterns in society (Palgunadi 2005: 5-6). The local religious leader Ahmad Tohir also appeared at the same period. The two seem to have a close age, although the backgrounds of the different religious experiences affect their understanding. From Madrais tends to be more esoteric Sufism and as stated by Djatikususma, he believes that God exists in all beings called *sir* with the highest position (Yayasan Tri Mulya 2000: 16). *Sir* is a god only felt in the human heart and energy of all forces (Aripudin 2011: 70).

In the practice of religious rituals such as the ceremonial salvation of a newborn child, the inauguration of a new home, and the commemoration of the country's independence, the community often performs thanksgiving rituals. Islamic elements, such as reciting prayer beads (Subhanallah), tahmid (alhamdulillah), takbir (allahu akbar) and tahlil (lailaha ilallah) are accompanied by readings for the dead ancestors. According to Rachmat Subagja, they are religious traditions which develops into a cultural necessity and can be juxtaposed with traditional ceremonies (Subagja 1981: 13).

In development, Madrais adds to the practice of Islamic rituals from Sundanese cultural traditions such as the teachings of *Pikukuh Tilu*, which is a combination of syncretism with the teachings of non-Islamic religions (Mulder 1983: 7). In case of death, a combination of religious teachings such as the replacement of a white shroud with a black cloth and the use of a casket are practiced. A black cloth is a symbol of color in Sundanese cultural traditions such as urang baduy (baduy people) clothing while the use of coffins is a Christian tradition. Islamic leaders such as Mad Tohir responded to the syncretism of religious teachings by Madrais. An open debate often occurred between Rais and Tohir, especially after the completion of the religious ceremonies in the community (interview with E. Yusman, April 12, 2010). Mad Tohir had a more religious understanding of fiqh and was often exoteric. The different perceptions of Islam

involved the practices that led to two camps of adherents with conflict and hostility between them. The two religious leaders with different understandings developed their studies through socio-cultural institutions in the community. Tohir and Rais developed Islamic and cultural boarding schools, respectively. Tohir's pesantren died gradually since there was no one to advance it, while Rais was still in existence despite changing names (Aripudin 2011).

The existence of Madrais followers and the development of their detachment until its death as an institution indicates victory in an esoteric-oriented religious outlook, or shows it is strengthened by other factors. Various sources, especially *Pikukuh Tilu*, were used for the teachings of Madrais followers or Rama Panyipta during the reign of Tedjabuana, a leader born in 1892. Tedjabuana officially resumed his father's traditional activities in 1948 under Java Sundanese (ADS). As a result, he was called the Successor Rama, which means a parent who followed the father's footsteps. On return to Cigugur, Tedjabuana had a lot of achievements, including the improvement of the place of worship in Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, the service of ADS members and worshipers, and the establishment of junior high schools (Aripudin 2011). Additionally, while strengthening ADS after returning to Cigugur, the pressure from the Muslims intensified rather than subsiding. The followers of Madrais faced social isolation, including lack of contact with ADS followers, intimidation and pagan stamps.

Conflicts due to differences in understanding among Muslims which had existed for long gained momentum between 1960 and 1964. National social and political pressure related to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) added to the social burden of ADS leaders and non-religious followers. On September 19, 1964 Tedjabuana converted to Catholicism through the Cirebon Parish where he was "secured" and signed an official letter for conversion on September 21, 1964 (Nursananingrat 2000).

Tedjabuana's decision was considered appropriate since it could save his followers from the PKI issue destroyed by the New Order. However, the decision was very unfortunate and disappointing to the local Islamic leaders. This is because it was

in favor of Catholicism and formed an entry point for Catholics into Cigugur (Aripudin 2011). Moreover, the ADS leadership lent the jinnem room in Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal as a temporary place of service and baptism for the new Catholic community. As Palgunadi stated, the relationship between ADS and Catholicism is not always intimate. This is because the majority of ex-ADS Catholics do not prefer baptism, and this disappoints the Catholic leaders. Apart from damaging the ADS-Catholic internal relations, the decision also facilitated Catholic relations with ADS and encouraged the beginning of Catholicism in Cigugur.

In some parts of the urban Village in the Cigugur district, cultural ceremonies such as the *dadung*, *ronggeng gunung* (a traditional type of art with a woman who acts as *rongeng*), *tarawangsa* (a type of seven-wire harp), *jentreng* (Sundanese art from Sumedang) and *ngereremokeun* are observed. *Ngareremokeun* is a ceremony derived from Baduy Kanekes, one of the rituals in Sunda Wiwitan or Sundanese Teak Religion. It is a sacred observance performed at night before the peak of the Seren Taun ceremony. The existence of Sundanese local arts in important events in the ADS community helps to preserve cultural heritage. The motivation of the Sundanese culture preservation spirit was the basis of the ADS community's ideas, which still holds the suspicion of local Islamic leaders. For instance, the spirit of the teachings of Madraism exists in Sundanese cultures.

The political pressure of the New Order era which did not include the belief of ADS as a religion intensified the suspicion of local Muslims. On July 11, 1981, Djatikusumah's grandson Madrais announced the establishment of PACKU (Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun Urang) as a transformation of ADS. The center of PACKU's activity is still in Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, though it has branches in various regions. However, it was still regarded as a community of ADS followers, hindering its development. The difficulties in development is also attributed to the success of the Islamic leaders' lobbies to the local government.

The government through the West Java High Prosecutor granted the proposal of Islamic leaders. On August 25, 1982, the Prosecutor issued Decree no: KEP-44 / K.2.3 / 8/1982 on the Prohibition of the Belief Flow of the Paguyuban Adat Cara

Karuhun Urang (PACKU). This decision was a severe challenge to the ADS community during Djatikusuma's leadership. The prince's efforts to survive through fierce challenges, especially from Islam met a lot of resistance. All the innovations by PACKU's followers always receive similar resistance, both from the government and Muslims. For instance, the establishment of SMP by ADS was balanced by the development of madrassas, pesantren, and mosques by Muslims. The cooperative economic affairs by the Catholic community also received a similar challenge.

The Madraism community continues to make survival efforts, including name changes. Following the collapse of the Post-New Order in 1998, the followers of Madrais re-organized themselves and established AKUR (Indigenous Karuhun Urang) in 1999. The word "AKUR" is not just an abbreviation, but also a Sundanese acronym which means peace or harmony through shared cultural traditions. Madraism followers hope for a harmonious condition, though there are many differences between religious communities.

D. Islam and Catholics

The presence of Catholics in the Cigugur region was initially attributed to the decision of Muhammad Rais leadership, specifically Prince Tedjabuana who converted to Catholicism with his followers. This is the most popular view, although it is denied by Rosana who argued that Catholicism in the Cigugur region was due to the struggle of the missionaries, while Tedjabuana's decision was a reinforcement of the results of the mission and spread of good news (proselytization) (Rosana 2005). A similar argument was also made by Father Mathias Coppens, the first servant priest at the time. According to Copen, the decision of the followers to convert to Catholicism was based on their consciousness and not coercion (Aripudin 2011: 164).

Islam and Catholic relations have a long history and exists in various forms. In Indonesian, each region has its own form of relationship. In Ungaran, Islam and Catholicism uphold tolerance, although controversy is triggered by the establishment of mosques (Saerozi 2017). As Rofi stated, the relationship

between Islam and Christianity is not monolithic. Social and political factors also contribute to the relationship between the two groups (Rofi 1999).

The relationship between Islam and Catholicism in Cigugur went through several social and cultural stages. In the Islamic groups, the arrival of Catholics was a new challenge that sparked *mission competition*. Catholics were “*infidels*” and Da’wah and halal blood are obligatory to them (Aripudin 2011: 81). The words “*jeung penghayat acan selesai, Kristen geus datang*” means facing the prisoner is not finished, the Catholic has appeared. They imply Muslims are no longer limited to followers of Catholicism, but the religious life of its followers in Cigugur. The missionary competition of religious people in Cigugur has increasingly become fierce and sensitive. Catholicism is a government-recognized religion while madraism is not a religion although it has changed and adopted the Djawa Sundanese Religion (ADS) name. Since Catholic was recognized by the government, Muslims could not arbitrarily perform da’wah as it was conducted to the followers of Madrais. This is because Islam does not preach against people who are already religious, both doctrinal and juridical. (Q.109:6).

The exodus of religious conversion from madraism to Catholicism is a new round of interaction between Catholics and Muslim followers in this city, though it competes Islamic da’wah. Temporary Catholic services were carried out by local Catholic leaders in a small borrowed room in Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal (jinem room). Apart from serving new followers, Catholic leaders also established churches and schools, ranging from childhood to high school. They also established hospitals and cooperatives, participated in social activities and provided scholarships to the needy (Badruzaman 2006). Also, they offered financial assistance to the people intending to get married.

The social service carried out by the Catholic leader was considered to be an arrogant mission in the past (Rais 1995). The missionary action was countered by Muslims who established schools, madrassas, Islamic boarding schools, Islamic colleges, cooperatives and demonstrations that caused public concern on physical clashes between religions. The Ministry of

Religion helped through the crass program by establishing the State Islamic Education (MTsN) and the State Madrasah Aliyah (MAN). However, the response from Muslims did not surpass the achievements of Catholics in the establishment of hospitals.

The Catholic mission's approach to Islam include the expansion of mission through preaching (sermons, lectures, and dialogues), the establishment of worship places, educational institutions, cooperative and politics (Sukmana 2014). In terms of community service, Catholics established Sekarkemulyan Hospital and Goa Maria's pilgrimage which was inaugurated on July 21, 1990, by Cardinal Tomko. Goa was established to serve the pilgrims of Catholics from various regions and cities equipped with complete facilities, such as a large cross wall, a statue of Mary, a shooting area and a hall for important rituals such as Christmas and Easter. In response, Muslims established the Darul Mukhlisin Islamic foundation which is equipped with mosques, dormitories, schools, and radio stations. These two adjoining locations are called DM2 and stand for "Darul Maria and Darul Mukhlisin". The Muslims responded by establishing similar facilities to the Catholic mission movement, except the hospital. Other examples of Catholic social movements and actions provoked reactions from local Muslims include;

1. Mobilizing the masses in front of the Goa Maria gate. The mobilization of Catholic masses was originally a pilgrimage to Goa Maria. However, the mass action was considered by local Muslims as an unusual demonstration showing the Catholics were dominant. The mobilization of the masses of Catholics to Goa Maria is perceived as a mission and a show of strength. Through the spokesman Badruzzaman, a local preacher protested the act and considered it a form of Catholic proposition (Aripudin 2011). The reaction of Muslims to the demonstration involved mobilizing their masses, both the locals and those from areas outside Cigugur, such as Cirebon and Tasikmalaya.
2. Establishment of cooperatives with Catholics as the majority members. Catholic Dewi Sri Cooperative deals with cow milk production and savings and loans (Aripudin 2011: 191). Before Dewi Sri went bankrupt, it had sparked competition

with Muslims who established the Laras Ati and Miftahul Janah Cooperatives with members being Muslims. Competition between Catholics and Muslims tend to conflict and only the efforts of each restraint might bring harmony.

3. Throwing firecrackers by children and young Catholics to local Muslim youth. Although it was originally a game, the firecracker was rung at inappropriate times, such as during the Maghrib and taraweh prayers and was conducted near the mosque. The action took place in 1996 and could be appeased by the community and local religious leaders.
4. Seizing waterways for agriculture. The Islamic and Catholic struggles for fertile land since majority of the people depend on agricultural products, especially crops, livestock such as cattle and pigs for non-Muslims. Water regulation to supply agricultural land is sometimes irregular, giving rise to the competition that triggers religious conflicts.
5. Cynical taunts (war of words) between Muslim, Catholic groups, and ADS. Catholics call the Muslims poor, while Muslims call the Catholics dirty. ADS perceive Muslims as rude, while Muslims see them as uncircumcised, and therefore prohibited from entering the mosque. The words of ridicule often trigger conflicts between them.
6. School and marital assistance for economically disadvantaged people are often used as a way of persuading converts, both from Islam to Catholicism and vice versa. Some people convert from Islam to Hinduism because of the ease of wedding and living. However, after receiving the assistance getting the convenience of life, most of them return to their original beliefs (Aripudin 2011: 197). Conversion of religion in these cases refers to the views of M.A. Kevin Brice is categorized as a convert of convenience, which is a formality to obtain material (Brice 2015). The religious conversion behavior led to the establishment of a mu'alaf institution which was initiated by Islamic religious leaders (Aripudin 2011: 195).
7. Aggressive religious mission, especially Catholicism, against local Muslims. The purchase of community land by the Catholics and their institutions for religious purposes is a challenge in maintaining relations between people

of different religions in Cigugur, especially Islam and Catholicism. The progress of the economic potential of the Cigugur community, especially those engaged in services, tourism, and home industries has made Cigugur one of the natural tourist and religious destinations. The response of the local community to these economic potentials is to provide facilities for supporting visitors, such as clean water facilities, providing souvenirs, restaurants, lodging, such as hotels and transportation services. However, these communities need sufficient capital and of the solutions involves selling land at quite expensive prices. This option was exploited by several members of the community and Catholic institutions by buying land, although the prices were expensive.

The harsh pattern of the Islamic approach to Catholicism changed to a more dialogical approach (McQuail & Windhal 1993: 24). Local Islamic leader Mashuri tried to utilize dialogue while dealing with Catholics. The dialogue refers to Denis McQuail and allows problems to be approached perceptually with changing dimensions. According to Alwi Shihab (1997: 58), dialogue brings about a meeting point while abandoning the exclusive view of religion. The themes of the sermon designed by Mashuri appear cooler and dialogic, such as the importance of recognizing the existence of a community of non-Muslim religious communities while providing solutions to the interaction of Muslims and Catholics (Mashuri 2005). A similar response was made by a Catholic leader Abu Kasman who memorized Al Quran and tried to make Catholic dialogue more polite with a cultural approach. There was a translation of several verses from the New Testament and the Old Testament into Sundanese. Using the language of instruction of the local community to introduce Catholicism was Kasman's project to ease the understanding of Catholic teachings. The position of Kasman as a local priest and the upbringing of the Church of Christ strengthened communication and led to a comprehensive and more cohesive relationship. Kasman also used Sundanese for the sake of the less skilled Sundanese-speaking priests (Aripudin 2011: 126).

The approach by Mashuri and Kasman did not reach the mission and da'wah level based on the view of religious pluralism. However, both efforts impacted the relations between Islam and Catholicism in religious missions. Internalization and dissemination of Catholic teachings by Kasman did not reach a transformative level compared to several missionaries such as Kyai Sadrach in Central Java, C.L. Collen in Ngoro, East Java, and F.L. Anthing in West Java (Aritonang 2004: 101). Kasman used Sundanese local culture as a means of preaching the gospel since it is utilized as an acculturative medium in spreading religious teachings. Catholics such as Aman perform shamanic rituals while carrying out missions using “jampi” and “ngelmu” and pronounce them in Sundanese, confessing faith in the Triune God. The “ngelmu” and “slametan” refers to Bible study using dialogue, question, and answer, by sitting on the floor and praying, especially after the baptism (interview with Church of Christ the King of Cigugur, April 2010).

The response to the approach of the Islamic mission, Catholicism and Protestantism in the Indonesian is almost the same. Alwi Shihab (1995) showed the response to the inter-religious relations was carried out quite intensively by Muhammadiyah in several regions such as Yogyakarta, Semarang, and Jakarta. However, there are exceptions in some areas, such as in Bandung Karel A. Steenbrink (2006; Th. Sumartana (1994: 24). The recurrence of the history of the relationship between Islam and Catholicism shows that there are relations between typically religious Indonesians, though they undergo several stages. Awareness of relations between people of different religions from horizontal conflicts can be controlled and minimized to avoid clashes and war like in other parts of the world.

E. Catholics and ADS

The conversion of the Madrais community to Catholicism was originally a decision of the then leader of the death row, Prince Tedjabuana, who dissolved the ADS due to the New Order's political pressure. Tedjabuana gave freedom to his followers to join one of the government-recognized religions. The majority of the ADS communities are the Catholics who followed his

decision. This history can be traced to the branches of ADS outside the center of mourners, such as in the areas around Kuningan, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Majalengka, and Banjar. The conversion of individuals politically and culturally allows for the survival of the Madrais community. Since the ADS community did not really choose Catholicism, they did not want to be baptized, though the baptismal procession is the first sacrament in Catholic initiation. Some also claim to have taken part in Catholic rituals, yet they are still adherents to the mourners' beliefs.

It is interesting to observe the conversion of the ADS community. Since it refers to the Mutaqin analysis, the conversion is only a tactic to continue to exist in response to the formal rules of religion in Indonesia (Mutaqin 2014). ADS community conversion is spread into several recognized religions, such as Islam and Christianity, especially Catholicism. A large number of ADS residents converting to Catholicism is a reasonable decision considering their previous religious life experiences. Nevertheless, the local leadership represented by the Parish also want them to be Catholics. The signs of the basic motives for religious converts to Catholicism due to self-salvation was read and proven by local Catholic leaders. Precisely, in June 1981 PACKU (neo-ADS) inaugurated thousands of new Catholic followers, the Madrais people (Aripudin 2011: 62). This situation was increasingly confusing to the local Catholic leadership until they had to deal with the community leaders as it was considered betrayal.

The religious attitude as shown by the followers of Madrais proves that the freedom of belief is a human right. After the dissolution of ADS by the government, the majority of Madrais community members did not choose Islam. This is because the Muslims and their leaders were hard on them, in addition to domestic political factors that occurred during the New Order of Indonesia (Hefner 2013). They chose Catholicism because they were considered not to have historical sin. This was the perception of the followers who were careful in responding to their diversity. Catholics learn from Islamic experience facing those who are considered failures.

In case of opposition from community followers, Catholic leaders were more strategic since they contributed to developing a social instrument of Catholicism. In contrast, Islamic leaders choose to be apathetic and permissive to their attitudes. Catholics are more persuasive and have good relations with the royal family, especially those who embrace their religion. The contribution of the Madraism community to Catholicism has given rise to a distinctive form of relational relationship. Catholics are more accommodating to the Madraism community movement as evidenced by their participation in the celebration of Seren Taun, a tradition belonging to the Madraism community. They show more tolerant religious attitudes while maintaining their beliefs.

F. Cooperation and Integration

The seren taun ceremony which was used as the annual agenda of the AKUR community was also utilized as a media to unite religious people in the Cigugur after a long period of conflict. The ceremony is held mainly in Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal every 22nd day of the month of Rayagung in the traditional Sundanese calendar. In the seren taun procession which lasted for 7 days, various ceremonies were carried out, including the demonstrations of traditional Sundanese art and praying together. The joint prayer was carried out since the ceremony was a form of gratitude to the Almighty for the abundance of agricultural produce for the year. In prayer, each follower comes with their respective religious backgrounds. Certain Muslims, Catholics, and others help to make the annual event successful. As stated by Abu Kasman and Pastor Augustine, the Catholics refers to it as a “cross-faith celebration” where togetherness and unity can be enjoyed. Catholic awareness is vital and helps to commemorate the historical contribution of the people to Catholicism (Aripudin 2011: 215). The Catholics conduct their own mass in commemoration of the seren taun.

There is an exception for immune local Islamic leaders who follow the annual cultural ritual. They are represented by Muslim leaders from outside the region, especially those from NGOs, such as Fahmina Cirebon. The relationship between

Islam and Catholicism and followers of mourners may not have melted. Local Muslims still hold back and do not participate in the annual ritual, sorting and choosing certain events to follow. For instance, in ceremonies for the death of members of the community, Muslims are usually present with other religious people. During prayers, they represent Islam, Catholicism, where the followers pray according to their beliefs. Likewise, Cigugur people mingle, cooperate and help each other in social affairs, the construction of mosques, waterworks, and celebrations of Indonesian independence. They also mingle in and mutually help each other in domestic affairs related to wedding celebrations and housewarming.

Religious tolerance also appears to be gaining momentum. During the Eid-ul-Fitr celebration after Muslims fasted for a month, Catholics often congratulated them. Neighboring Muslims and Catholics send food to each other on the feast day. Likewise, on Christmas holidays, gifts, especially foods are acceptable to Muslims. As a result, religious follower feels valued and recognized as citizens despite different beliefs.

In the construction of mosques in the Sukamulya region and Cisantana, Catholics offered help in the form of physical and building materials. However, the same help was not offered by Muslims when Catholics built churches. The situation is understandable since in the two regions of Cigugur, the majority of the population are Muslims who have not fully recognized the importance of working with the community. The presence of the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB) is quite significant in managing religious relations in the region. The organization was founded in 2007 to further strengthen the existence of people of different religions. It provides information on the importance of religious harmony, handling conflicts between different religions and strengthening brotherhood (Interview with FKUB chairman A. Nur, September 2010).

Apart from the seren taun ceremony and certain religious events, cooperation between people of different religions also occurs in activities related to the affairs of young people. For instance, at the art stage and sporting event to commemorate Indonesia's Independence Day, young people from various religious

backgrounds (Islam, ADS, and Catholics) mingle and collaborate to make the celebration successful. This is facilitated by the sub-district which comes up with a function and encourages local youth to interact, know each other and chat. There are a few cases of young people of different religions coming to know each other better and advance a personal relationship to matrimony. For this reason, several families consist of several members of different religions.

Marriage between members of the community is different in religions and helps people to blend with one another in the family, which is the most fundamental community institution. The kinship relationship plays a significant role in maintaining the integrity of the community and minimizing conflicts due to different religious backgrounds. However, marriages of members of different religious backgrounds did not last long in families, with parties re-embracing their original religion. Local Muslims responded to the number of cases of conversion by determining converts, especially those who embraced or returned to Islam. Data obtained in 2009 on the convert is shown in the table.

Table 3: The number of ADS adherents in Kuningan⁴

No	Origin of the Villages	Total	Coordinators' Name	Information
1	Cigugur	139 people	Nana Juana	+ 4 new converts
2	Sukamulya	95 people	Sahri Sudarta	
3	Cisantana	53 people	Tarkim	
4	Cipari	24 people	Adnan Djajuli	
	Total	311 people		

The kinship relationship is vital in maintaining the integrity of the community of different religions and has implications on environmental factors. Several members of different religious families with adjacent houses or neighbors are found. This provides an opportunity for each family member and community to receive, meet, contact and communicate with each other. Exchanging gifts, buying and selling goods, and borrowing everyday necessities occurs without individuals looking at their differences in beliefs. People could often be seen in the morning

⁴ Source: Report of the Kuningan FKUB Coordinator from 1990 to 2009.

leaving for their respective assignments. The Islamic leader returned from the mosque, while the monks went to the church. Likewise, farmers, employees, and students meet and greet one another. Some chat on matters to do with the affairs of their daily lives, especially the mothers.

Equality in political aspirations also plays a significant role in fostering cooperation. The majority of the Cigugur population voted for nationalist parties in the 2009 and 2014 elections, specifically the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), followed by the Golkar Party and the Democratic Party (both nationalist parties). The Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) took the fourth place. More details can be seen in the 2009 and 2014 general election votes in the following chart.

Table 4: General Election in Cigugur⁵

No	Political Party	2009	2014
1	PDIP	1315	3295
2	The Golkar Party	730	3711
3	The Democratic Party	468	3346
4	PKS	249	3392
5	Gerindra Party	214	2978

The similarity in political aspirations shows that differences in people’s religious attitudes are not always influential and are in line with political attitudes. PDIP as a nationalist party is not only chosen by Catholics but also Muslims and mourners. The data also shows the existence of religious understanding among the people.

Among Catholics, the relationship between religion and politics is not a problem since the two are separated. However, Islam has a different view because politics and religion cannot be separated, something that is evident among Muslim santri. According to C. Geertz’s thesis on the typology of Javanese Muslims, the majority of Muslims in Cigugur may be categorized as priyayi and abangan (Geertz 1976: 113). Muslims in the santri category are still limited to educated graduates from

⁵ Source: Data from election recapitulation in 2009 and 2014 in Cigugur District, Kuningan Regency.

Islamic boarding schools or colleges. The prijajis are mainly of the groups of heretics since they are of royal descent, especially the leaders. The similarity in political aspirations clearly supports opportunities for cooperation that leads to an integral society.

In line with political aspirations, cooperation between people of different religions was also facilitated by the sub-district government and the kelurahan/village government. Cigugur District and Cigugur Sub-District play significant role in creating community integrity. The local government might play a direct role in controlling and creating balance in the government that accommodates and serves the entire community regardless of the differences in religious background and belief. Several times the members of the Catholic community became the heads of the RT and RW and once a sub-district head. This shows religious the relations are positively developing.

G. Conclusions

This article was developed from a direct study and the analysis of several research results related to religion in the hillside of Mount Ciremai, West Java. Studies on the relationship between people of different religions and religious communities are interesting in pluralistic societies such as Indonesia. The struggle of religious people in Indonesia occurred long for long and passed through the social and cultural stages to form an integral and intact society based on national diversity and unity. The pluralistic communities in religion needs to be quick to realize and acknowledge the reality and existence of members of different faiths and beliefs. The spread of religion and belief needs to be carried out with more humanist approaches and methods, considering the socio-cultural context of society and freedom. Basic human rights remain fundamental and the core of the mission of religion. Studies related to the form and pattern of religious relations are lessons and themes that need to be the focus of further study in the context of other societies.

Part 7

Man and Woman Leadership, Tradition, and Pesantren Resilience: Pesantren Cikalama West Java, Indonesia¹

Pesantren as traditional Islamic study and *da'wah* centers in Indonesia have managed to survive rapid social changes. Some traditional elements of *pesantren* change, while some others do not; some elements are even defended, allowing the institutions to remain in existence. This article reveals the dynamics in *pesantren* tradition defense through the conservation of leadership traditions and traditional rituals networking that make up the power of the *pesantren*. *Pesantren* institution defense encompasses the defense of *kyai* leadership traditions and hegemony, *santris'* religious learning culture and behaviours, and religious ritual traditions that are reinforced by innovations of tradition networks. Tradition innovations are made through the diffusion of *pesantren* elements as traditional pillars and innovations of religious rituals that follow neither modernization currents nor political affiliations. Tradition innovations are sourced from local culture, Islamic, and traditional ritual capital, including the archeological conservation of spiritually meaningful *pesantren* tradition heritages, both tangible and intangible. Power defense and hegemony theory is used to consider *pesantren* tradition defense in articulating the traditional phenomena and traditional hegemony networks of the *pesantren* to form a *pesantren* defense and hegemony model in more detail in the broader context.

A. Introduction

Studies on the *pesantren* in Indonesia seem to meet no ending. The so-called Islamic religious institution is comprised of complex, dynamic, and even romantic elements. The complexity that comes with *pesantren* studies originates not only from *pesantrens'* pervasive growth in the world's largest Muslim-majority country, but also from their significant contributions to the development of the Muslims in Indonesia. *Pesantrens*, as with other comparable Islamic institutions, also go through ups and downs and even bankruptcy following the deaths of the *kyais* of the *pesantrens* or the conflict-driven departure of the *pesantrens'* *santris* (Aripudin 2012). Many major *pesantrens* survive and flourish thanks to their innovations and attempts to adapt to changes with time (Tan 2014, 426). However, some other long-standing major *pesantrens* fail to survive due to numerous factors and come to be disbanded (Dhofier 2011, 59).

Some long-established *pesantrens* remaining in existence and even continuously developing to date are Hasyim Asy'ari-founded Pesantren Tebuireng, Almubarakiyah Suryalaya, Diniyah Thowalib, Pesantren Cikalama, and Pesantren Al-Amin. The aforementioned *pesantrens* are of varied backgrounds and characters, such as the diversity and form of pesantren institutions that are no longer functioning. In other words, each *pesantren* has diverse manners, approaches, advantages, disadvantages, and characters, as described by Lukens-Bull (2019).

One of the central elements of the *pesantren* is the presence of *kyais*, who generally are men, although there are also some *pesantrens* which are under women's leadership (Burhanudin 2002; Chusniyah and Alimi 2015). *Kyai's* leadership in a *pesantren* remains to be the most determining element in the life of the *pesantren* (Dhofier 2011, 69). The various attributes attached to a *kyai*, such as being learned in religious affairs, charismatic, and of an elite bloodline, make up the core character in the *kyai*-led *pesantren* power defense. This reliance on *kyai's* personal character even determines whether the *pesantren* would be able to survive and develop or, conversely, collapse. Through *kyai's* charisma grows in society and *santris* a *takzim* attitude, or reverence and respect for the *kyai*, which has an influence on

the institutionalization of his ideas and aspirations, including the institutionalization of *pesantren* tradition heritages (Aisyah et al. 2022).

The institutionalization of *pesantren* traditions that are passed down from generation to generation constitutes a vital character and a traditional strategic pattern of how the *pesantren* maintains its existence. This traditional pattern remains in practice until today, although with some modifications to respond to the demands of society members as main stakeholders. Innovations in the internal part of the *pesantren* through the marriage of the boarding tradition and schooling abound in response to such needs and changes, although at the cost of weakened certain elements in *pesantren* traditions. An instance of such changes in the *pesantren* is the strengthening of the new orientation toward achievements and innovations that has been growing since the 1990s with more and more individuals in the *santri* circle being enrolled in colleges (Azra 2000, 118).

It turns out that the changes and shifts of orientation in the *pesantren* with all its innovations do not eliminate the power of *pesantren* systemic elements that have been ingrained in *pesantren* traditions, such as leadership and teaching traditions in worldview and practice in the *pesantren* world (Riyanti, Astuti, and Annisa 2020). Although it is fair to say that the traditions in *pesantren* institutions as revealed by some scholars are established, there remain some *pesantren* practices that are considered to appear “abnormal”, such as the existence and role of female leadership in *pesantren* institutions. This thematic discourse emerges out of the intellectual traditions pertaining to women in the *pesantren* who are expected to be obedient wives to men, in conjunction with the fact that the leadership of *pesantren* institutions usually falls in men’s hands (Nurish 2010).

Revelation of the *pesantren* tradition defense pattern in the midst of sociocultural changes in society as well as modernization apparently takes a variety of forms, especially in the case of traditional *pesantrens*. How traditional *pesantrens* defend their power and traditions by positioning women in *pesantren* leadership is a phenomenon of interest to be unveiled, with the growing social acknowledgement of women in *pesantren* contexts (Malihah, Nurbayani, and Wulandari 2020; Rouzi et al. 2022).

Revealing the fact of the phenomenon of power tradition defense that involves women as *pesantren* leaders is critical, at least in reference to two questions: 1) There is this concept of *pesantren* leadership under *kyais*, who are men as well as women, with certain central roles in *pesantren* leadership. There is this question of whether women's existence in *pesantren* leadership is part of the equality spirit or just a complementary and participatory element, so women's existence and leadership role stays in men's leadership hegemony? 2) Another question to be answered is in what situation and history women take up the central point in *pesantren* leadership traditions, which gives them the "appearance" of being irreplaceable by men, as is the case with the leadership in *Pesantren Cikalama*, Sumedang, West Java?

B. Pesantren Review

The *pesantren* institution's presence in Indonesia as an Islamic teaching, *da'wah*, and cultural center is age-old. It is an educational institution native to Nusantara (Madjid 1997). *Pesantren* traditions, as revealed by some scholars, principally are a manifestation of the relationship of the cultural values of Nusantara society and all its historical realities to Islam. *Pesantren* traditions are manifested not only in the traditions of classical Islamic teaching, but also in various other cultural systems, including leadership, politics, economics, and roles in Indonesia's development, in a continued fashion (Munir 2016).

Culturally speaking, the *pesantren* institution has transformed into some sort of a cultural defense fortress for Islam and Indonesian Muslim society. *Pesantrens'* roles are not only confined to being centers for "traditional" Islamic studies and propagation of certain Islamic characters; *pesantrens* also have a role in strengthening civil society development in general, and even crating statesmen (Dhofier 2011, 59). *Pesantrens* are not only concentrated in rural areas as are normally the case; they are also present among urban communities. Therefore, it is expected that *pesantren* institutions serve as an anchor in the religious life of urban communities. Being an anchor in the tradition defense in Islamic culture, *pesantrens* will attract more attention.

The *pesantren* culture advocates peaceful coexistence, leading to the potential for defense against religious radicalism in Bull's terms. The mystical traditions of the *pesantren* provide a robust ground on which the majority of Indonesian society alienate radical Islamism. These traditions are rooted in popular Muslim folktales surrounding the Islamic basis in Indonesia (Lukens-Bull 2008). Bull has been consistent in findings regarding the strong Islamic culture conservation role played by *Pesantren* institutions, as well as their institutional counterparts throughout Southeast Asia (Lukens-Bull 2010).

There are numerous other papers concerned with the *pesantren*, especially in its relation with Islamic movements in the Nusantara (Hurgronye 1996; Benda 1980; Geertz 1960; Ricklefs 2001; Azra 2013; Arnold 1965; Boland 1985; van Bruinessen 2013). A number of earlier papers on Islam have yet to comprehensively uncover the dynamics of leadership, notably women's leadership in *pesantrens*. However, those papers provide clear descriptions of Islam's relation with the culture of Indonesian Muslim communities in various forms as well as its dynamics. *Kyai's pesantren* leadership is said by many scholars as resembling the leadership of kingdoms or monarchies. Zamakhsyari Dhofier (1998, 70), for instance, refers to *kyais* as *little kings*. In Islamic literature, a king is referred to as a sultan, a form of address which is masculine, and so it is a rare case where a sultanate is held by a woman. Similarly, the *pesantren* is a reflection of a kingdom, which is seldom headed by a woman.

The preaching of Islam in West Java, particularly in Sumedang, is a little illuminated by several archeological relics such as the tombs of Priangan elites or *menak* as well as those left by Islam propagators, notably Syarif Hidayatullah or Sunan Gunung Djati Cirebon. Intensive propagation of Islam took place since the 13th through the 16th centuries during Islam proliferation and expansion beyond the Middle East all the way to Southeast Asia while in the Middle East itself Islam was going backwards (Johns 1980). Azra goes as far as saying that an intensive relation between the Nusantara and the Middle East was established in the following centuries, namely, the 17th through the 19th centuries (Azra 2013).

The *pesantren* institution as an Islamic educational institution holds a determinant role in responding to and forming the Islam character in the Nusantara, especially in Islamization in the hearts of local kings' power and earlier cultural traditions. The interaction between Islam and Nusantara culture is apparent in the dialects in the Islamic thinkings demonstrated by Hamzah Fansuri, Syamsuddin Sumatrani, and Abdurrauf Singkili in Sumatra, that is, in Sufism colors, and it holds true also in Sumedang, as is seen in the *Primbon* Book pertaining Seven Dignities ("Kitab Paririmbun (Ancient Manuscript)," n.d.). Islam propagation was also carried out by Walisongo, or the Nine Saints, one of whom was Syarif Hidayatullah, an elite and an Islam propagator in Western Java, particularly Cirebon (Pigeaud and de Graaf 1976). Some of the religious leaders that came under his influence were Syekh Goparana or Aria Wangsa Goparana who resided in Subang, Syekh Abdul Muhyi Pamijahan, and Sultan Maulana Hasanudin Banten. Goparana's *da'wah* scope was not restricted to Subang, but it also included Purwakarta, Cianjur, Sukabumi, Bogor, and Limbangan, which belonged to the territory of the Sumedang Larang Kingdom around the 1530s until his death (Ekajati 1988).

According to the *rundayan nasab* of R. Mintareja, leaders of Pesantren Cikalama are of the lineage connected to Syekh Goparana through his son Raden Aria Wiratanu Data or Eyang Dalem Cianjur (d. between 1692 and 1695) (Bahrudin 2003). Islam propagation in Sumedang took place through local kingdom institutions. *Ulamas* and elites engaged in mutualisms throughout Islam propagation, as was one involving Prince Kusumahdinata or Pangeran Santri a.k.a. Ki Gedeng Sumedang. The most phenomenal figure that was both an *ulama* and a Sundanese elite was Haji Hasan Mustapa, who was promoted to be an Islam "spokesperson" during the Dutch Colonial government (Bamualim 2015, 22–24). Such an elite and *ulama* institutional relation had an impact on the Islamization in Tatar Sumedang through cultural approaches (Ravianto (ed.) 2017).

Pangeran Santri's *da'wah* movement was passed down to his son Raden Angkawijaya, who was entitled Prabu Geusan Ulun Raja Sumedanglarang. Sumedang in the Ulun Era fell under the control of Islamic Mataram, during which its territory spanned

to Tasikmalaya (Kartadibrata 1989). Prince Kusumahdinata IX or Prince Cornel, a Sumedang Regent (1791–1828), endowed his land in Condong, Cibeureum, and Tasikmalaya for the establishment of Pesantren Riyadul Ulum Wadakwah in the 18th century, now known as Pesantren Condong. Islam propagation through *pesantren* was only realized through the *pesantren* founded by Hadratusyekh K.R. Asyrofuddin from Kraton Kasepuhan Cirebon, which remains in operation until today (Wiriadmadja, n.d.; Handayani, Wiyanarti, and Yulifar 2019, 89).

According to the information above, Islamization in Tatar Sunda, particularly Sumedang, is of a distinctive color. Islamization through elite institutions seems to be a unique approach, as with some other regions in the Nusantara. Meanwhile, Cirebon, where Syarif Hidayatullah as an Islamization generator in the western part of Java, became an important point of reference to which as well as a source from which Islamization flew. Some of the legacies of this Islamization process, aside from the tomb of Syekh Goparana, are Islam social and cultural facts in Subang, West Java, which are generally observable in the life culture of the Muslims in the cultural context of Sundanese society.

C. Research Methods

This research used a case study approach. Interviews and extensive observational research at the research site were carried out by researchers for data collection purposes. In this paper we are of the view that *pesantren* traditions undergo dynamic changes, with some being defended and developed and some others being replaced to follow the sociocultural changes that take place in society. The traditions defended particularly pertain *pesantren* leadership that combines culture in Sundanese elite power hegemony (*menak*), *ulamas*, and religious teachings.

D. Result and Discussion

1. Pesantren Leadership in Cikalama

The *kyai's* leadership tradition in Pesantren Cikalama perhaps is the most powerful element of *pesantren* traditions that steers the

life of *pesantren* traditions as a whole. Based on prior research findings on *kyai's pesantren* leadership tradition (Steenbrink 1986; Soebahar 2013), the leadership in Pesantren Cikalama shares a similarity with that in other *pesantrens*. *Kyais* as *pesantren* leaders are descendents of the *pesantrens'* founders. They are charismatic and even believed to be gifted with *karamah* by Allah thanks to their morality and religiosity. The differences from, or the superior points over, if it is termed in such a way, *pesantren* leadership in general are described as follows:

First, the combined elite and *ulama* genealogy strengthens the genealogical tradition in *pesantren* leadership. The leadership of Pesantren Cikalama ever since R. Mintareja has been *pesantren ulama*-elite leadership. The two power traditions have merged in the *pesantren's* leadership. Not only do they hold power, *kyais* in such a portrait also control (i.e., own) *pesantren* assets just like kings as sole rulers do (Aripudin and Tajiri 2021).

Second, not only are they *pesantren* leaders, *kyais* are also public figures. It is evident that a great number of public figures, usually alumni of Pesantren Cikalama, have come to consult Cikalama *kyais* regarding social, land, and political matters or regarding the future. Local officials and employees, businesspersons, and the general public also come to visit, albeit only to ask them to pray for them or to seek advice concerning problems that they are facing. Put otherwise, such an attitude of a *kyai* in meeting all visitors' needs, including spiritual matters, is a must for the *kyai* to maintain their charisma (Horikoshi 1987, 178).

Third, *pesantren kyais* are not administrative leaders. Therefore, administrative affairs seem to be unsystematic. The administrative management of the *pesantren* is conducted by individuals on stand-by in the *pesantren's* secrateriate. Yet, these *kyais* have what is called absolute power and authority. All *pesantren* affairs, including technical matters, must be conducted with the knowledge and permit of the *pesantren kyais*. Upon receiving a permit proposal, the *kyais* will grant their permit either under conditions or under no conditions according to the problem and degree of benefit.

Fourth, there is women's leadership in the *ngabungbang* ritual tradition, which is an innovation in Prophet Muhammad's birthday celebration tradition that takes place from the 12th to

the 14th of the month Rabiul Awal. Following the pilgrimage procession to the *pesantren* ancestors' tombs, approximately 300 m to the *pesantren*'s precinct, *kyais*, *santris*, and *pesantren* family members prepare themselves to participate in the peak procession of the *ngabungbang* ritual at 12 o'clock during the night. *Dua* and *tawassul* (prayers for *ahl qubur*) calling upon the names of Allah, Prophet Muhammad and other prophets, Prophet Muhammad's family, the companions, and so forth until the predecessors of the *pesantren* are continuously recited towards the peak ritual. The assembling congregation consists of seven to ten thousand people.

The *ngabungbang* ritual procession is led by a woman, and only a woman, irreplaceable by any men, who is named R. Endeh Siti Sa'adah (shortened as Resisa), the second daughter of Engkos Abdul Kohar and sister to Yuyu M. Yusuf (Mama Yuyu), leader of Pesantren Cikalama from 2017 to date. It is for this reason that female congregation members occupy the frontmost lines before their male counterparts (Aripudin and Tajiri 2021, 73).

The emergence of a woman's role in the leadership tradition of Pesantren Cikalama is a historical factor. The woman referred to above is R. Oma Murtasi'ah (ROMA), a champion and a spiritualist from Limbangan. ROMA's relation as a champion to *kyais* of the *pesantren* as a principal symbol is reminiscent of the comparable relation between *ulamas* and champions in Banten as real social power that is operated to strengthen the traditional authority of the *pesantren* institution until ROMA's death. In the implementation of the "*ijazah*" ritual, Resisa is accompanied by Mama Yuyu in leading the *tawassul* ahead of the "*ijazah*" conferment. Here the "*ijazah*" takes the form of a "specific *du'* (pray)" that is recited by Resisa, followed by the entire attending congregation. To keep to ethics and commitment, the "specific *du'*" text must neither be written nor recorded. The writing or recording of the "specific *du'*" is considered to be a violation which may harm the violator if it is committed.

This women's leadership portrait in Pesantren Cikalama shows that leadership in the *pesantren* institution is not immune to women's leadership, even though men's leadership hegemony

remains strong. The historical factor in women's leadership in the *pesantren* suggests institutionalization of traditional leadership traditions. The social support for it grows even stronger in contemporary days. The relation between female *kyais* and other *pesantren* elements is alike to male *kyais'* relation, which carries a *takzim* attitude as part of the strengthening of Islamic traditions in *kyai-santri* relations. In the leadership operations, as in teaching *santris*, the *kyais* of Pesantren Cikalama are both self-reliant and assisted by some teaching staff who are still related in kinship.

2. Scholastic Tradition

The scholastic tradition at Pesantren Cikalama is practiced consistently as an Islamic traditional education institution, in terms of both approaches and methods. The books studied are also classical in nature, some of which even are basic. In the studies of *nahwu* and *sharaf* (Arabic grammar), *matan Jurumiyah* (text or *lapaz*) by Muhammad bin Muhammad Daud as-Shanhaji (672–722 H) is one of the books studied by junior and senior *santris* as well as alumni every Wednesday night directly under the guidance of the *pesantren* guardians (Observations and interviews with MY in March of 2018 and May of 2021).

The book *Jurumiyah* contains *matan* and explanation (*syarah*) on how to understand changes (*i'rab*) in Arabic with respect to word position in sentence and to the last letter and vowel mark of a word. This basic *nahwu* book can be found and studied in some traditional *pesantrens* in the Nusantara (Dhofier 2011, 53–56; Bruinessen 1995, 148–53). The difference in practice lies in the explanations (*syarah*) or personal interpretations of the *kyai*. Additional interpretations or *syarah* even serve as “key explanations” in the defense as well as innovation of the scholastic traditions that are preserved and practised continuously (Observation and interview with MY on the 26th of May, 2021). The innovative interpretations of the *kyai* at times are oriented not only towards the meaning carried by the *nahwu* text, but also towards ethical and social matters. The study of *nahwu* in the learning system in Cikalama occupies a central position and is conducted in a graduated manner, although this gradation is

not always standardized in its organization and structure. This decision is in reference to the principle that “*arf* is the mother of knowledge and *na wu* is the father, and no conclusion is to be drawn without reference to both” (*a - arfu umm al-‘ulm wa al-na wu ab h , wa l takhr j al-nat’ij bi d nih*) (Interview with MY on the 26th of May, 2021).

The *fiqh* book *Safna al-Naj t* and the book *Fat al-Qarb al-Muj b (Taqr b)*, for instance, are intensively studied and even belong to the praxis science as its materials are widely used for worship ritual practices, such as *al t*, *zan bat*, and *zak t*, to name just a few. *Safna al-Naj t* is a compact *fiqh* book of the Shafi’i school. The book was authored by a Yemenite *ulama* named Salim bin Sumair al-Hadrami. He died in Jakarta in the 13th century H. With regard to this book, Mama Yuyu, leader of Pesantren Cikalama, even opines that the discussion of worship *fiqh* materials contained is comprehensive for both junior and senior *santris* (Interview with MY on the 17th of June, 2021). The same holds true for the book *Fat al-Qarb* that is used as a basic reference in the study of *fiqh* in Cikalama. This book is a *fiqh* book authored by Imam Ahmad bin Husain as-Shahir Abi Syuja.

As for ethics materials, the books *Sullam al-Tauf q* and *Sharh ‘Uq d al-Lujayn* are used as handbooks. The book *Sullam al-Tauf q il Ma abba All h ‘al Ta q q Mukhta ar f m Yajib ‘al Kulli Muslim an Ya’lamah min U al-d n wa Fur ‘ih* was authored by Abdullah bin Husain bin Tohir Ba Alawi Al-Hadrami al-Shafi’i (1191–1272 H). This book is also common in other traditional *pesantrens* (Solichin 2018). The other book is “*Uq d al-Lujayn*”. The complete name of this book is *Sharh ‘Uq d al-Lujayn f Bay ni uq q al-Jauzayn*, which was authored by Shaykh Nawawi bin Umar al-Bantani al-Jawi (dead in 1316 H/1898 AD). The book *Uqudulijain* contains themes related to marriage and husband-wife relationships in a household according to the Islamic *sharia*. Some even refer to it as a “sex education book” (Riyani 2019) Indonesia, in their marital relationships. Dominant discourses teach that women should obey their husbands, and most women believe that they should serve their husbands sexually whenever required. Sex is a taboo subject and women should not discuss

sex or initiate sex. Their sexual desire is not acknowledged. However, in-depth interviews with 42 married women, and some husbands, found that a few exceptional women managed to challenge or negotiate around these dominant discourses. The paper examines their exercise of agency with regard to the initiation of sex, positions and practices that they prefer, their ability to say no to sex, ways to avoid having sex and their demand for mutual pleasure in sex. Some other classical books are *Dhurra al-N i n*, *Fat al-Mu'n*, and *Na m Qadirian*, as well as *Pangan Dika Kaula* that discuss *akhlaq*, *fiqh*, and *tasawuf*, respectively. *Na m Qadirian* itself contains poems by Shaykh Abdul Qadir Jaylani, a prominent *sufi* from Iraq and the founder of the Qadiriyyah *sufi* order. *Qadirian* poems are recited every Thursday night.

The studies of books are conducted under the guidance of *kyais* using approaches and methods that are adjusted to the textual narrations of the books. The *kyais* or the study guides are addressed “*raden*”, or just “*den*” for short. This form of address is not used for Mama Yuyu Yusuf (leader of the *pesantren*), for whom the form of address Mama is used. There are a total of three teachers, namely, Mama Yuyu, Oef Shafiudin, and Didim Dimyati. Meanwhile, women’s studies are guided by Endeh S. Sa’adah. All teachers are kin to the *pesantren* ancestors, and none of them are external to the *pesantren* family. The teaching methods practised include *balagan*, *bandongan*, *segatan*, *sorogan*, and *tarkiban* (observation on June 19, 2021). The “*balagan*” method is a study method by which *santris* listen and pay attention to the *kyai*’s recital and explanation in a group. The *kyai* recites and translates sentences rapidly instead of translating word for word (Dhofier 2011, 54).

In “*bandongan*” processes, there is no dialog or question and answer session between the *kyai* and the *santris*. Some reference books such as *Sullam al-Taufq*, *Fat al-Qarb*, *Fat al-Mu'n*, *Dhurra al-N i n*, and *Safna al-Najt* are taught using the *bandongan* method in Pesantren Cikalama. Distinguished from *bandongan* is the “*segatan*” method, which is particularly used to study and gain an accurate understanding of the position of a word. For instance, among others, a word is claimed to occupy

the *fi'il amar* (*fi'l amr*: command verb) position according to the *wazn* of the main word. The “*segatan*” demands that *santris* must be active and verbal.

Similar to “*segatan*” is the “*tarkiban*” method, that is, a learning method that aims for *santris* to know how to use and combine one word and another to form a sentence. *Segatan* and *tarkiban* are two methods used for topics of *na wu* and *arf* or the Arabic grammar. The last method is “*sorogan*”. In this method, *santris* demonstrate what they have learned individually to the *kyai* from both *fiqh*- and *arf*-themed books. *Santris* usually make a demonstration to an *ustadh* or a senior in advance to ensure correct recital in terms of *i'rb* (sentential change), intonation, and definitions and meanings involved in sentences. The *kyai* listens to this demonstration of the *santris* and make corrections. Admittedly, this method carries a problem, especially when it comes down to differing *pesantren* cultures (Karimah 2018).

Of the learning methods abovementioned, the *sorogan* method is considered the best learning method as it allows *santris* to learn independently, although it requires more thorough preparations. *Kyais* may use this method to find out about a *santri*'s progress in picking up an ability in person as well as to conduct an evaluation. *Sorogan* is applied every morning and late afternoon given the more lax allocation of learning time during this period in contrast to the more-densed night time.

A number of conclusions are then drawn regarding the scholastic tradition at Pesantren Cikalama. *First*, the construction of the scholastic tradition at Pesantren Cikalama combines epistemological elements of *shara'* law, Adat law, and reasoning law (“Kitab Pangan Dika Bab Hukum (Book of ‘Pangan Dika’ Chapter Law),” n.d. and interview with MY, June 17, 2021). The laws aforementioned are in reference to the explanation and the text of *Pangan Dika*. Nonetheless, the use of the reasoning law is relatively limited, as in the study of theology (*aqaid*), which tends to be *Asy'ariyah* and dialectical (“Kitab Pangan Dika Bab Hukum (Book of ‘Pangan Dika’ Chapter Law),” n.d.). The Adat law is studied and practised especially in matters that are related to daily activities in the form of causes and effects instead of

the Adat law (*adat recht*) applicable in Indonesia that covers religious affairs (Ngani 2012, 3); rather, this *adat* (custom) law is more like a convention or an unwritten custom.

Second, the religious materials in *fiqh* under the *shara'* law category tends to refer to the ideas expressed by Imam Shafi'i or belonging to the Shafi'i school. In theology and *'aq da*, the materials refer to the ideas expressed by Abu Hasan Al-Ash'ari (the *ahl as-Sunah wa al-Jama'ah* school). In *tasawuf* (*sufi* orders), although less dominantly, the materials used tend to be in referece to the Qadiriyyah *sufi* order founded by Shaykh Abdul Qadir Jailani, as is proven by the "Qadirian" recital tradition or *manaqiban* (Salahudin and Arkumi 2016, 73).

Third, the scholastic reading texts are written in a combination of Arabic, pegen Sundanese, and, occasionally, pegen Javanese. With respect to the religious traditions in Sundanese society, the *da'wah* approaches using *nadham* and poems are culturally friendly, hence facilitating the Islamic value internalization (Islamization) process (Woodward 2019)post-coloniality, the construction of National Islams and nationalisms are extraordinarily complex. They pose complex academic, theological and political problems. This paper considers examples from the province of West Java in post-colonial Indonesia. It will be concerned with the ways in which elements of local West Javanese/Sundanese culture are rejected by Islamist nationalists but at the same time incorporated into a regional variant of the culture friendly Islam Nusantara formulated by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Using Sundanese in poems and *pantuns* as has been done by Sundanese Islamic figures is an effective approach to *da'wah* (Rohmana 2012). Given this picture, the Islamic teaching at Pesantren Cikalama can be categorized as classical or *salaf*, that is, teaching that retains the classical traditions of the *pesantren* without the introduction of secular teaching. It is what sets Pesantren Cikalama apart from *pesantrens* that only recently emerge with secular teaching, even with the incorporation of secular schooling, and that are frequently categorized as *khalaf* (modern) *pesantrens* due to their recency (Naj 1985, 115–16).

3. Conclusion

The *pesantren* tradition defense is carried out through the conservation of leadership traditions and traditional ritual networking until resilient *pesantren* traditions are formed. *Pesantren* traditions include the defense of traditional rituals and *kyai* leadership hegemony, *santris*' religious learning culture and behaviours, and religious traditions that are supported by innovations of tradition networks towards institutionalization, which make up the power in *pesantren* defense. Tradition innovations are made through the diffusion of *pesantren* elements as pillars of the traditions and innovations of religious rituals that follow neither modernization currents nor political affiliations. Tradition innovations are sourced from local culture, Islamic, and traditional ritual capital, including the archeological conservation of spiritually meaningful *pesantren* tradition heritages, both tangible and intangible.

Changes in the *pesantren* institution take the form of changes that strengthen *pesantren* traditions, both in leadership and in the conservation of *pesantren* traditions, such as combining the aristocrate-*kyai* leadership tradition and women's leadership. The aristocratic tradition strengthens the male-lineage-based *pesantren* leadership tradition, although with the consequence of changes in the arrangement of *pesantren* asset affairs, given that the management of *pesantren* assets is based on Islamic traditions through the *waqaf* system instead of the inheritance arrangement normally applied in the power succession in the aristocratic tradition. Such a change was first applied toward the end of the third-generation *pesantren* leadership of Cikalama, that is, when the *pesantren* leadership was assumed by a son-in-law of an aristocratic background. Meanwhile, women's leadership, although being in place, remains under the influence of men's leadership, where women's leadership is applied only in the arrangement of *ngabungbang* ritual *ijazah* as women in this function are irreplaceable by men. Small change dynamics take place in the leader's orientations and inclinations, both in terms of religious affairs and in terms of religious physical facilities.

Part 8

Another Side of Folk Tradition; Da'wah, Entertainment, and Magic in The Madurese Community¹

The emergence and development of traditional art is closely linked to the process of religious propagation. Art in religious societies does not always emerge deductively as a development of the spirit of religious teachings. In fact, art in traditional societies has the potential to be produced as a medium and tool for spreading religion and entertainment, while simultaneously strengthening community character. Cultural values in art then merge and integrate into a mutually complementary local wisdom, so that religious art and culture are inductively functionally embedded. This article aims to reveal how Islamic values as a religion functionally relate to the artistic traditions of the Madurese people. The position of art as something profane and entertaining then changes to follow the position of religion as sacred and has similar consequences. The relationship between art and Islam is evident in song lyrics, the history of art's emergence, moments of artistic performances, art genres, the spread of religion, and the legality of religious leaders. Traditional community art is ultimately preserved as Islam is preserved, even developing into a multifaceted force that has impacts such as improving the community's economy.

¹ Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian kepada Masyarakat (LP2M), Bandung UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 2018.

A. Introduction

The relationship between Islam and art as local wisdom has not yet been resolved theologically, especially when referring to the traditional Islamic academic tradition. S.H. Nasr, for example, only limits Islamic art to calligraphy and *nasyid*. [Nasr, 1993: 27-29]. Nasr's view was criticized by Herzfeld (Faruqi, 1988: 201) for being very narrow and Arabistic. Art outside of that, even though practiced by Muslims, can be considered to have no theological basis, so it can be said to be doubted and even rejected. Nasr's view is similar to Iqbal's thesis on the movement of life as a manifestation of God [Syarif, 1993: 121]. Therefore, art, as part of this manifestation, must also embody the shadow of divine values, not the shadow of Satan that leads humans away from God (QS, 6: 162). More specifically, art in Islam must reflect *tawhid* (devotion to God) (Faruqi, 2019).

The relatively strict view of art in relation to Islam, as expressed by several Muslim scholars above, has given rise to the inaccurate perspective of Western scholars that Islam limits, reduces, and hinders artistic creativity (May, 2012, 3). Islam lacks a "sense of art," as if it were incompatible with art, especially visual art (Grabar, 1983: 31).

In practice, the relationship between art and Islamic values, as practiced by Muslim communities, does not always run smoothly, like railroad tracks, connected yet distant, or like the relationship between water and oil, able to be together yet separate. In some cases, the relationship between art and religion depends heavily on the human actors behind the game. The social setting and the context in which art and culture develop also determine whether art and culture are human cultural products, functional, complementary, and reinforcing.

The question of whether art, culture, or religion is superior or dominant becomes less relevant when one seriously examines how the two relate in practice across substandard sectoral boundaries. While some scholars in Islamic history have held conservative perspectives on art and seemingly ambiguous views on its relationship to religion, others have also held moderate, traditional, and even liberal views. However, none of these views

have hindered the development of art within religion, or vice versa, in the practice of Muslims.

Over time, the relationship between art and religion has also become dynamic. Both are elements that complement and sustain each other. In fact, Islam and art, in certain realities, overlap and complement each other. The two are difficult to separate. This relationship is increasingly important in addressing the classic issue of art's place in religion, particularly traditional arts, due to the onslaught of modernization and Islamization. Islamization, within certain Islamic schools of thought, such as Wahhabism, is often identified with the puritanization of religion, where art is seen as having the potential and is suspected of being harmful to religion. Meanwhile, modernization is seen as displacing traditional values and replacing them with modern traditions, often identified with Westernism (Madjid, 1987).

Cultural conservation, including traditional community art, has raised public awareness of the importance of community-produced art as local wisdom. Religion also reinforces this by spreading understandings regarding the importance of preserving this local wisdom, through the concept of *urf* [Khalaf, 1978:89]. This is further confirmed by facts and realities within society, where the sacred and spiritual values of religion are embodied in art, and vice versa.

Art performances are eagerly awaited and responded to with reverence by the audience, especially religious figures and artists, or cultural figures, including those in Islamic boarding schools, such as through religious guidance (Bukhory, 2011). Therefore, art and Islam will be more flexible if they refer to the limitations offered by Blair, namely art that lives in Muslim society. "Islamic art is generally held to be "the art made by artists or artisans whose religion is Islam for those who live in predominantly Muslim lands, or for purposes that are restricted or peculiar to a Muslim population or a Muslim community" (Blair & M. Bloom, 2014).

There's a *tug of war* in the development of the relationship between art and religion, especially as it evolves into a tourism industry. However, this situation doesn't undermine it. Religious leaders and cultural figures act as bridges and brokers for the

relationship between art and religious traditions, as demonstrated by cultural figures and religious leaders in Madura, one of the fourth largest ethnic groups in Indonesia.²

In the Madurese folk art tradition, Islamic art is not limited to religious works, but encompasses all artistic traditions within the local Muslim culture. Its powerful aesthetic appeal transcends time and space, as well as differences in language and culture. The common features of Islamic art provide a remarkable coherence, regardless of the country or time in which it was created.

This study of Madurese folk art uses a phenomenological approach, using direct observation and in-depth interviews related to the topic. The research theme encompasses the spiritual actualization of religion in folk art, which functions to preserve the community's culture. In addition to this theme, this study also demonstrates the functional use of art and Islam as a medium for religious dissemination.

Observations were conducted at folk art centers in five regencies on Madura Island. Interviews were conducted with religious leaders, such as H.D. Zawawi and Edy Setiawan, cultural figures, artists, policymakers relevant to the study theme, and stakeholders who support and develop Madurese folk art. The data obtained were then classified based on the study's theme. Therefore, a literature search also served as a way to carefully view and analyze the data, allowing the collected data to be reduced to specific folk arts that have functional value in the relationship between art and religion (Islam) that influence the character of Madurese society.

This approach also aims to avoid repeating similar studies on the same objects that have been conducted by previous researchers. However, the researchers acknowledge that the data on folk arts captured in this study represents only a small fraction of the hundreds of folk arts on this largest salt producing island.

2 Lusiana Mustinda, *Domestic Destinations 10 Suku di Indonesia yang Jumlah Populasinya Paling Banyak*. Pada sensus tahun 2010, suku Madura memiliki populasi sekitar 7.179.356 jiwa. Suku ini berasal dari daerah Madura dan sekitar provinsi Jawa Timur. <https://travel.detik.com/domestic-destination/d-4708589/10-suku-di-indonesia-yang-jumlah-populasinya-paling-banyak> diakses 17 Desember 2020.

B. Madurese Context

The relationship between Islam and art, and even art, culture, and religion in general, has been explored by scholars through observations of Islamic archaeological remains from upstream to downstream. Several findings reveal that art, culture, and Islam have a dynamic relationship, absorbing the local cultural values of ethnic communities. This applies not only to Arab culture, where Islam was first introduced, but also to non-Arab cultures where there have been struggles between Islam and local communities, including the relationship between Islam and European art and culture (Ryan, 2019).

Arabic nuances in Islamic arts and culture, especially folk art, are sociologically evident and still dominant, as they have become integrated with new traditions, embodying Islamic culture. Art in religious rituals is emotionally imbued and possesses spiritual value (Haldane, 1982). Not only the ritual aspect, but religious moments also serve as a platform for absorbing the artistic aspects inherent in art performances.

Other research related to Madurese society was conducted which had more or less influence on the social and cultural system of the society, such as the social changes of Madurese society as an agrarian society (Kuntowijoyo, 1981). He found the uniqueness of Madurese society in the form of a typical dryland ecology, differentiating it from similar conditions in Java, because it can form a scattered settlement pattern and migrate outside the area, or in Geertz's observation, Madurese society is included in the category of coastal people who are oriented towards trade and have a strong Islamic faith (Geertz, 1981, 3). The structure of social and economic organizations has shaped the personality of Madurese people who are individual-centered and political leadership in the hands of ulama.

Complementing Kunto's findings regarding the changes and shifts in values in Madurese society due to modern education, Islamic organizations and ulama still maintain sacred religious values. The influence of Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and *kiai* (Islamic religious leaders) in religious and worldly affairs is very strong. Madurese people believe that Islamic law, especially Sufism and local culture, is

very important and needs to be implemented in all aspects of their lives (Pribadi, 2013), including its influence on folk arts culture. This view supports Bouvier's findings that the structure of arts and culture in Madurese society is closely related to the religious, political, and economic spheres (Bouvier, 2002).

Muslims in the Madurese archipelago certainly have a unique appeal, particularly in the study of their religion and folk arts. Previous researchers' stereotypes of Madurese society are overly simplistic, necessitating a broader perspective, such as its actualization in religious life and the arts. The Madurese, as the fourth largest ethnic group in Indonesia out of 633 extant ethnic groups, possess a rich cultural heritage that needs to be uncovered as part of efforts to preserve their cultural heritage.

Specifically, evidence of the relationship between arts and culture and Islam in Madurese society is evident in the *tandhe'* ritual, which is integrated with Islam (Hidayaturraman, 2018) and the bull racing art (Juhari, 2016). The *tandhe'* culture is present in Islamic wedding ceremonies. The presence of religious leaders and Muslims at these rituals demonstrates the harmonious relationship between Islam and *tandhe'* culture, in addition to the religious values inherent in these traditions.

C. A Glimpse of Madura Island

Madura has been known since ancient times. It is known not only for its abundant natural resources, especially salt, but also for its islands and people, which later created the culture and character that is attached to the Madurese people. Physically, Madurese people, referring to Van Gennep's opinion, differentiate them from Javanese people in general, "...they are stockier and more muscular, but not bigger. Their faces are bigger and less refined and their cheekbones are very prominent. They look fiercer and often rough". noted that the face of the Madurese is "cruel in nature", because the head structure is thicker, the appearance is more fierce and powerful. Madurese, both commoners and nobles, are less pleasant figures than Javanese. They seem wild, have thick hair and often have thick mustaches or beards.³

3 Huub De Yonge, *Garam*,...*ibid*, h. 64.

Madurese women are also said by Western observers to be less well positioned than their Javanese sisters. Van der Linden wrote that Madurese women were said to be strange, fat and ugly, and their beauty was far below that of the average Central Javanese woman, let alone East Javanese. Madurese women are said to age quickly, their bones are too rough and their faces too dull. That's the phrase of composer J.S. Brandts Buys wrote.⁴ The only positive thing about Madurese women, according to Hageman, is that they have nice and plump breasts, because they are not used to wearing *penjung* or *kemben*.⁵ According to Linden, the character of Madurese people can also be seen in their clothing, which is said to be messy and tacky, shabby and dirty. The men have a habit of wearing ragged knee-length trousers, sarongs tied around their heads and negligees tied casually around their heads.

What Western observers see and reveal about Madurese society is of course still debatable, especially considering that the characteristics and characters mentioned above can also be found in communities outside Madura (Raditya, 2020). However, what is more interesting is that the character of a society will continue to change and continue to create its culture. Social and cultural changes as a result of advances in information technology and transportation, such as the Suramadu bridge in the current Madurese context, have of course greatly influenced changes in the culture of Madurese society. The changes in question will also bring about a shift in the values and arts and culture that have been maintained and developed by the Madurese, both at the level of form and attributes

It can be proven that the culture of the Madurese people has changed, as can be seen in their artistic culture. Do you still see stereotypes about the characteristics and character of the Madurese as found by the Western experts above in the form of cultural arts that they preserve today? Why does it also have to be done through arts and culture, not through social structures, for example? These questions are of course very

4 Huub De Yonge, *Garam*,...*ibid*, h. 64.

5 A piece of cloth worn to flatten the breasts, and because of the "strange" habit of Madurese women who carry everything on their heads, something that Javanese women would never do. Huub De Yonge, *Garam*,...*ibid*, h.65.

useful for digging deeper into Madurese society as reflected in the current actualization of their arts and culture.

Starting a discussion about arts and culture in Madura, religious arts more specifically, it seems I must immediately remember the words of Helen Bouvier, a European scholar who wrote completely and seriously about arts and culture in Madurese society. Bouvier said that art is not a light activity without a purpose, not related to space, time, materials and the society around it. On the contrary, material, social and historical conditions play a decisive role in the development of artistic production.⁶

Studying arts and culture, writing and publishing them to a wide audience, directly or indirectly, is a separate angle of knowing who (who) and how (why) the culture of that society. Culture in the form of art, both its ideas (the art of ideas), the actualization of behavior in the form of art (the art of behavior) and the very visible facts of art artifacts (the art of artifacts) is a form of art and culture that describes the characteristics and character of a society or nation. Therefore, studying the arts and culture of a society or nation is actually studying and understanding the human face. Moreover, if human society has a diversity of artistic and cultural actualization that refers to ethnic, ethnic and even religious diversity, such as Indonesia, it will be even more extensive and more complicated to study.

Bouvier sees art developing through space, time and materials as means, tools and even media to make art sustainable. Including the media in question is religion. The relationship between religion and art is like two words of the same coin, because they both complement and need each other, especially as a medium for preserving the arts and culture of society. Religion can also be sustained and accepted by its adherents through the arts and culture of society. The cultural arts in question are arts that have been and are developed in society. Regarding when the acculturation of art and religion occurred is difficult to reveal. However, the relationship between the two

6 Helene Bouvier, *Keasingan dan Keakraban, dari Lapangan ke Susunan Tulisan: Satu Contoh Pengalaman dan Metode Etnografis dalam Bidang Antropologi Kesenian*, dalam Pudientia MPSS (Editor), *Metodologi Kajian Tradisi Lisan*, Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2015, h. 333.

in the context of Indonesian society is difficult to separate. In the arts and culture of the Madurese people, the majority of whom adhere to Islam, have greatly influenced the development of both.

Research on arts and culture in Madura as one of the centers of arts and culture of the Madurese community, in general, especially those related to religion, as carried out by local researchers is still separatist in nature, seems incidental, so it does not provide a factual description of Madurese arts and culture, most of which are still stored in community traditions which are sometimes “hidden”. Even though the Madurese people are the fourth largest ethnic group in the archipelago. “Outside” researchers such as Bouvier appear to be very helpful in providing information about the object in question, so that facts about the cultural heritage of the archipelago appear on the surface and become information material that can be used by relevant agencies regarding the richness of cultural heritage in Indonesia.

Below, I try to reveal, confirm and explore some of the arts and culture of the Madurese people, both those that have been written by several experts related to Madurese arts and culture and those that have not been related to the motivation and/or actualization of arts and culture with religious nuances accompanied by integrative elements in the community’s artistic traditions.

D. Art as a Da’wah Media

Two young men, around the age of 24 or above, faced each other as if they were going to fight. They each hold a club made from certain wooden roots, usually rattan, approximately 100 cm long (lapalo) which is provided for fighting. That was the beginning of the Ajhung Art performance which is also called lapalo or *kolpokol* and *panjhalin*.⁷ Ajhung art is practiced by some Madurese people, especially in Sumenep. Before the Ajhung event is held, a simple ritual ceremony by reading

⁷ H. Bouvier, *Lebur, Seni Musik dan Pertunjukan Dalam Masyarakat Madura*, Jakarta, YOI, 2002, h. 200.

readings such as prayers or mantras is carried out, so that the sense of magical aura is very visible during the event.

The prayer reading that accompanies the demonstration of the Ajhung art of the Madurese people is not only the legality of “halal” and additional ceremonial rituals at the performance event, but also confirms that this art does not conflict with religion. Madurese society, as is known, is almost 100% Muslim. Art in Islam is a reflection of society as a way of viewing the spiritual realm and the universe (Hussain, 2009). For Muslims, reality begins with and is centered on Allah. Allah is the core of worship and aspirations for Muslims, and is the focus of their lives. Islamic art is a spiritual representation of objects, and not of their physical qualities.

There has not been adequate information regarding the historical background why this art was created. However, according to Bouvier’s findings,⁸ SA was initially a moment for “revenge” from the mountain communities which was carried out cruelly and ended in serious injuries, even death. SA art is performed in relation to abject, yet feared, human and material contexts

Religious rituals are also visible in the Damar Korong stage⁹, namely the ceremony of making a fire lighting device wrapped in paper like a lantern. Damar means “light”. Korong means “in brackets”. Elements, such as fire, paper, oil, when designed using traditional technology, can create a kind of fire balloon which then floats due to the pressure of the fire. However, this argument is not enough to be the reason why the lantern floats. Before the Damar Korong (DK) event was held, a few days earlier the actors carried out ritual ceremonies, such as prayers, reading mantras and expressing the function and purpose of the event.

The DK ceremony is still carried out by some people in Madura, especially Sumenep when commemorating major Islamic

⁸ H. Bouvier, *Lebur*,....198.

⁹ The name of this art was first obtained from the informant Hidayat (56 years old), an employee at the Sumenep Regency Education and Culture Service. According to the informant, the DK tradition is still carried out, especially by the people in two villages north of Sumenep. Unstructured interview, April 20 2016 at the Coffee Lovers Community (KPK) shop.

holidays, such as the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, Isra Mi'raj and the Islamic New Year (1 Muharram). In fact, DK's art performances attract the public's attention, apart from being considered a "miracle" that is full of mystery, it also has the following reasons:

Firstly, that the DK event cannot be performed by just anyone, so the time for the performance is very limited and could be intentionally limited to increase curiosity and witness it. At first glance, the DK event looks like a children's game like a child in a village. However, if we look deeper, the DK event procession has a very special value and is staged only by certain people. The magical and mystical aura is difficult to separate when DK is performed. Moreover, it is performed at night, and indeed if it is performed during the day the DK stage has less special value than at night.

Second, DK is initiated more by older people who have become respected community figures. It was almost difficult to find young people participating in the performance directly, except for one or two people who had met the requirements to do the DK demonstration. The audience who watched the DK stage were very enthusiastic about watching the event and felt they had it as part of the entertainment of the people, especially Muslims. DK's performance on Islamic holidays is difficult to separate. Commemoration of religious holidays without DK rituals feels bland, lacks appeal and is tasteless. DK's performance in relation to the commemoration of Islamic holidays, seems to hone the truth of the commemoration being celebrated in a more contextual form.

Different from the SA and DK performing arts is hadrah art. Hadrah can be said to be an art that has a special connection with Islam. Almost every corner of the village in Madura Regency has hadrah art groups with various names. Referring to data from the Tourism office, in Sumenep Regency alone there were 231 hadrah art groups or 'seni hadrah'(SH) founded by people spread across rural areas.¹⁰ This data does not include hadrah art groups in other districts, such as Pamekasan and Bawean, which shows the community's closeness to hadrah art. However,

¹⁰ Dinas Pariwisata Kabupaten Sumenep, (tulisan lepas), 2010.

SH in Sumenep is more lively and is evenly distributed in almost every village. Hadrah is the art of using percussion instruments, namely songs accompanied by spiritual songs to get closer to the Almighty through chanting poetry.¹¹ The poems are usually in Arabic, and/or a combination of Arabic and local languages.

SH appears to be a typical Islamic religious art that is not originally from Madura. Just looking at the name hadrah from the Arabic word hadara, meaning present.

Fadmin Prihatin Malau, *The Art of Expression in Islam*, [Harian Waspada, 14 June 2016.] which refers to presence before Allah. SH is carried out as a form of presenting the divine spirit within humans. Observing the poetry that is sung, the space and time of performance, as well as the attributes used by SH actors when performing, it is clear that SH is an art with Islamic religious nuances. Referring to Malau's view, art in Islam is an educational process that is positive, enlightening, liberating, generates optimism, guides and develops noble morality and akhlakul karimah.

SH in practice, is not only ansich art, but also has recreational or entertainment value. The rhythm of the tambourine beat (Madurese: fly) which is synchronized with the song's lyrics, even though it looks Arabic-Arabic, SH can still highlight the entertainment aspect. The entertainment aspect in SH has the aim of making humans submit and surrender to God, so that art can improve human quality. Therefore, on the contrary, it is an attitude of disobedience if art and entertainment do not lead to submission to God. SH art in other languages shows that the aim is more than just entertainment, but has the depth and breadth of its authentic manifestation, which always emphasizes the beauty and inseparability of God (Nasr, 1993: 218)

Through religious arts performances, Madurese people can get closer to God as experienced by the performers. The internalization of Islamic values is more easily accepted through traditional art. Islam can be integral to local culture (syncretic). The experience of religiosity is almost experienced in every arts event, including theater which is able to present 'threshold'

11 Dinas Pariwisata Pemerintah Kabupaten Sumenep, Laporan penyusunan Data Base Sistem Informasi Potensi Wisata, Seni dan Budaya Kabupaten Sumenep Laporan Akhir (Final Report), LPPM Institut Teknologi 10 Nopember Surabaya, 2006, h. 75.

events for artists and audiences. The religiosity presented through the 'threshold' event is where the Madurese people find their moment of encounter with God (Hidayatullah, 2019). According to Malau, this is what is called art in Islam as a contribution to tamaddun (civilization) with the aim of Allah.

SH is a typical art form and is performed by men. According to Bouvier, the basis of SH is qasidah which is the basic lesson for drummers and dancers before they hit the drum or start the basic movements of the choreography in a sitting (ruddad) or standing (zaf) position. The main source of nadham or poetry that is sung comes from the Book of Barzanji or the Book of Diba' which can also be seen in samroh and gambus art performances.¹²

SH is art that has quite a strong religious content, even containing the Prophet's salawat and Koranic content. However, there is also an entertainment aspect, especially when watching the dancers' movements with great emotion. SH art in each region in Madura has slight differences. SH in Sumenep, for example, the SH stage not only has religious preaching value, but also has entertainment value that really entertains the public. SH in Sumenep was first introduced by Zainal Arifin and AB Ta'lab and was staged quite complicated but still entertaining, especially when watching the performers.¹³ Combining entertaining artistic tastes with serene religion does not seem easy to do. Sometimes the performers themselves laugh at themselves because of the difficulty of combining two rhythmic orientations, religion and entertainment. However, this difficulty was in fact solved by the serious efforts of the performers who were enthusiastic about presenting entertainment that married art and religion.

Another Madurese folk art tradition that is related and significant to da'wah is the *Nyadr* Traditional Activity.¹⁴ The word *nyadr*, from Arabic, nadzr, is a traditional ceremony in Madura, especially northern Madura. The Nyadr (AN) traditional event is held around July (or the month of Maulid). AN is a custom that is difficult to explain in standard terms. The flexibility of

¹² Helene Bouvier, *Lebur Seni*...h. 214.

¹³ Khozien Arnanta, *Hadrah, Seni Musik Favorit Masyarakat Madura*, tt. <https://www.scribd.com/document/293304938/Hadrah> diakses 22 Desember 2020.

¹⁴ Informasi tentang Seni *Nyadr* diperoleh dari Informan Misbahul Munir. Wawancara tanggal 18 April 2016.

the relationship between beliefs and mantras and prayers, the sensitivity of Islamic beliefs and people's self-actualization are integrated into the cosmology of society. AN is considered by a small number of local ulama to have led to animist beliefs. However, according to community leaders and academics, these views and attitudes are just concerns. The participation of religious leaders who attend every AN ceremony shows that AN is not animist, so it can be preserved.

Initially, the AN activity was carried out, namely the story of a king from Bali who wanted to seize a virgin (girl) from Sumenep until a war broke out between Prince Telor and Prince Wetan. However, the attempt to seize the virgin was unsuccessful. In the morning, the local prince came to celebrate the salvation, and the tradition of nyadr emerged. The nyadr procession is now carried out through the following process; The night before the Nyadr event preparations were made carefully, like a celebration. They call this event a celebration. The morning of the celebration, they brought the family group with food, such as rice to be cooked to and during the event with feelings of cleanliness in their hearts and keeping away evil thoughts.

There is a fact that, if those who come are not clear in their minds (not clear) the rice that is cooked to become rice is not cooked (still raw). When the rice is cooked, it is placed in a plate that has historical, magical and unique value. These plates are very expensive to sell. About this plate, it was even offered hundreds of millions, because it has value as a relic from an elder. In the story, the plate was once bargained for and sold and suddenly the plate broke.¹⁵

The AN event is still being practiced in the Dadap area of Sumenep. Why in this area? Referring to the information above, the story of Balinese people who were lost due to war in the Dadap garden area which was separated by a river. There is a burial location in the Dadap garden. When entering the grave, visitors are marked as part of the family. The sacred grave would not have been photographed if it had been photographed. When the grave was dug there was water. Local people believe

¹⁵ Wawancara....Ibid.

in supernatural powers, especially when the characters are still alive. However, when the character dies, the grave becomes dry. Some say it is a “miracle”.¹⁶

There is also another version of the nyadr custom which can be considered more objective and trustworthy. The nyadr tradition was first practiced when the potential for salt was discovered in Madura. Then when Islam came the event shifted to tahlilan or salvation. When the pre-ceremony was carried out, first the local people boarded a boat to compete in speed. After the event is over, large pieces of rice such as tumpeng are installed or served and then eaten together, distributed among the people and the rest is dried, like making aking rice in Java. This leftover rice is still eaten in the future by mixing it in small amounts with good rice to get blessings. People believe that mixing leftover rice with regular rice will bring blessings. In this AN procession, there appears to be a process of Islamic acculturation in intercultural da'wah (peaceful conversion to Islam). Islam entered Sumenep earlier than Gujarat through the activities of traders. A year later, Islam in Sumenep was strengthened by Sunan Giri and Sunan Kudus from Java, especially Prince Katandur, grandson of Sunan Kudus, who also carried out Islamization through local cultural media, namely Karapan Sapi.

Karapan Sapi (KS) according to kyai and cultural observer from Sumenep D. Zawawi Imron [Interview on April 19 2016] was originally a missionary to spread Islamic values. Islam is absorbed, and/or community culture absorbs Islamic values as a form of accommodating local cultural value or vice versa, so that it becomes a complementary form of hybrid culture. Conceptually, the process of absorption (receptie) in the science of da'wah is included in the category of intercultural da'wah (Aripudin, 2013). The potential context of local culture was not wasted by the Muslim missionary from Kudus who was popularly called Sultan Katandur. This sultan's name later gave birth to its own art, namely Tandhur Art. Sunan Kudus's grandson, who was called Sultan Katandur, was Sayid Baedowi. Baedowilah is considered to be the first to introduce KS which

¹⁶ Lihat buku ITS itu dari Dinas Parawisata itu

later developed into cow fighting which entertained the public. Even in KS there are developing elements of gambling, magic and prestige which are more visual and material than spiritual which becomes the motivation.

Baedowi was assigned to Madura not only to change religion through his preaching, but also to spread culture, planting the land with nets and then giving seeds to plant (tandur). Teaching reading and guiding the community through traditional arts. While planting rice, Islamic preaching was conveyed by quoting verses from the Koran. As a result, plants increase in abundance, they are fertilized, watered (tandur) and so on as experienced and believed by the community. Thanksgiving after the harvest, the edges of the rake (a tool for cultivating the land) are cut off, then the cow karapan becomes. In that arena, local people believe that small planets appear in the field. (Abdurahman, Tempo 1994).

E. Art as a Cultivator of the Warrior's Spirit

Referring to Wahyuni's view,¹⁷ KS is popular with the public because it has unique features and interest that is full of the elements above, namely magic, gambling and prestige. Many cow owners come to Prince Katandur's grave before the competition, asking for blessings from the spirits of that place. Ask a shaman or kyai to pray so that the cows that will be competing will be strong and run fast. Another interest is the element of betting money (gambling). It is not uncommon for bettors (carok) to fist fight (fight) if the cow loses in the karapan. Carok, sometimes not only the audience, but also the owner of the cow. The next interest is prestige, especially for the owner of the winning cow. The owner of the winning cow not only increases his rank, but can also increase the selling price of the cow to skyrocket and the owner becomes famous. Therefore, it is not surprising that Karapan cattle owners dare to care for cattle even though the maintenance costs are high and expensive.¹⁸

17 Wahyuni, *Perkembangan Karapan Sapi sebagai Obyek Wisata Budaya di Kabupaten Sumenep 1998-2007*, Skripsi Jurusan Sejarah Universitas Jember, 2009, h. 36-37.

18 Interview dengan Hasbi, Juli 2017

The final interest is that KS is popular with the public because of the combination of KS art and art, namely saronen. Saronen is performed before the KS event begins. Saronen players really display the attitude of courage, chivalry and pump up the spirit of KS fighting, so that the audience is increasingly interested in watching this artistic performance, both domestically and internationally. The Saronen associated with KS was originally a demonstration of the beauty of a female cow with a horse for a ritual at a sacred tomb. Saronen is usually played by no less than seven people with the instruments sitting cross-legged, circled on a mat that is protected from rain or hot sun because it is protected by a tarpaulin. Saronen is also performed at family events, weddings and parties.

Towards the end of the saronen performance in other locations, such as in Bangkalan, Paterongan art is performed. Paterongan, more fully Paterongan Galis, is the name of a place in Bangkalan Regency as well as the location of the center for making sickles (are, takabuh, muteng or kitchen knife), which is a type of weapon that functions to protect oneself from brokers. The sickle is a kind of antique item made from selected ancient iron which is a source of livelihood for the Madurese people, especially Bangkalan. Paterongan is also the center for maintaining these tools, including other ancient objects (gaman), such as sickles, keris and whips, so that they look clean, shiny and their shine is maintained. This Paterongan art is in the form of drama which stages a play in its performance. The stories performed in the show have cultural value, namely about the nature of human life, the nature of human work, and the nature of human relationships (Pramono, 2019)

E. Folk Traditions as a Media for Social Relations

An artistic ritual that has social and religious functions at the same time is the Pangka ritual. Pangka is the last harvest festival that is old, even as old as the cow race. Young people in new clothes come to the rice fields to take part in the harvest. People cook outside the paddy area to cook rice. Unmarried

men, singing hambhaha-hambohaha, came carrying ropes and approached the women. If there is a woman who is suitable/close then accepts the man's rope to ask for his "heart". If the woman accepts, then it is a sign that there is compatibility, then the man goes to the chosen woman's house. If the woman doesn't want to, she won't give up her rice. At 12 noon they ate together, then returned to the sub-district town and then to the woman's house. This process is a sign that the man and woman have become one.

G. According to Cleric and Humanist D. Zawawi Imron, the Pangka Ritual is Islamic

¹⁹The Pangka ritual is highly maintained and preserved by historians and elders. The Pangka ritual is considered better than modern young people's courtship, because after the Pangka ceremony, it is not long before they get married. Generally they are adults. At that time rice was abundant because of the harvest season. For young adult couples, this situation is an indicator that marriage will not be far away. Culture adapts to nature and is very close to the development of other local cultures.

The Pangka ceremony on Kameang Island (east of Sumenep), for example, includes a party and a place to find a soul mate or life partner. Pangka is in the form of reaping rice leaving behind good rice. Good rice will be served when a wedding takes place. In the evening before the wedding, local people hold the kotekan tradition, a kind of staying up all night making flour like kotekan. Traditional communities are very close to the cultural heritage of their ancestors, so that every step they take in a new life they have to go through stages of traditional ceremonies which are an important part of their relationship to the cycle of social life.

In the pangka ritual, prayer and feasting unite cohesively and sacredly. Skipping this cultural ritual procession will cause emptiness and even danger in the future. This procession clearly

¹⁹ Wawancara, Juli 2017

contradicts modernization, therefore modernization is considered dangerous, including modern religious attitudes. The dangers of Modernist Islam, such as not believing in prayer, prayer is just a formality and religion is considered to be just lip service and fun, as analyzed by Bovier (Bouvier, 2002) in “Lebur”, from the word Lebu which means fun.

In every Madurese folk art performance, the elements of magic, entertainment and religion seem difficult to separate. Demonstrations of this folk art can also be seen in the sandhur ritual art (Dhamong Ghardam), which is one of the traditional arts commonly practiced by the Madurese people. Sandhur Ritual (RS) according to Aziz,²⁰ is a rite that is danced with various purposes, such as asking for rain, ensuring that the well is full of water, honoring sacred graves, getting rid of the danger of disease and repelling reinforcements (repelling disaster). The sandhur ritual is dancing and singing accompanied by music. The movements in dance are nothing more than adapting the body's rhythm to the dance movements of the local community. Body rhythms arise as a spontaneous response to singing or music. Sometimes, one or two people experience a trance condition conditioned by the handler/elder/shaman as a medium for conditioning and communicating with the supernatural.

There is a story about this hospital and how it became, a kind of asbab at-Tarikh as well as being the spirit of the hospital, which is translated into the story of the Prophet Zakaria. Once upon a time, someone named Sandhur was a teenager, devout and pious Muslim. His piety became the talk of the town, but he was only a goat herder. The teenager's position made the infidel jealous, so he intended to harm and kill him. When the Saleh was shepherding, the infidel planned to commit murder, but the Saleh disappeared into the earth (Sandurrelang=Sandhur-missing), and the Saleh was saved by God by being put into a tree. Knowing that Sandhur was in the tree, the infidel then sawed the tree.²¹

The initial ideal frame of the RS ceremony is related to the procession of human life, especially traditional communities, such

20 A. Fahrizal Aziz, *Kebudayaan Madura Upacara Adat Sandhur Pantel*, (tulisan lepas) Malang, 2011.

21 <http://lidawati.blogspot.com/2012/02/sandhur-pantel-perlambang-perjalanan.html>

as farming and fishing communities. They, like other humans, have the potential to depend on the Almighty in the process of their life's struggles. In order to reach the infinite, humans need symbols and media so that their goals and aspirations are achieved and granted. The Madurese people call the procession of the ritual ceremony referred to as Sandhur, which is named after the figure Saleh above.

The RS ceremony procession is usually led by a shaman who is tasked with reciting prayers in Madurese and Arabic alternately. When the ritual ceremony takes place, the performers are not allowed to include musical elements during the procession. Apart from being considered standard, violations of implementation can cause disease and disaster. There are many variations in the names of RS ceremonies in each region. Sandhur Lorho is known in Pasongsongan, Rokot Somar in Batuputih and in Guluk-Guluk there is Sandhuran Duruding (SD) which is done when harvesting corn and tobacco. There are also forms of ratep and rubaru, namely processions asking for rain, as found in Pakondang village and Kalebengan village. SD is singing by men or women or both, but without musical accompaniment.

Another variation of the RS, namely the lede or leddeg dance which is a village seletan procession, such as in Daramista village and Lenteng village. This dance is accompanied by a lumping horse. In Sarongangi village there is cahe or ginger which functions to bring rain which is danced to saronen music. All of these art forms clearly contain multi-cultural elements. Hindu, Buddhist, Javanese and Islamic traditions are integrated into a kind of cultural hybrid unique to Madura. Elements of Ancient Javanese, Madurese and Arabic are combined as can be symbolized in the form of offerings, holy water, mantras, prayers and songs.

Another form of RS is Sandhur Pantel (SP) which is a traditional art form from West Ambuten village. SP is a ceremony when connecting with the Sole Essence, the ruler of the universe. SP is an expression of smallness and smallness as well as human inability when facing various problems, disasters and trials. SP's position is like a bridge which becomes a medium when connecting with God which functions to distance

and ward off disasters and is reflected in the form of praise, a summary of prayers accompanied by songs, dance and music. The local people believe that SP is able to open the doors of heaven, so that God the Ruler is willing to extend his love. Through the SP procession, the local community asked for rain to fall immediately. Fishermen ask for abundant fish catches (rokat base), children's rokat event (rokat pandhaba)²² and the goal of obtaining healing.²³

SP, like other traditional arts, has been passed down from generation to generation by the community, it is an intact heritage and the community does not dare to change it. It is believed by the local community that any changes to the SP could cause disaster and illness to the perpetrator. Apart from being a cultural heritage (treasure), a form of heritage such as SP can be interpreted as how persistent the community is in carrying out traditional efforts to solve the life problems they face. Alternative thinking is the only way when efforts to problem solve life's problems are considered a dead end. The optimistic attitude of simple people that is generally practiced by people in the region is the right psychological attitude that makes life continue to survive.

H. Other Cultural Arts

Madurese folk art is not limited to a few arts that are widely known among the community, because there are certain artistic traditions practiced in smaller areas that do not originate from Madura, but were developed by the local community. There are arts that are developed in Islamic boarding schools and offices based on certain instruments. We simplify this limited data by dividing it into two forms, based on instrument and genre, as follows:

22 Tujuan dari prosesi ini agar si anak selamat dan dijauhkan dari bermacam gangguan, materi maupun makhluk halus.

23 SP is carried out by someone when it is found that someone's illness is not getting better even though they have received medical or traditional treatment. The final effort was then carried out by the SP procession . A. Fahrizal Aziz, *Kebudayaan...*h. 4.

1. Gambus

There are two forms of Gambus Orchestra in Madura; village gambus and Arabic “taste” gambus. The art of the Arabic “flavored” gambus is thought to have originated in Arabia, namely Hadramaut, North Yemen, Egypt and Kuwait. The gambus, both the instrument and the music, is said to have come from Arabia.

The gambus musical instrument is included in the group of string instruments. The material is dadap wood. The voice box is watermelon-shaped, with no tone markers. Gambus has 9 strings (three single strings and three double strings). Gambus does not have Javanese buttonic rules, but Arabic music rules which are characterized by short intervals, do not have metallophones and melisma which has various melodic decorations.

In contrast to the Arabic “taste” gambus, there is also the “village gambus” which is designed according to the tastes of the Madurese people. Village gambus is usually performed by young Muslim farmers. Village gambus often use modern instruments, such as organs, guitars and accordions. Based on these modern musical instruments, the team compiling the Sumenep Regency information database in its Final Report interpreted the gambus as an art accompanied by dance with Islamic nuances but with more complete equipment, such as flutes, drums, rattles, violins and electons.²⁴ However, in Bouvier’s observations, the use of modern musical devices apparently creates chaotic rhythms and sounds due to poor sound and microphone settings.²⁵ Gambus orchestras, both pure Arabic and village flavored ones, are commonly used by Madurese people at weekly social gatherings, before and after Ramadan, and are even used as a complement to wedding events.

2. Dangdut

In a collection of articles about modern Indonesian culture, dangdut is not mentioned at all. This Indonesian intellectual, who writes sharply about pop literature, films, comics and even

24 Dinas Pariwisata Pemerintah Kabupaten Sumenep, *Laporan...*, h. 41.

25 Helene Bouvier, *Lebur Seni...*, ibid, h. 77.

graffiti, was stunned to hear that someone would pay attention to dangdut. While Western scholars who pay attention to researching the culture of developing societies tend to research fine arts and literature rather than music. Indonesian scholars, some of whom were educated in the West, it seems ridiculous, consider dangdut to be a shallow and cheap type of art. That's what William H. Frederick said in his paper *Rhoma Irama and The Dangdut Style: Aspects of Contemporary Indonesian Popular Culture*.²⁶

Malay dangdut orchestras first appeared in 1972/1973. In fact, dangdut has been around since the colonial period, which coincided with the emergence of keroncong music. When rock and pop music groups began to emerge from the West towards the 1960s, in Padang and Medan also emerged "Melayu-Deli" style orchestras which were influenced by music in Indian films. At that time, in 1970, Rhoma Irama, a descendant of Priangan Timur Tasikmalaya, launched his own style of music which was intelligent and pithy. This new style of music does not feature Western styles, but is modern. Bring messages even though they are simple and in language that is easy for young people to understand. Not imitating Malay-Deli with Arabic and Indian style decorations. This new style of music is called dangdut and Rhoma Irama himself is the originator. With his Sonnet troupe, he spread his wings through musical films, spreading social, moral and Islamic messages. The scholar above, Frederick even calls it missionary music, Islamic pop.²⁷ Since then, dangdut has become popular with its various variants and has become widespread.

This new Malay music, in Madura is called dangdut, where the flute and drum are the main instruments. Dangdut orchestra performances are usually held at weddings for rich city people, end of school year ceremonies and national celebrations. In Sumenep Regency, Malay dangdut music is not yet popular in rural areas, due to language barriers. However, it was developed using the Madura-Sumenep language which is known in the community. Moreover, nowadays, in several areas in Madura

26 William H. Frederick, *Rhoma Irama and The Dangdut Style: Aspects of Contemporary Indonesian Populer Culture*, Indonesia, 1982, h.102.

27 William H. Frederick, *Rhoma Irama*....h. 116.

there are Malay Pop Festivals throughout Madura. The songs are varied, pure Malay, Arabic and Madurese.

3. Saronen

Saronen, according to the Tourism Office report, is the music and dance that accompanies the bull racing team before advancing to the battlefield. The music is dominated by the sound of trumpets, *cenek*, *cendung*, drums and the pounding of gongs which are usually played by men dressed in flashy attire, so that it looks festive.²⁸ Saronen art, actually a type of musical instrument, can be found in almost every corner of Madura, especially when *karapan sapi*. Saronen (*surmai*, *sirmai*, *sorune* or *shanai*) in Tatar Pasundan is often called *tarompet* and in Bali it is called *pereret*, which has existed since Hindu times. This *selompret* comes from Arab-Persian culture, so this musical instrument is accepted by people across religions.

The art of saronen in Madura, apart from being used to beautify racing cows, is also used for horses at wedding parties as well as complementing certain household rituals which are sometimes accompanied by masked dances. Except in Dasok Village, Sumenep, saronen orchestras performed by less than seven players have their own uniqueness, especially in terms of the musical instruments used. Apart from the trumpet, there are drums (large and small), *tongtong*, *kenong* and a *ghung raja* and *rencek*. In other places, saronen are sometimes found with the addition of the *angklung* musical instrument.²⁹ Meanwhile, based on genre, Madurese folk arts are spread across small artistic traditions and performed by certain communities, such as Shadow Puppet Theatre, Mask Art, *Laddrok*, Drama, *Tayub*, *Lok-Alok*, *Dhamong Gardham*, *Ratep*, *Penca' Silat*, *Diba'*, *Samroh/Qasidah*, and *Samman*. This folk art tradition is preserved by the Madurese people even though it does not originate from their region. *Samman*, for example, is an artistic dance from Aceh. However, local communities maintain it as do certain communities in Pamekasan which requires further research.

28 Dinas Pariwisata Pemerintah Kabupaten Sumenep, *Laporan...*, h. 45.

29 Helene Bouvier, *Lebur Seni...*, ibid, h. 57.

I. Current Trends in Madurese Art and Culture

The activity orientation of today's Madurese society is similar to that of societies outside Madura. Fulfilling daily economic needs is the target of each family, so to meet these needs many Madurese migrate. For those who do not migrate, they carry out activities that are concentrated on agriculture, fishing, salt farmers, services and tourism. To complement the last activities, especially services and tourism, the community's cultural product business is turned into an amazing tourist commodity, especially certain well-known cultural arts, such as *karapan sapi* and *saronen*.

At every cultural arts stage, not only local tourists are interested, but also foreign tourists. The religious arts and culture scene in Madura is increasingly strengthening, because the attitude of the people is religious and strong in maintaining local culture. Religious and national holidays are a momentum to show the existence of the arts and culture of the Madurese people. Religious rituals are also used as local media to strengthen the existence of culture and show it, so that every change in the culture becomes more visible, both materially and in its mission.

It is true that there are several religious arts and culture products that are rarely "in demand", but are more for protection and conservation to avoid misuse of their meaning and mission, such as *carok* art. There is a shift in values at the same time due to external cultural influences, especially after the opening of the Suramadu bridge, so people need to be careful in doing so. Madurese cultural arts adequately describe the character of the Madurese people with all their advantages and disadvantages.

J. Conclusion

Referring to the explanation as stated in the discussion section above, it shows that folk arts have a complex relationship with elements of society's culture in general and are interrelated, such as religion, entertainment and conservation of tradition.

Arts and culture emerged due to various motivations, such as religious motivations, cultural conservation and entertainment. Even in its development, arts and culture can become a bridge to gain position and influence for a person or group of people in society.

Cultural arts are used as media, even the *syi'ar* of the Islamic religion (*da'wah*) itself because of the very religious background of society. The actualization of cultural arts in Madurese society even shows religiosity, or at least becomes an element in “*halalized*” religious rituals, as can be seen in the art of *qasidah*, *pangka* rituals, *katandur* and *aeni Ajung*. Meanwhile, it appears that religious arts and culture refer to their background as part of the domination of religious elements leading to demonstrations of the art and tourism business, so that they seem to lead to conservation to obtain additional economic income for the community, as most prominently in the *Karapan Sapi* and *Rhoma Irama dangdut*. Arts and culture performance services are also growing, not only at secular events, but also at religious events.

The original purpose of certain artistic performances, such as *carok* and *Ajung* as performances to foster the spirit of chivalry and patriotism among the people, began to shift towards a more “soft” and limited direction. Apart from avoiding the stigma of violent art conservation, it also avoids negative stigma towards Madurese people. Performing arts that are considered to contain elements of violence are then polished to be softer and staged at certain and more limited events. The original aim of art demonstrations to foster a spirit of patriotism and chivalry was still maintained and demonstrations were limited and not exposed to the public.

Ultimately, the existence of the arts and culture of the Madurese people can be seen in general as media produced by the community which functions as a link between social and cultural relations for all elements of society regardless of social status background. The integration of Madurese society can be seen in arts and culture as its instrument. Arts and culture not only strengthen and strengthen social and cultural religiosity, and vice versa, the context of Madurese society justifies it. Likewise,

a mutually reinforcing relationship can be seen in the growth of the tourism economy and even political practices. Islam as the majority religion of the Madurese people, folk art and other social systems appear to be integrated in the Madurese social system, so that one cannot be separated from the other, they even complement and strengthen each other.

Part 9

When Quranic Learning Goes Online: Covid-19 and The Response Of Quran-Based Pesantren in Indonesia

The Covid-19 (Corona) pandemic has forced the system of spreading and understanding the Qur'an to be carried out online. Online media as e-learning was actually known before the corona season. One of the institutions implementing e-learning is the Darul Qur'an Islamic Boarding School led by Yusuf Mansur. The famous preacher with the "alms flag as the gateway to riches" is phenomenal in Indonesia. This study uses the phenomenological method and the AIC (attract inform community) model, a combination of methods based on social research and Information Technology (IT). This article proves that Mansur was able to build a system for disseminating the Koran (online and offline/face to face) combined with a business concept that has floating funds and cooperatives and has a tower with 285 rooms. Based on the AIC model, it can be stated that Mansur's PPPA web (Quran memorizing nursery program) was effective in supporting e-learning and socializing the Koran during the Covid-19 period. The Qur'anic e-learning approach has implications for Islamic institutions as capital for brand marketing of da'wah institutions and their development. This strategy is a solution to spreading the Qur'an in abnormal situations and experiences in the future.

A. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has left the Indonesian Government no other option than issuing a policy that instructional process, including religious precelytization (*da'wa*), be conducted from home. Students study from home, and from home too do teachers/lecturers instruct them. The Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia specified this policy in Circular Letters No. 2 and No. 3 of 2020 on the Prevention and Handling of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-2019), dated March 9, 2020.

Problems with the application of “home learning” arise, both experienced by students, parents, preachers and teachers themselves. There are several things that religious leaders need to consider when organizing online learning. How is learning the Qur'an through online media and its implications for the splendor of *da'wah* which requires mastery of online media, so that it appears that the target also has the opposite role?

The problems abovementioned are interesting to uncover. This research aims to figure out how prepared Yusuf Mansur-led Pesantren Daarul Qur'an (PPPA program) has been in holding online instruction before and after the COVID-19 outbreak. This online instruction has been picked up by many religious and education institutions.

The approach adopted by Mansur in his religious procelytization is a great way to counter the common religious views and dialectics that often associate the COVID-19 pandemic with narratives that tend to be mythical and theological, even political (Azman, 2020). The pandemic is said to be “God’s combating disbelievers” as those taking place in the history of peoples in antiquities.

Indian scholar Amir Ali (2020) is of the notion that the country’s politicians take advantage of the outbreak to corner Muslim minorities and spread Islamophobia. Even BBC analyst Mary Harper (2020) unveils the perception of Uighurs Muslim minorities of the COVID-19 pandemic as a “punishment” for unjust rulers. The use of negative narratives as a response to the pandemic is highly situational and variable from one region to region.

The social tendency towards religion (read: spiritual values) when facing problems, such as the problem of the corona outbreak, has also shown that the negative thesis towards religion is starting to appear wrong, because there are symptoms, even the opposite fact, namely the strengthening of religious spirit as happened in the West (Soucek , 2023).

Something similar can be seen in the case in Indonesia which tries to position religion in harmony with science when responding to problems such as the Covid-19 outbreak (Kurniawan et al., 2022). In other languages, religion can functionally help overcome complex health problems and challenges faced by humans (Sisti et al., 2023). The spread of the corona outbreak is like a “momentum of religious awareness” for humans.

Especially when Covid cases are on the rise, Muslims in particular are carrying out the religious rituals of fasting in Ramadan. In addition to daily religious rituals, such as praying five times a day and reading the Koran together, the intensity will be added to the tarawih prayers and fasting for 1 month. In the context of Muslims in Indonesia there is also a response similar to what happened in the muslim world. Islamic religious institutions, such as Islamic boarding schools and madrasa reacted to government regulations regarding the Covid-19 outbreak. Governor regulation (Pergub) in West Java No. 443 of 2020 concerning health protocols for the prevention and control of the Covid-19 outbreak in Islamic boarding schools was opposed by Islamic boarding school clerics. They rejected the Pergub, especially regarding sanctions for Islamic boarding schools that violate health protocols.

Pesantren Daarul Qur'an, a *pesantren* under the stewardship of Yusuf Mansur, has responded to the pandemic tactically well before the issuance of the governor regulation. This is in contrast to the thousands of Islamic universities in Indonesia which responded to the pandemic at later times, approximately two months after Pesantren Daarul Qur'an implemented its strategies of disseminating and teaching Qur'anic values to Muslim congregants. The phenomenon of the way Yusuf Mansur-led Pesantren Daarul Qur'an advances the religion under the abnormal situation not only represents a solution but also

enlightens about wiser attitudes and actions, although with more complex challenges in maintaining its congregants.

For Muslims in Indonesia, the name Yusuf Mansur and his *pesantren* are familiar. Yusuf Mansur was born with the name Jam'an Nurkhatib Mansur, from an affluent Betawi family, the couple Abdurrahman Mimbar and Humrifiah. Yusuf was very spoiled by his parents, but smart. Yusuf attended Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Chairiyah Mansuriyah Jembatan Lima, Tambora, West Jakarta, which was founded by his great-grandfather, K.H. Muhammad Mansur (Wikipedia, 24 April 2020).

Yusuf Mansur initiated PPPA, from which many Qur'an memorizers have been produced through free education for the destitute (*dhuafa*) enrolled at Pondok Pesantren Daarul Qur'an Bulak Santri, a *pesantren* situated on Jl. Ketapang Poncol, Ketapang, Cipondoh, Tangerang, Banten. The fund for this program is raised from the *sadaqa* of Wisata Hati congregants (Wikipedia, April 24, 2020).

The Qur'an Memorizer Fostering Program (*Program Pembibitan Penghafal Al-Qur'an*, PPPA) of Pesantren Daarul Qur'an is a *tahfizhul Qur'an*-based *sadaqa* managing institution dedicated to societal development and managed professionally and accountably. It started in 2003 in a small corner of Musholla Bulak Santri with a few *tahfizh* students before it spread its teaching to thousands of students across Indonesia.

On March 29, 2007, at Balai Sarbini Jakarta, the PPPA of Pesantren Daarul Qur'an was officially introduced to the public. It was then inaugurated by a notarial deed on May 11, 2007. It initiated the Rumah Tahfizh movement at home and abroad to provide various aids such as scholarship and aids to humanity, health, and societal development. It also won the society's trust as a partner in *sadaqa* management in *tahfizhul Qur'an*-based national development.

In order to reveal religious phenomena as the theme of this article, phenomenology is used as a more relevant strategy combined with the AIC (Attract Inform Community) model. AIC is a combination of social research-based methods and information technology (IT) to deal with new cultural phenomena. In this research, the purpose of this method is to understand

the process of internalization of religion (read: the Qur'an) as part of the spread of adaptive Islam to the challenges of contemporary life phenomena.

B. Results and Discussion

1. Online Quran Learning and Dissemination During the Pandemic

During the COVID-19 pandemic, education and *da'wa* institutions conduct religious instructions and dissemination online. A variety of problems have occurred: not all the instruction targets have the access to online learning due to busyness, low technological literacy, and technical problems with instructional agents' phone unendingly vibrating from audiences' questions, including questions from the students' parents (cnnindonesia.com, 25 April 2020).

The task burden experienced by school students from online learning is overwhelming. It seems that the students spend leisure time at home, but in fact they are given assignments that wear them down. "If they keep it up this way, the tasks given by the teachers aren't going to be done even if we stay up all night working on them" (haluan.com, 25 April 2020). This is also the case in the *da'wa* segment.

Forza Bintang Wirayasa's tweet at his Twitter account @bintangforza at Wednesday noon, April 8, 2020 under the title "Isi Hati Beberapa Ibu-Ibu", or mothers' confession in English, with four accompanying screenshots of WhatsApp chat and status was hotly responded to by netizens. As of Thursday morning, April 9, 2020, this tweet was retweeted 3.2k times, liked 5.2k times, and given 535 comments. The following is the excerpt.

"Let me tell you something. Today is the fourth day of online class, and I am going nuts. What is it that gives me the pip? My child's not listening? No... It is the Zoom and assignment submission schedule. During Zoom meeting, the class suddenly becomes a *dangdut* karaoke bar. What's worse is the meeting schedule is updated on the meeting day (some meetings, a day before). So, our task as moms is: refresh the Edmodo app from 7.30 a.m. to 1 p.m.!!!

We don't have the time to take care of kitchen stuff, let alone our works (that's even the last on the list). Every single hour every day I must keep an eye on the class schedule. And for God's sake, my child is only a FIRST grader! How in the world is it possible for my child to check on his schedule, moving to another zoom link, and do other stuff on his own? So, please, teachers, try to be in parents' shoes. We would be thankful even for a small thing as having a dump in peace!!!" (kalderanews.com, 25 April 2020).

Family members also admit that they cannot do anything about these problems. Fadiyah (24) describes her 8th grader younger brother, Widat, as frequently having a panic attack and a bad temper when encountering some difficulties in solving his school problems. "Maybe he's just frustrated that he doesn't understand and there's no one to ask" (Tirto.id, 25 April 2020). In recitation activities, *mustami'* in religious lectures also ignore. Those are some of the problems that arose during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. This information illustrates the unavoidable pluses and minuses of online learning (Novita and Hutasuht, 2020). In fact, similar problems are also experienced in *da'wah* activities, so that it becomes an important evaluation material in *da'wah* through online media (Thaib, 2018).

Based on the description above, an inference can be drawn that unpreparedness is experienced not only by the academic society, but also by the following parties.

First, teachers and preachers are not ready. From observations on three teacher WhatsApp groups and four religious discussion groups with an elementary school teacher and a *da'i* regarding online religious instruction and *da'wa* during the COVID-19 pandemic (March through April 2020), the results obtained have the following criteria: (i) delivered materials, tasks, and explanations when the online instruction was underway in various ways, such as, through videos, text-based files (in .pdf, .doc, .ppt, or other formats), blogs, teleconference, social media, among others; (ii) gave materials and tasks without direct explanation, so the students and *mustami'* listened to and did the tasks given, like *pekerjaan rumah* (homework) (Novita dan Hutasuht, 2020).

Second, da'wah institutions and schools are not ready. Although the e-learning system has been a common knowledge to many schools, its implementation still poses them a challenge (to be precisely put, the schools have yet to be ready for its adoption). During the implementation of online instruction as an effort to prevent COVID-19 transmission, the school: (i) Freeing teachers to choose and use any online media for teaching. Freeing teachers to choose and use any online media for teaching but there is one school recommendation media that must be one of the teacher's choices. For example, teachers must use Google Classroom but teachers are free to use other supporting media, such as WA groups, Zoom, blogs, and others. (ii) Requires teachers to use online media designed by the school itself, although in practice the use of other supporting media is also permitted.

Third, students are not ready. The criteria for students' abilities during the implementation of online learning include: (i) Difficulty understanding explanations from the teacher because they are used to face-to-face meetings, especially practicum material. Do not have parents who are able, both in terms of pedagogical ability or time, to guide their children to understand the material from their teacher. Don't have enough internet connection. They don't have supporting devices, such as laptops, so material that is ideally done using a laptop has to be done on a mobile device (Singh, 2020).

2. PPPA's Web (pppa.id) and Management

The pesantren's Daqu method covers 1) observing prayers in congregation and guarding the heart and attitude, 2) observing the non-mandatory prayers of *Tahajjud*, *Dhuha*, *Qabliyya*, and *Ba'diyya*, 3) memorizing and contemplating (*tadabbur*) the Koran, 4) pay *sadaqa* and performing non-mandatory fasting, 5) learning and teaching, 6) praying for oneself, praying for others, and asking others to pray for oneself, and 7) adopting the charactersitics of *ikhlas*, *sabr*, *shukr*, and *ridha* (Mansur, 2020; Ramyani, 2022).

One of the results of the meetings of Pesantren Daarul Qur'an executives in 2014 at Hotel Siti was the Big Dream Daqu, a big dream to build 100 *pesantren* in 100 cities over

five continents. From this meeting was born the It's All About One Hundred program. Later, the PPPA, the *pesantren*, and the DBN gradually developed their programs. The PPPA of Pesantren Daarul Qur'an under its *Kampung Qur'an* program sprang in a number of regions and started to provide educational aids and assistance for the destitute (*dhuafa*), the disaster-affected, and the remotely domiciled. Thousands of *tahfizh* centers were built across Indonesia and even at some spots abroad (Shunhaji, 2019; Idawati, 2020).

The PPPA's vision is to build a *tahfidzul Qur'an*-based civil society with self-sufficiency in the economic, social, cultural, and educational domains upon local resources with an orientation toward the Koran glorification. The PPPA established cooperations with various corporate chains and organizations around the world in its Koran- and humanity-related programs, including, Paytren, CIMB Niaga Syariah, Mandiri Syariah, Telkomsigma, Midtrans, Pertamina Gas, PGN, SMi, Horison, PayTren Aset Management, Pos Indonesia, Gopay, Ovo, Enesis Group, BNI Syariah, Dana, Link Aja, Asuransi Jasindo, PT. Amythas, and Pertamina Retail. It even opens up an opportunity for those who wish to partner with it (26 April 2020):

In terms of operational, the PPPA institution is guided by the following structure and tasks: Advisory Board Yusuf Mansur and Ahmad Jameel. Chairman of the Daarul Qur'an Nusantara Foundation M. Anwar Sani. Main Director Abdul Ghofur and Operations Director Abdul Sidik (Sasongko, 2019).

3. Qur'an Call

Qur'an Call is a Koran memorization service by phone 24/7 aimed at the general public. The following are some indicators of the program's success: an increased number of workers memorizing the Koran through the Qur'an Call program; recorded improvement in Qur'an recital (*tahsin*) of individual service user with every Qur'an Call service use; an increased number of members of society finding the service as helpful to their Koran recital learning; and an increased number of members of society aware of the Qur'an Call program (Nurchalifah, 2019).

The Qur'an Call program features *Tahsin al-Qur'an*, *Tahfidz al-Qur'an*, and Daqu Method Education services. This program is applicable under two situations: the operator contacts the service user and the operator is contacted by the service user.

The duration of the Qur'an Call program varies for each content. For example, the Daqu Value content will take no longer than three minutes. The program contains 70% *Tahfidz al-Qur'an*, 20% *Tahsin al-Qur'an*, and 10% Daqu Method. The Qur'an Call program also contains Daqu values: Koranic verses related to the Daqu method, *tahajjud* prayer, 15-minute *Dhuha* prayer, non-mandatory fasting, Qur'an memorization, and *sadaqa* (PPDQ, 2019).

The Qur'an Call operators' competences include the following:

1) having memorized 15 *ajza'* of the Qur'an and being committed to memorize 1 more *juz* per month; 2) understanding the methods of *tahfidz* and *tahsin al-Qur'an*; and 3) having good mastery of the Daqu method. To enjoy this Qur'an Call service, contact this free-toll phone number: 0800 1500 311.

4. Web qurancall.id

A qurancall.id web screenshot is presented in Figure 1. The web contains some pages on which prospective students may access information online. The complete description provided as a promotional means will strengthen their confidence in the program and interest in enrolling.




Figure 1 qurancall.id Homepage (Accessed on May 2, 2020)

The web qurancall.id is a Koran learning platform with biweekly video-call meetings and a specific curriculum at which users meet with the best Koran teachers across Indonesia from various reliable Qur'an education institutions who have been through strict test and certification process. A playlist of video tutorialas for using YouTube Qur'an Call. However, although the qurancall.id web claimed to have provided an Android application, the link it provided is found inactive (accessed on May 2, 2020).

A certain fee is to be charged on a prospective student. This fee is to be appropriated for the empowerment of the Koran teachers and for the development of Koran *da'wa* throughout Indonesia. For data validation some information must be filled by a prospective student: full name, e-mail address, phone number, and gender information according to his/her identity card (KTP). For those not holding identity cards, no information is provided as to the alternative.

There might pop a question whether you have understood all information on an *ustadzah* from a third party which is not under the control of qurancall.id. We are not responsible for the entire loss caused by third parties. The Qur'an Call video-call application is only to be used for Koran instruction. Hence, if it is used for purpose other than the specified, Qur'an Call is not to be held responsible. This statement may only serve as a disclaimer since it is said that a prospective teacher must join an interview before proceeding into the instruction process.

Instruction materials (the Koran and its translation) is available in the .pdf format and is accessible anytime upon login. Qur'an Call preserves a number of qualities, namely **istiqamah** (consistency in Koran recital learning), **simple** (a simple, systematic method to improve the Koran recital quality), and **flexible** (applicable anytime and anywhere following your personal schedule).

A web can be used as a mass mobilization medium for what is termed *promotion* (Daniels, 2004). By this program, this promotion offers a 1x free learning facility. The students may choose any of the following: *Daqu Mubtadi* (beginner level of Koran recital), *Daqu Tahsin* (advanced level), and *Tahfidz* (memorization).

Assistance is provided via WhatsApp (WA), including notification on the 1x free meeting registration. This is suitable with web's function as an interactive medium in which contact facility is provided (Tasdik, 2018). The instructions are available on the QC YouTube channel.

This web features the menu History (containing submenu Santri, Pengajar, Waktu KBM, Sisa Waktu, Catatan, and Status), Reminder (containing instruction schedule), Materi (containing .pdf files), and Ngaji Yuk. To start a learning activity, a user must search a teacher first (see Figure 2).




Figure 2 Teacher Search (Accessed on May 2, 2020)

This web also comes with a quick survey asking the question “can one Quran easily be understood?” The user may answer either a. easy, b. difficult, or c. neither easy nor difficult. This survey shows that the web administrator is aware of the importance of public participation (UNDESA, 2016).

After signup, a teacher may determine whether he/she is “ready to teach” or “not ready to teach.” This will tell whether a teacher is still busy with another activity. How to teach can be accessed on the YouTube channel, while the onequran.com web is not active even though this is one of the facilities claimed to be available on the QC web (Diakses 2 Mei 2020). Yusuf Mansur also made an update with Quran MP3 Offline on Decembber 2, 2019 (see Figure 3).




Figure 3 Quran MP3 Offline (Accessed on May 1, 2020)

5. Analysis of PPPA Web

Figure 4 shows the web's profile as derived from whois. domaintools.com, including the information that the PPPA web (pppa.id) was first active on July 1, 2019. This web is an update from it was previously, pppa.or.id.

Whois Record for PpPa.id

— Domain Profile

Registrar Status	clientTransferProhibited, serverTransferProhibited
Dates	306 days old Created on 2019-07-01 Expires on 2020-07-01
Name Servers	ABBY.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM (has 22,000,218 domains) BRADEN.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM (has 22,000,218 domains)
Tech Contact	—
IP Address	104.31.86.220 - 588 other sites hosted on this server
IP Location	 - Texas - Dallas - Cloudflare Inc.
ASN	 AS13335 (registered Jul 14, 2010)

Figure 4 PPPA Web Profile (May 3, 2020)

The information derived from statshow.com shows that there are 46 visitors and 103 views to the PPPA web (pppa.id) daily.



Figure 5 PPPA Web Visitors (May 3, 2020)

The analysis of the PPPA web in this research used the AIC model (attract, inform, community) as this model accommodates the appraisal category *community*. A web must have the ability to influence the public (mass mobilization) as end-users to interact with the web administrator, as in expressing opinion or responding to the question or materials given. The AIC model places an emphasis on the *building community* category, hence highly relevant for figuring out the web’s effectiveness in encouraging public participation. The *community* attributes are as presented in Table 1 (Tasdik, 2018).

Table 1 (Adaptation from Tasdik, 2018)

No	Attribute	Score	Remark
1	Online polls	2	Functional
2	Member login	2	Functional
3	Guest book	0	None
4	Contact (chat)	2	Functional
5	Online forum	0	None
6	Commentary	0	None

A web attribute is not seen based only on whether it is existent or nonexistent, but whether it is represented in the form of menu or not. An attribute which exists but displaying an error page is uncomparable to one that does not exist at all. If the attribute is represented as menu but the page corresponding to it is erroneous, it is presumable that the web developer deems the attribute as important. However, if the attribute does not exist at all, it is presumed that the web developer is of the view that it is unimportant or even unaware of its existence.

Under the *community* category in the AIC matrix (Daniels, 2004), the *interactive* component contains four attributes: comment, forums, seed conversation topics, and members only. This is as stated by Marcella et al. (2004) in Nurhadryani (2009:220) that a web has four communicative functions. Hence, according to Table 2, a web is said to be interactive if it has three or 75% of the four attributes.

Tabel 2 Number of Attributes under the Interactive Category (Tasdik, 2018)

Category	Number of Attributes	Information	Attribute Interval
Interactive	3	75% of four attributes	3–6
Fairly interactive	2	60% of four attributes	2
Insignificantly interactive	1	< 60% of four attributes	0–1

Based on Table 1, it is known that the PPPA web has three interactive attributes, namely online polls, member logins, contacts. So, the PPPA web is interactive because it owns 75% of the interactive attributes (Table 2). It is said to be interactive if the presence of interactive attributes on the web exists without error. The meaning of the less interactive category here is a variable which only has a score of 1 (error) and which has a score of 0 (absolutely no attribute). That is, through this quantity analysis, it appears that the evaluation of achievements is easier to measure, so that the progress of learning seems clearer.

Thus, it can be concluded that the PPPA website has facilitated two-way communication between pesantren managers,

including ustadz, preachers and students properly. In other words, the PPPA web is interactive and supports e-learning of the Koran well (effectively) because it already has 3 interactive attributes.

6. Conclusions

Based on the results of the discussion in the previous subchapter, it can be concluded that Yusuf Mansur developed learning the Koran through offline (face to face) and online which had an impact on the publication of his da'wah. In fact, he has developed an Android-based learning application for the Koran. It is quite a phenomenon that he managed to build a Koran learning system by joining it with a business concept with a floating fund exceeding Rp1 billion and with Koperasi Merah Putih, which had allowed for the construction of 2 towers with 285 rooms.

Seen by the AIC model, Mansur's PPPA program is said to be effective in supporting e-learning. This is evident in the presence of three of four interactive attributes (features), namely, online polls, member login, and contact.

One of the lessons learned from the Covid-19 pandemic for e-learning the Koran, PPPA is ready to continue learning and preaching online (online) because the system is available and running. This can be a reference for many educational institutions, both formal and non-formal, which in fact, when online learning was implemented due to the impact of Corona (Covid-19), some institutions had to start building an online system from scratch, even the implementation of the learning system was still scattered due to e-media. learning is left to each teacher (not integrated with one academic system).

What is no less important, when the corona outbreak is over, schools (especially tertiary institutions) should be able to continue the e-learning system because e-learning is not only survival in the midst of an outbreak but can be a solution for future learning systems in the industrial era 4.0.

Part 10

Development and Dynamics of The Halal Tourism Business in The Field of Services and Culinary in Indonesia

The halal certification trend in the Indonesian food and service industry has raised various analytical views and questions. One central question is whether this halal certification trend represents a form of religious awareness (Islam) or merely a gimmick motivated by economic principles to attract consumers. Observations regarding halal certification reveal diverse interests and objectives, both from business actors and consumers, leading to various forms of halal certification, each with its own challenges and issues. This article reveals that the halal certification program represents an actualization of Islamic idealism, offered, particularly by Muslim scholars, as part of “da’wah” or the instilling of Islamic values, as well as a response to the growing halal issue in the business world in non-Muslim countries. The courage to offer and practice Islamic values in business activities, such as hospitality and culinary businesses, and even nature tourism, has given rise to new perspectives in the business world, even if it seems merely formal. This means that halal certification in practice is not entirely an implementation of Islamic idealism, but also a strategy in capturing the consumer market which is still in the wait and see stage which requires time as a testing tool, so that halal certification can be seen as a strategy for implementing Islamic values in business ventures and not just a gimmick as has been perceived so far.

A. Introduction

The issue of halal certification in the Indonesian business world, including services, food (culinary), accommodation, and entertainment, has raised diverse views, hopes, and questions from various groups. Muslims, as represented by Islamic organizations such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), socio-religious organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, have responded to the growing halal business trend by demanding halal certification (Slamet, Abdullah, and Laila, 2022; Faizin, 2023). For idealistic Muslims, halal certification is an embodiment of Islamic values in transactions, and its implementation is considered an act of worship with multiple rewards, as is the opinion of Muslim academics. This idealism is generally represented by progressive and idealistic Muslims, as evidenced by their arguments based on core Islamic values, such as the Quran, the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the views of Islamic scholars (Hennida, Nauvarian, Saptari, & Putri, 2024). Meanwhile, for certain Muslim groups, the issue of halal certification in business has given rise to a variety of opinions and attitudes, presumably reflecting a lack of widespread knowledge about the issue. This diversity of Muslim attitudes and perspectives could reflect the diversity of religiosity in a pluralistic society that is not bound by any one religious viewpoint (Battour and Ismail, 2016). However, some groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim, are agnostic, even questioning the widespread need for certification in the halal economy.

For those within the agnostic community, there appears to be skepticism regarding the implementation of Islamic law in business matters, especially in areas such as banking and hospitality. They generally remain skeptical about Islam's strict ethical and moral principles, and some even harbor a fear of Islam (Islamophobia), which is associated with political Islam (El-Gohary, 2015; Khoiriyati, Suharko, Krisnajaya, and Dinarto, 2016). At the very least, they prefer to wait and see how Islamic law is implemented, with halal certification being considered an option in what is currently perceived as a “worldly” matter. However, over time and with the development of profit-oriented businesses that transcend theological boundaries, they have developed into lucrative business segments, particularly the culinary and halal

tourism businesses in non-Muslim countries such as South Korea, Australia, and Japan (Khalid, 2024; Hasani, 2024; Yusof and Shutto, 2014).

Countries with halal tourism destinations, as mentioned above, are generally large non-Muslim nations, yet they are committed to attracting Muslim tourists from around the world, which has implications for providing halal tourism services. Similarly, Muslim countries, despite limited knowledge of halal tourism, need to open businesses adhering to halal standards, which has led to the emergence of halal tourism destinations in Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Slamet, Abdullah, and Laila, 2022; Faizin, 2023). The problem is that the proliferation of halal tourism businesses, as discussed above, does not necessarily translate into seriously developed tourist destinations for various reasons and issues. The most crucial issue, among others, relates to the concept of halal itself, in terms of food and tourism, and who has the authority to issue halal policies. Furthermore, how halal practices are implemented during their operational stages, which in certain experiences overlap with regulatory, management, and mechanism issues in the form of rules, religious norms, and cultural norms.

In practice, halal tourism faces challenges due to differing socio-cultural issues in each region. In certain areas, such as Bandung and Semarang, for example, halal tourism practices are less established due to social and cultural reasons. The distinction between what is considered halal and what is considered haram is not very clear. The parameters of Islamic religiosity, as the religion practiced by local communities, are limited to certain ad hoc issues. Meanwhile, issues of muamalat (translation), such as the halal tourism business, are perceived as issues that require a certain authority to determine (interview, 2024). Meanwhile, certain groups respond seriously, even conducting academic studies and issuing edicts on halal issues, as has been done by the local Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), both in food and religious tourism. This means that there is still a significant gap between the issue of halal tourism and the general public's understanding of it.

In the conceptual realm, for example, diverse opinions still exist regarding the definition of halal, which differ from

one another, especially at the practical level. On the one hand, the concept of halal remains general, as scholars have argued. Meanwhile, other concepts are more idealistic and specific, and some even appear ambiguous, despite sharing common principles (Widodo, Situmorang, Lubis, and Lumbanraja, 2022). Conceptually, halal tourism, in the form of culinary food, hotel services, and entertainment, as defined by scholars and implemented in business practices, appears to be still in the “trial and error” stage, particularly in regions across Indonesia. Public interest in halal issues, as the primary target consumer, still seems to adopt a “wait and see” approach. This situation raises the question of whether the halal business issue is truly a necessity with added value and promising economic prospects, or whether it is merely a gimmick. Meanwhile, scholars, as represented by the MUI, are still struggling to strengthen religious norms through their fatwas (Prawiro, 2023; Faizin, 2023).

Through a socio-anthropological approach and observation and triangulation methods, this paper reveals the perspective of the dynamic process of halal business practices in Indonesia, concentrated in three major cities: Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Bandung. It examines the process and dynamics of halal business operations in the culinary, hotel, and entertainment tourism sectors. It also explores emerging issues and challenges as acknowledged by halal business actors and consumer responses. It also explores how solution-oriented efforts draw on existing halal business concepts and practices to realize a new, socially, culturally, and economically healthy business practice through the halal certification program and its underlying principles.

B. Plus Business and Its Challenges

The idea of halal business, in the form of hospitality, culinary, and religious tourism, has developed within Islam and is even a religious commandment (Quran, Al-Baqarah (2):168). Its implementation in everyday life is part of implementing Islamic law. Rejecting it constitutes a violation of religious norms and rules. The implementation of religious rules in business matters (mu’amalat) on a personal level is not as widespread an issue as

religion itself in general. However, religious issues, specifically the implementation of Islamic law in business, which is essentially a public domain, pose challenges different from other issues, such as the politicization of religion (Olsen, 2003; Olsen, 2023).

Any business under Islamic law is initially considered a permissible activity, even an obligation, when linked to the human duty as a caliph to strive for physical and spiritual well-being. This physical and spiritual relationship, in Islam, is positioned as a single religious teaching that does not separate religious matters from matters of livelihood, or in the words of H.A.R. Gibb, “...*Islam is much more than a religious system; it is a complete civilization...*” (Gibb, 1932: 12). This means that business activities such as culinary businesses and hotel procurement services, among others, do not conflict with Islamic law and are even regulated by it. Therefore, these business ventures are not only profitable but also constitute acts of worship with multiple rewards. In certain experiences, tourism business practices have been carried out by some Muslims, even becoming a promising business bargaining chip economically and culturally (Santosa, 2022).

In the hospitality business, for example, many hoteliers have implemented sharia-compliant systems in their management, either fully or partially. This reality presents a worthy business opportunity for business owners to attract sharia-compliant market segments. Meanwhile, for consumers, offering halal sharia tourism represents a choice with worldly goals in line with religious law. Profit-oriented businesses with divine sharia values often create problems in practice, particularly when sharia values align with business interests. This is due to various factors, such as a lack of widespread public understanding of halal sharia tourism and debates surrounding its operation (Said and Elangkovan, 2013). Another factor is regulatory and implementation issues. The operationalization of sharia tourism appears to be limited to offering options, driven by business owners’ initiatives, rather than as an integral part of a halal and muni sharia business program. Another challenge faced by halal business owners is the standardized facilities, which adhere to the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) fatwa. Some facilities are incomplete, such as

separate swimming pools for men and women and separate hotel rooms, as found in several hotels that have implemented sharia standards but lack complete facilities (Interview, 2024). As a result, halal sharia businesses face an imbalanced, chaotic, and immeasurable situation. Meanwhile, public awareness of halal sharia businesses is very limited. This is evident in the limited public awareness of sharia tourism businesses, including culinary, hotel services, and religious tourism (Interview, 2024).

The situation described above makes Sharia tourism, or halal tourism, or simply using the halal label, less attractive to certain conventional businesses, as it offers less promising profits. Several Sharia businesses attempting to reach this business model demonstrate that Sharia, or halal, or whatever they call it, is actually less promising. However, as a business owner, no matter how small the opportunity, with optimism and careful calculation, or simply to maintain an image and respect for Muslim consumers, especially Islamic institutions, why not try? Moreover, the boundaries between “Sharia and halal” are already clear, with varying and gradual scope. According to information from cafe, hotel, and food service managers in Bandung, they are generally responsive to the need to obtain halal licenses, but the majority of business owners admit they are “still in the process,” even though these businesses have been operating for an average of over five years (interview, 2024).

The tug of war in halal business practices between the general tendencies of consumers and entrepreneurs and the limitations of sharia on the other hand make halal business ventures require reliable strategies due to these interests. In fact, as the spirit of halal business as can be referred to in several sources in Islamic fiqh has a clear purpose, namely to protect humans from everything that can harm themselves and their environment (hifz an-Nafs), even protecting their wealth (hifz al-Mal) from all forms of haram practices with spiritual values as a form of obedience to God. Maintaining wealth in Islam, not only the material objects of wealth must be good, but also the way to obtain it must follow the correct method (halalan at-Tayyiban) as stipulated in the Qur’an (QS, an-Nahl: 114).

In a Sharia-compliant halal business, not only is the food delicious and meets nutritional standards, but it must also be

halal. Not only must entertainment venues delight consumers, but they must also provide comfort, peace of mind, and peace of mind, aligning with their beliefs. Sharia-compliant businesses face significant challenges, particularly due to the trend toward materialism and the indulgence of physical pleasures, which can lead to a hedonistic lifestyle that denies personal purity and distances them from divine norms and ethics. Sharia-compliant businesses, as practiced by culinary and entertainment entrepreneurs, are not inherently complex, although administrative processes, like most businesses, do require precision and recognized procedural standards.

These procedures do not hinder freedom of business. In fact, determining which transactions are lawful (halal) or permissible (haram) and which are forbidden (haram) in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is quite straightforward in practice. In principle, anything good and beneficial to society is lawful and permissible, and anything that causes harm or threatens it is forbidden and prohibited. This is the foundation of Islamic business teachings, which essentially form the ethical system in Islam. Some general provisions regarding the principles of business transactions refer to the Islamic social/legal system of Sharia and the basis for these decisions (Mohammed, 2013).

In several halal business practices, both traditional and modern, the values of trust and fairness are found to underlie business practices as halal responsibilities, as practiced in traditional markets. The successful implementation of these values through a continuous development process is supported by market entities with synergy within existing local cultures. These values can support healthy business practices. The application of these values, combined with local cultural influences, has implications for the sustainability of traditional markets, which can be adopted by both traditional and modern markets as halal markets (Muhammad and Sari, 2021). Therefore, halal businesses can not only generate profit but also be healthy, calming, satisfying, and equitable a plus point in Islamic business practices.

Halal business, therefore, focuses not only on goods or objects as a means of transaction, but also on the transaction process, acquisition, and results that can be healthy and

beneficial for all parties. The orientation of halal business goes beyond the immediate material gain, but also parallels the long-term (afterlife) social benefits and education. Supervision is a crucial element in halal business, even though standardization is followed and practiced. Providing peace of mind and security, when needed, to both business actors and consumers provides greater direction and certainty.

C. Tourism Business vs Worship

It must be acknowledged that the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim. However, despite this, the majority of people's perceptions of halal (the concept of sharia) and their general knowledge of Islam remain limited, which poses a fundamental challenge to halal business practices. The dichotomy between "worldly" and "afterlife" issues, for example, is evident in their understanding of Islam. Promoting halal business is indeed a challenge for business practitioners, as any business must be widely known to consumers to gain market share. However, this fundamental problem must also be addressed by intensifying the role of religious scholars in explaining religion comprehensively and comprehensively. It is still common in society to believe that the afterlife in religion encompasses ritual worship, while business is generally understood to be a non-religious issue, unless the business in question is prohibited or forbidden by religion, whether in terms of the object, the environment, the process, or its purpose (Khalil, 2007).

Business is not considered an act of worship and therefore can be conducted as desired, except for those clearly prohibited. In fact, prohibited businesses are still widely practiced by Muslims. This public perception has impacted innovation in halal tourism businesses, which have emerged as a discourse and business practice considered new. Conceptually, halal tourism businesses are challenging, but in practice, they appear to be still seeking a form, as is the case in the United States and Indonesia (Azmi, 2024; Lasurdo, 2022; Slamet, Abdullah, and Laila, 2022). This is evident in halal business practices, which are still in the development stage and vary widely in practice. Furthermore, halal

tourism also presents challenges for business actors regarding the provision of additional facilities. In the halal hotel business, for example, referring to the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) fatwa standards and government standards regarding the provision of swimming pools as an attraction, hotels must have two pools to prevent mixed swimming. Meanwhile, hotels face limitations regarding land and space, which impacts the length of the halal certification process (interview, 2024).

Similar problems are also experienced by halal food tourism businesses, where several flavoring ingredients and raw materials still have to be tested through a long process because they are feared to contain substances that could harm consumers, as experienced by many cafe entrepreneurs in the cities of Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya (Setiyowati, Azqiya and Umriyah, 2020). The reality of many business people facing these challenges has made many business people eager to get a halal certificate as a guarantee that the culinary food provided is safe for consumption and halal according to the Shari'a.

So what argument can justify the practice of halal business if it isn't an act of worship? Submission to God through business practices according to His will. All efforts toward halal standards, within the context of liberal business without ethics, are part of this worship process. Motivation is a crucial foundation for all activities in Islam if they are to be valued by God, and no act of worship is true or good if it isn't based on God's name, as Weber demonstrated in Christian business practices. If Protestant ethics, oriented toward capitalism, are successful, why isn't a business ethic in Islam that focuses on justice evident?

Contextualizing and innovating "worship" in business, while taking into account the socio-cultural ethos of society, presents a strategic challenge in building a society aligned with the goals of Islam, namely a society of physical and spiritual well-being. Essentially, all aspects of business activity, grounded in divine spirituality, direct human activity. This requires avoiding ethical and moral behavior and violations in business, and embodying healthy, just business practices. Business practices that do not lead to shared justice, because they conflict with ethics and morals, will therefore be rejected. This rejection not only constitutes an

ethical and moral violation but also undermines the human and social systems, ultimately leading to uncertainty and destruction.

D. Halal Certification and Labeling: Impact on Economic Development

So, how does the halal certification process work in culinary tourism and service businesses, especially when business operations are ongoing and halal assurance has not yet been issued? Should businesses continue operating while awaiting halal legalization to ensure compliance with sharia law, or should operations be suspended until halal certification is obtained from the relevant institutions? This issue is crucial to consider considering the numerous problems experienced by entrepreneurs, such as those experienced by several food seasoning companies, both local and imported, which have shaken the internet and raised public doubts due to indications of containing harmful substances deemed haram (forbidden) (Sari, Hamzah, Dianne Rusmawati, 2018; Jong, 2019).

To avoid similar experiences and incidents, businesses are increasingly seeking halal legality, one way being through halal certification procedures. Halal certification in the culinary and tourism service industries can generally benefit both entrepreneurs and consumers. Halal businesses, as they function, can provide benefits in the form of quality food products and spiritual peace. Halal certification, as a concrete manifestation of efforts to protect humans from all forms of physical and spiritual violations, thus has added value beyond simply fulfilling physical needs, especially for Muslims (Raja, 2023).

Halal certification for consumers also serves as a control over business processes, providing a sense of security, increasing trust, and eliminating doubt. The importance of ensuring and ensuring a clear halal business objective represents a solution to the growing number of businesses that disregard the norms and beliefs of Muslim consumers, who are committed to a quality of life (Aslan, 2023). Similar experiences in Turkey have also been experienced by Indonesia, the largest Muslim country.

Halal certification, which requires prior standardized assessments, poses challenges for Islamic marketing in practice.

Assessments apply both before and after obtaining halal certification. In fact, periodic assessments and controls require a different approach due to emerging and dynamic issues. Therefore, the management and administration practices within a halal certification program cannot be underestimated if the program is to continue. When the halal certification period expires, for example, as is the case in the United States (Al-Mahmood, 2023), is an extension necessary? If necessary, must it meet the standards established at the beginning of the halal certification process, or what? This will depend heavily on the issues faced by halal business actors.

Addressing these issues is crucial for the halal business and industry sectors. These challenges include social heterogeneity, questionable raw materials, unethical practices, poor understanding of Islamic theology, communication gaps, variability in acceptance, human resource management issues, supply chain constraints, and inappropriate Islamic marketing orientation (Islam and Talib, 2023). Furthermore, marketing challenges and poor brand positioning also hamper the growth potential of the halal industry, a problem not only felt by halal businesses in Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, halal businesses in Malaysia still face social barriers, with the public being less interested in the requirement for halal products. This has prompted businesses to pursue strategic breakthroughs through various efforts and methods, such as implementing manufacturing execution systems to bring new insights to address the challenges of halal food (Saiman and Yusma, 2022; Al-Shami and Abdullah, 2023).

Indonesia also faces similar challenges as a business process essential for Muslims. Several institutions are involved in realizing ethical business practices, such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (LPPOM MUI), the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Food and Beverage Agency (BPHB), and religious organizations. Among the challenges that arise in halal certification are the perspectives of food industry players, who view halal certification as merely a license, as well as financing issues (Anwar, Fahrullah, and Ridlwan, 2018). However, Indonesia has a

more advanced experience in consumer response to halal business products. Referring to the findings of Yusuf, Rangkuty, et al., halal certification, from an economic perspective, can increase business profits because people from various economic strata are required to see the halal certification logo when purchasing food, beverages, and the like. The goal is to ensure the food and beverages they consume are guaranteed halal. Meanwhile, from an economic perspective, the goods or services offered to consumers will be profitable for business actors who have halal certification compared to business actors who do not have halal certification, thus having an impact on increasing sales of halal products, as well as its impact on business actors' enthusiasm for applying for halal certification (Yusuf, Rangkuty, Krisna and Radito, 2022).

According to Jailani and Adinugraha's records, total Indonesian public spending on halal products in 2017 was USD 218.8 billion, and halal business trends in the Islamic banking, halal tourism, and halal food sectors have positively impacted Indonesia's economic growth (Jailani and Adinugraha, 2022). Several important points addressed to the government through relevant institutions, such as the Ministry of Tourism, must be immediately resolved, namely regulations related to halal development in tourism and producing standardization regarding the halal tourism concept to be implemented in Indonesia. Because, as Cahyani stated, the development of halal tourism has a significant impact on Indonesia's economic development, as evident in the emergence of various types of businesses in tourist destinations, accelerated infrastructure improvements to and from tourist destinations, the creation of new jobs, and increased regional revenue (Madnasir and Cahyani, 2024).

Although there appears to be significant growth in the halal economy in Indonesia, it is still modest compared to halal businesses in other Islamic countries. In fact, according to the 2021/2022 Global Islamic Economy Indicator Score, Indonesia is not even in the top 10, far below Malaysia and Sudan. This is ironic, as it is disproportionate to the percentage of the population, where Muslims constitute the majority and have the largest Muslim population in the world. According to a study by Jailani and Adinugraha (2022:1), Indonesian public spending

on halal products in 2017 was only USD 218.8 billion. It can be argued that halal products are a good business, especially in Indonesia. This figure, he said, can be considered a prospective development, as it was found that the halal lifestyle in Islamic banking, halal tourism, and the halal food sector has positively impacted Indonesia's economic growth.

In the context of economic development in Indonesia, synergy and collaboration between relevant institutions are essential for economic development and addressing the ongoing problem of sectoral egos. The idea of establishing regulations that serve as an umbrella for halal businesses and eliminating regulations that hinder business innovation is timely. The synergy between relevant institutions for halal business development has not been optimal, resulting in the slowdown of the targets of halal businesses in Indonesia. Yet, the challenges are very real, such as competition with neighboring countries, evolving consumer preferences, concerns about the integrity of the halal economic process, and the uncertainty that lies ahead for the Indonesian halal industry. Therefore, careful navigation and strategic decision-making are needed to ensure that Indonesia can maintain its competitive advantage in the ever-expanding global halal market. According to Thomson Reuters and Standard Dinar, Indonesia only ranks in the top 10 in four halal industry sector indicators, including halal fashion (ranked 3rd), pharmaceuticals and cosmetics (9th), Islamic finance (6th), and halal food (2nd). On the other hand, Indonesia is not in the top ten halal media and recreation sectors (Maulana, Thasker and Zarkasyi, 2024).

Halal certification and labeling are the most central stages in the development of halal businesses into finished products in Indonesia, alongside ongoing control to maintain the quality of halal industry products. This process is built into the development of the halal business system. Criticism of the progressiveness of halal businesses has arisen more from management skills, as has been criticized by several state financial managers (Mulyani, 2024). The development of halal business practices, despite the vast opportunities, has so far focused too much on resolving normative ethical issues based on "ijtihad" (arbitrary) without reaching a resolution, resulting in stalled development progress.

E. What about Future Development?

Based on the data presented above, there are at least two fundamental and urgent challenges related to halal business: first, the challenge related to the lack of real, empirical data on the frequency of halal economic businesses. The differences in rankings of halal business development in Indonesia issued by local and international institutions are due to the different standards used. This calls for more serious research to uncover data on halal business development in Indonesia, including urban and regional centers where halal businesses have the potential to grow more rapidly. The lack of data on halal business development can lead to uneven and uncertain distribution. This condition can also foster an “agnostic” attitude among consumers and potential consumers of halal business products, particularly among the younger segment of halal business consumers, as is currently being observed (Pradana, Rubiyanti, and Marimon, 2024).

Such psychological conditions are also found in the practices of halal businesses, or those in the process of moving towards halal-compliant businesses in Bandung City, where consumers generally wait and accept efforts to achieve halal business success. Halal businesses are crucial for halal business development (interview, 2024). Meanwhile, consumers appear to be waiting amidst the operationalization of general business practices. A psychological gap arises when consumers must directly ask business owners whether their products and services are halal. Social control, while present, is reactive, and can create uncomfortable situations and conditions, as occurred in the past.

Second, challenges related to halal business regulations that still overlap with conventional business regulations, in addition to differences in international regulations among countries developing halal businesses. The demand for ethical food is growing, and halal food plays a significant role. These differences can have significant implications for the halal market. Various Halal Certification Bodies (HCBs) can approve food products, but they often prioritize national regulations over international ones, as is the case with Pakistan, the Islamic State Institute of Standards and Metrology, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, the Indonesian Ulema Council, the GCC Standardization Organization,

the Malaysian Islamic Development Agency, the ASEAN General Guidelines, and the halal standards of Thailand, Iran, and Brunei, all of which differ (Abdallah, Rahem, and Pasqualone, 2021). The differences stem from various schools of thought, posing challenges for regulators, consumers, and food producers. Controversial issues include stunning, slaughter, aquatic animals, insects, and labeling requirements. All standards except the GSO allow the slaughter of non-Muslims, and stunning is permitted in all but the Pakistani standard. This gap underscores the need for standardization and harmonization in the halal food industry to meet the demand for ethical food (Akbar, Gul, Jahangir, Adnan, Saud, Hassan, Nawaz and Fahad, 2023).

For example, in the food sector, halal encompasses slaughtering, storage, display, preparation, hygiene, and sanitation. This encompasses both food and non-food product categories. Given the rapid globalization of trade, advances in science and technology, and initiatives to simplify manufacturing processes, it is crucial for marketers to fully understand the concept of halal, as well as the challenges faced by global halal businesses, including Indonesia. In Abimanyu and Faiz's view, halal regulations in the ASEAN-7 region alone are generally adequate to achieve their objectives, but there is considerable diversity in halal standards, institutional structures, internal and external environmental conditions, and their impacts. The implications suggest that ASEAN has the potential to enhance halal business and global halal trade. Although various efforts have been made, more synergistic cooperation is needed to develop harmonized halal trade regulations to enhance the economic, social, and consumer protection benefits for the ASEAN region. The research gap between empirical data and literature or theory regarding the trade of halal food products in the ASEAN region must be addressed immediately (Abimanyu and Faiz, 2023).

Research on the halal economy currently appears to be in its infancy and is still at the normative legalization stage, which has yet to address more accurate and substantive measurements of its development and future opportunities (Mulyani, 2024). Studies on the superstructure are also still weak, as evident in the general literature on halal business topics and themes

in Indonesia. Furthermore, differences in the trends of halal business practices in each region, as revealed by Abdala et al., appear to be influencing the emergence of diverse perspectives and standards. This necessitates a breakthrough and a more comprehensive formulation of the urgency of resolving the superstructure issues (Abdallah, Rahem, and Pasqualone, 2021). This comprehensive formulation implies the need for more general, broad-reaching regulations, while also providing the opportunity to develop specific regulations by aligning them with local contexts.

Other strategies for developing a halal business include forming alliances with new clients and improving overall team morale, both offline and online. Hiring people with positive attitudes, of course, enhances the competitive climate in managing halal business products, and conducting continuous experimentation before innovating to create a flywheel effect. At the same time, prioritization decisions emerge naturally based on successes built upon successes. Rethinking marketing through collaboration and communication, continuously seeking opportunities, and building better relationships with future work programs, as practiced in conventional businesses, is crucial.

I believe that halal businesses, based on Islamic ethical values, operate in a manner not significantly different from conventional businesses in general. Based on the aforementioned realities, the challenges of halal businesses and similar businesses are more about courageous decision-making (ijtihad) and ongoing oversight. Resolving normative ethical and regulatory issues must be approached as a continuous process, not as a stop-gap measure. Meanwhile, service improvement skills remain aligned with professional standards developed in conventional businesses based on ijtihad.

E. Conclusion

Business practices that adhere to Islamic ethical principles are popularly referred to as the halal business trend because they represent a potential market segment. The foundation of halal business practices has long been in place, based on

ijtihadi (intelligible text) that follows developments and changes in business practices in society. The spirit of halal business practices is not merely theological, a form of worship, but rather a sound business practice that requires careful management, from motivation, production processes, marketing practices, to distribution, distinguishing it from the Weberian ethical business tradition. Halal business in Islam is intertwined with and impacts other human activities, particularly its management. The halal spirit is not sufficient; it requires sound, efficient, and transparent management, as is common in conventional practices. Halal certification and labeling have both halal business and marketing value. Communication skills, incubation, and internationalization are integral parts of halal business.

Part 11

The Spiritual Solidarity and Collaboration in Handling Rohingya Refugees in Aceh¹

Human solidarity is a universal attitude demonstrated by humans without limits. This attitude emerges when witnessing the plight of someone experiencing adversity and struggling between life and death. The values of solidarity then emerge, driven by religious background, traditional societal doctrines, global sentiments, and local wisdom, which encourage various social elements to undertake collective and collaborative action, both incidental and planned. This article explores the process of handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh, ranging from the most urgent, emergency, to long-term, policy-oriented rehabilitation planning. Through a social approach and active participatory research methods, in-depth interviews, and field observations, it is shown that collaborative action in the Rohingya refugee response process takes three forms: urgent, priority, and urgent, through providing security for refugees while at sea, providing food supplies, and putting pressure on local authorities. The refugees are then accommodated in specific locations, utilizing underutilized buildings as temporary refugee camps. They are treated and provided with services like brothers and sisters while seeking more humane solutions, played by formally operating NGOs and socio-religious institutions, driven by a sense of solidarity and shared experiences with the local community. In the Aceh context, follow-up refugee management initiatives were carried

¹ was published in the International Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, 2026

out collectively and collaboratively through a cooperative triad: NGOs, Islamic boarding schools, and the government, through planning for education and skills training before returning and/or distributing them to their desired destinations for their future. The involvement of Islamic boarding schools and former GAM combatant volunteers in refugee management is also interesting to explore.

A. Introduction

A humanitarian tragedy rocked ASEAN, especially after Burmese (now Myanmar) Prime Minister Thein Sein expelled the predominantly Muslim Rakhine ethnic group from his country in 2012. As many as 140,000 people were displaced, leaving 800 stateless. Kutupalong, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is the world's largest refugee center, housing more than 600,000 refugees. Hundreds more fled to nearby countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The Rohingya were expelled by the Myanmar government because they were explicitly denied citizenship under the 1982 Burmese Citizenship Law.² Ethnic differences, historical background, and religious sentiment have become central issues in the push for the Rohingya to be expelled from Myanmar.

The Rohingya are considered illegal immigrants from Bengal and Bangladesh, possessing a distinct identity and history that differs from the 135 other ethnic groups recognized by the government.³ The issue of historical differences has sparked debate regarding ethnic integration into a nation. While this issue should not be used as a justification for ethnic cleansing (genocide), it can even be resolved through more humanitarian mechanisms, based on humanitarian considerations.

On the other hand, the silence of democracy and human rights leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was expected to offer positive

2 Raja Malo Sinaga, "Kenapa Rohingya diusir dari Myanmar? Ini Penjelasanannya," *Detiksumut*, 2023, <https://www.detik.com/sumut/berita/d-7083866/kenapa-rohingya-diussir-dari-myanmar-ini-penjelasanannya>.

3 Md Rafiqul Islam and Amena Khatun, "A History of Rohingya Displacement, Rohingya Ethnicity, and Contested Identity in Myanmar and Bangladesh," in *Understanding the Rohingya Displacement*, 2024, 23–36, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1424-7_2.

hope, has only provided a flat statement regarding the Rohingya issue, adding to the complexity of the Rohingya issue. Not only is it a humanitarian issue, but also a religious and historical one. The Rohingya issue has been used as a commodity and a domestic political instrument by Myanmar politicians to gain the sympathy of the people, who are predominantly Buddhist.⁴ Suspicion has arisen that the expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group has elements of religious sentiment, as seen in hatred, the emergence of Rohingya militants and negative stigma accompanied by fear of Islam (*Islamophobia*).

The expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group, who have been present in Myanmar for centuries, will continue to occur without a solution, considering that the refugee problem has had a wide impact on nearby countries.⁵ Yet, the countries affected by these refugees, such as Bangladesh and Indonesia, did not sign the 1951 and 1967 Refugee Conventions and, of course, rejected them, despite pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accept them. The response from local humanitarian agencies, such as supporting UNHCR's pressure, has allowed immigrants to continue arriving in Bangladesh,⁶ The displacement of Rohingya refugees to Malaysia and Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim, has created new challenges in refugee camps related to their handling.

The various reasons and motivations for handling Rohingya refugees where they landed have given rise to new problems. Meanwhile, the refugees' conditions are heartbreaking and deplorable, giving rise to compassion and solidarity among fellow human beings. Rescue efforts, at least for the short term and on an urgent basis, are being undertaken, such as by local Acehnese communities and several local NGOs. They believe that leaving them inactive is tantamount to killing them. Referring to the

4 Edward White, "Aung San Suu Kyi Breaks Silence on Rohingya Crisis," *Financial Times*, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/748a7a9e-de8f-36c0-80b4-c102cf302bc9>.

5 Iftekhharul Bashar, "Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Myanmar : Quest for a Sustainable Solution," in *RSIS Commentaries and Reports* (Nanyang Technological University, 2012), <https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/entities/publication/cb69b87c-470d-4ca0-b75c-ae7e6245d6f7>.

6 Taufiq-E- Faruque, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh: The Case of UNHCR's Response," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional* 9, no. 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18196/jhi.91160>.

above issues, the question arises: what motivates the empathy of local Acehese community elements toward Rohingya refugees and how are they being handled?

Based on the results of the interview with Shams, Shams said that,

*“Uncovering these reasons is crucial, as it appears to be a spirit of handling Rohingya refugees beyond conventional approaches, such as a sense of shared fate (dĕjà vu), local wisdom, and shared identity. This question also attempts to eliminate the views of some researchers who deny the issue of religious sentiment in the Rohingya conflict”.*⁷

Uncovering the process of handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh is the primary objective of this research. Local communities' empathy and reflections toward the refugees emerged alongside the NGO community's responses for various reasons. This research included both primary and secondary data sources. Surveillance, interviews, participant observation, and documents were valuable sources of information that served as primary data. Data for this study were collected at refugee locations and from unpublished sources (from mid-2025 to late 2025). Previously, in early 2020 and early 2021, we conducted reconnaissance and tracer surveys to assess the reality on the ground, including living conditions, livelihoods, hygiene, and environmental factors.

Key informants, refugees, Islamic boarding school leaders, NGO activists, and community members, particularly local fishermen, were interviewed. A further eight key informants were interviewed in July 2023, consisting of NGOs, environmentalists, health experts, researchers, community leaders, and representatives of Islamic boarding school leaders. Additionally, in January 2024, 28 respondents (retailers, volunteers, overseas volunteers, community representatives, and health workers) were interviewed based on convenience. We also relied on secondary sources including journal articles, books, international reports, online papers, and newspaper reports. We studied and analyzed various policy documents published by the government, particularly Indonesia, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World

7 Shamil Shams, “More Economic than Religious,” in Dw.Com (dw.com, 2015), <https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-rohingya-conflict-more-economic-than-religious/a-18496206>.

Bank (WB), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some by telephone.

B. Rohingya Refugees in Aceh

Since the arrival of Rohingya refugees in Aceh, local fishermen have been the first to see, witness, and carry out acts of solidarity and rescue. Word of mouth spread through the community. Some also learned about the Rohingya refugees from local and international media, including security forces and the government, who blocked them because they were considered illegal immigrants. Concern, compassion, tension, and sadness all marked the initial arrival of Rohingya refugees on the coast of North Aceh in mid-2014, followed by a second wave in East Aceh later that year, with some refugees landing in Jambi.

The number of refugees still in Aceh is 513, with 90 in Lhoksemawe and 423 in Langsa. They include elderly people, 213 women, 210 men, and most of them children. Local fishermen were the first to rescue the refugees while they were still at sea. They were then sheltered on the shore before being transferred to temporary shelters. Upon learning of the presence of Rohingya refugees, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) immediately mobilized to provide services and provide assistance in the form of food and shelter in more suitable locations, such as disused buildings in Aceh. The Indonesian Humanitarian Foundation (YKMI) is one of the local NGOs that has responded quickly to the Rohingya refugees in Aceh. In fact, all refugees are currently under YKMI's coordination. As a local NGO, YKMI takes the refugees very seriously after coordinating with the UNHCR through various aid programs as outlined by the UNHCR.

The aid program includes providing adequate shelter, providing money for daily living, and planning guidance and training for refugees. Based on an interview with Shams, Shams stated that, *"YKMI's success began to be seen after the local government, including the regent, mayor, and governor, responded by willingly providing assistance in the form of a representative building as a temporary shelter. The local government had previously*

*rejected the arrival of the Rohingya refugees, considering them illegal immigrants, and even planned to deport them and return them to sea. Thanks to the efforts of various parties, including NGOs, the local community, especially fishermen, and later assisted by local Islamic boarding school leaders, the Rohingya refugees were accepted and provided with shelter in a local government-owned building that was not being used optimally”.*⁸

Just like living in a shelter, even though assistance for daily living and temporary shelter is available, the refugees appear to be in dire need of assistance. They are not only sad about their uncertain future, but also disappointed by their fate. For example, a 49-year-old refugee named Yasin, speaking in Arabic, expressed that:

*“They were happy to be accepted in Aceh as refugees, but their faces showed disappointment at their fate. They hoped to live a normal life like most people, free from pressure, fear, and pity”.*⁹

Another refugee, Kamil, 18, spoke in broken English while shedding tears and said that;

*“His hope is to leave the shelter and live a normal life. It’s as if he wants to be taken anywhere to achieve a decent, progressive, and dignified life”.*¹⁰

Witnessing the condition of Rohingya refugees like that, then gave rise to a feeling of compassion and humanitarian solidarity, including the involvement of religious institutions, such as dayah.

The involvement of Islamic boarding schools (dayah) in handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh was initially surprising, as these religious institutions place a greater emphasis on Islamic religious studies, similar to Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in Java. Although the role of Islamic boarding schools (dayah) is substantially similar to that of conventional NGOs, the emphasis of Islamic boarding schools (dayah) differs in the form of a

8 Shamil Shams, “Interview” (Myanmar, 2025).

9 Yasin, “Interview” (Lhokseumawe, 2025).

10 Kamil, “Interview” (Lhokseumawe, 2025).

coaching process that emphasizes religious teaching, rather than incidental, instant, and spontaneous services. However, the involvement of Islamic boarding schools (dayah) has proven to play a significant role, particularly in strengthening and implementing humanitarian solidarity. Islamic boarding schools are the most deeply rooted religious teaching institutions in the Acehese social and cultural system. The central social position of Islamic boarding schools has impacted the implementation of conventional NGO programs, as they receive support from the most influential religious institutions in Aceh and volunteers from former combatants of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Image.1: Observation into the Refugee Camp



Source: Field Observation

C. Refugees Proble

Global refugee data is uncertain. According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 16.1 million refugees. In the past 10 years, this number has doubled to 31 million refugees by 2025. However, other data at the end of the previous year, 2024, stated that there were 122.6 million people worldwide. They were forced to flee their homes due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations,

and events that seriously disrupt public order. In detail, there are 43.7 million refugees (32 million refugees under the mandate of the UNHCR or UN Refugee Agency, and 6 million Palestine refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). There are also 72.1 million internally displaced persons and 8 million asylum seekers.¹¹

One of these waves of refugees is from Myanmar, following violence in Rakhine State that has displaced 1.3 million people. Of these, nearly 750,000 are Rohingya. Some fled the ongoing conflict and instability in the country.¹² The data, not much different from the data released by UNHCR, that of the 619,400 Rohingya reported in Myanmar, 41 percent were internally displaced by the end of 2024. Around 11,300 people attempted the dangerous journey by land or sea and around 660 Rohingya refugees were reported dead or missing at sea.¹³ Population instability is a fundamental problem facing refugees in refugee camps, especially with the large numbers shown above. This situation could give rise to new, equally dangerous conflicts.

The number of refugees continues to increase each year, and most are victims of political conflict, as stated by Cosgrove et al. They argue that in the current climate of global geopolitical instability and increasing violence, political experiences have become a major factor influencing the health and well-being of refugees' mental health. The authors suggest that a politically informed approach broadens the perspective on Global Mental Health, moving away from the legacy of the over-pathologizing trend maintained by Western Mental Health.¹⁴

Displacement also occurs due to racial discrimination. Policy services are distributed to mainstream groups and disregard racial minority groups.¹⁵ In some cases, displacement is also caused

11 United Nation, "Sheltering Hope: Highlight on Urban Challenges," in *Peace, Dignity, and Equality on a Healthy Planet*, 2025, <https://www.un.org/en/>.

12 Concern Worldwide, "The 10 Largest Refugee Crises to Know in 2025," in *Concern Worldwide*, 2025, <https://www.concern.net/news/largest-refugee-crises>.

13 USA for UNHCR-the UN Refugee Agency, 2025. <https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/>

14 Elena Cherepanov, "Refugees from Countries with Complex Political Contexts: Politically-Informed Approach to Health and Mental Health Services," *Frontiers in Public Health* 11, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1323259>.

15 Amy J. Stevens et al., "Discriminatory, Racist and Xenophobic Policies and Practice against Child Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Undocumented Migrants in European

by conflicts between groups of different religious adherents as a result of developments in political issues or struggles for economic resources.¹⁶

Another refugee problem in the camps is the risk of protests and criminal cases related to the local community. While these issues cannot be generalized, they have raised fears among local communities. The impact of the displacement on local communities has led to social instability, social jealousy due to special treatment, environmental damage, and financial burdens.¹⁷

The refugee problem in two refugee camps in Aceh, Lhoksemawe and Aceh Langsa, has created problems including poor access to healthcare, sanitation, and clean water. Based on an interview with Usman, he stated that;

*“Crime also exists alongside the problem of refugees who have disappeared after fleeing the camps. Lack of environmental health control due to a lack of awareness among refugees and caregivers can lead to new problems, such as disease outbreaks. Mental distress, such as depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), is very common in refugee camps. Vulnerability to violence, especially for women and children, is a significant concern. Economic insecurity arises from limited access to land, the labor market, and recognition of qualifications, thus hindering self-reliance. Social isolation and discrimination contribute to poor mental well-being, while inadequate housing and sanitation create unhealthy living conditions”.*¹⁸

Assistance from local NGOs and the UNHCR to refugees is unreliable, as they remain uncertain about their future. Providing educational and training facilities is a solution, as NGOs collaborate with religious institutions, such as Islamic boarding schools (dayah), which have greater access to local

Health Systems,” The Lancet Regional Health 41, no. 1 (2024), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2023.100834>.

16 Sandra Pertek et al., “Gender-Based Violence, Religion and Forced Displacement: Protective and Risk Factors,” *Frontiers in Human Dynamics* 5, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2023.1058822>.

17 Nicola Daniele Coniglio, Vitorocco Peragine, and Davide Vurchio, “The Effects of Refugees’ Camps on Hosting Areas: Social Conflicts and Economic Growth,” *World Development* 168 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106273>.

18 Usmani, “Interview” (Langsa, 2025).

government, both at the city/district and provincial levels in Aceh. These efforts are ongoing, but they remain indefinite, pending developments that cannot be accurately predicted.

D. Dayah and YKMI Collaboration in Handling Refugees

The devastating sight of Rohingya refugees' lives in refugee camps in Aceh has sparked the movement of traditional Islamic educational institutions in Aceh, namely Dayahs. Dayahs are highly visible and central to Acehnese society, serving as centers of Islamic concern and existence. Their close relationship with community elements allows Dayah leaders flexible access to the local government. Likewise, the government has an interest in Dayah institutions because they can serve as a bridge of communication with the community, particularly in improving political relations in Aceh following the 2024 elections, a situation that had long been absent due to differences in political orientations based on sharia.¹⁹

The involvement of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh is quite strategic in assisting and solving problems. Religious traditions and ethical values encourage government and community support in handling Rohingya refugees. FBOs actively assisting refugees are not only Islamic-based, such as the Indonesian Humanitarian Foundation (YKMI) and Dompot Dhuafa (DD), but also Catholic-based, such as the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). They facilitate and advocate for the basic rights of refugees. Several other FBOs also participate in providing services to refugees, albeit on an incidental and ad hoc basis, such as LazisMu (Muhammadiyah Zakat Institution), MDMC (Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center), and the Human Initiative.²⁰

19 Nirzalin Nirzalin, "Islamic Shari'a Politics and Teungku Dayah's Political Authority Crisis in Aceh," *Journal of Government and Politics* 2, no. 3 (2012), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2012.0012>.

20 Malahayati Rahman, Laila Muhammad Rasyid, and Yulia Yulia, "Rohingya and Aceh: When Religion and Culture Play Its Role," *Journal of Law and Sustainable Development* 11, no. 12 (2023), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i12.1029>.

The Dayah religious institution is the most deeply rooted traditional Islamic religious educational institution in Acehnese society. It dates back to the Aceh Sultanate and remains so today. Its function focuses on the introduction and development of traditional Islamic education and teaching. The Dayah educational system still prioritizes “yellow” or “gundul” texts, with separate male and female students. During the revolution, Dayah education in Aceh successfully produced a cadre of ulama, educators, and leaders who mobilized the people to fight together to defend independence from Dutch military aggression. Shifts in the Dayah educational system occurred during the independence period. However, these changes were not radical due to various issues, such as the lack of human resources and religious orientation.²¹

Although the Dayah Institution is engaged in traditional Islamic education, it is not immune to humanitarian issues, both local and international. The issue of the expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group stranded in Aceh is among its concerns. Rohingya refugees share the same religious identity, namely Islam, and have similar historical experiences with the community and Dayah leaders, such as conflict and violence with the government. The conflict, violence, and expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group, as stated by Iqthyer Uddin Md Zahed, show the interaction of various factors, including the historical legacy of conflict, religious conflict, racism, the lack of social integration of the Rohingya into the mainstream Burmese community, geoeconomic factors, discriminatory state policies, and the politics of the ARSA conflict, all of which contributed to the accumulation of the Rohingya crisis.²²

The Acehnese people and Dayah leaders experienced similar experiences in the past, which encouraged rescue and protection efforts for Rohingya refugees. Dayah leaders then coordinated with local NGOs working with refugees, establishing cooperation and collaboration, as they did with the Indonesian Muslim Student

21 Fakhrrurazi Fakhrrurazi, Hasan Asari, and Erawadi Erawad, “The Role of Dayah Salafiyah in the Development of Religious Culture in Langsa,” *AL-ISHLAH: Jurnal Pendidikan* 13, no. 3 (2021), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.35445/alishlah.v13i3.1066>.

22 Muhandiz Az-Zuhri, Cintami Farmawati, and Zahida Putri Amalia, “Resolution of Religion Conflicts Through Communication Strategies in Gharib Fil Ma’na Hadiths,” *Jurnal Pendidikan* 15, no. 2 (2018): 101–18, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.28918/jupe.v15i2.1644>.

Association (YKMI). Based on an interview with Sulaiman, the Dayah leader, he stated that collaboration takes several forms, as follows:

“First, collaboration in coordinating priority refugee shelters. Dayah leaders, with their influence in the community and local government, facilitate the provision of suitable temporary shelters, such as those located in under-functioning office buildings located farther from local settlements. This action can only be undertaken by Dayah leaders and cannot be undertaken by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Second, collaboration in addressing the refugees’ primary needs, such as providing daily food and bedding. While most primary needs are covered by UNHCR assistance, this is not sufficient to meet normal daily needs. Therefore, other efforts are undertaken and implemented by local NGOs, such as the Indonesian Humanitarian Foundation (YKMI). YKMI’s role as a local NGO, along with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), not only follows UNHCR protocol but also provides and facilitates assistance to refugee families in the shelters, such as assisting with marriages, assisting with childbirth, registering data, conducting health checks, providing counseling, and maintaining a healthy and clean environment within the refugee camp. He even made a planned breakthrough by donating 3 hectares of land to expand his educational institution and create an education and training program for Rohingya refugees. The traditional Islamic study program, which had been implemented previously, was expanded by creating a more specialized program for the refugees. The educational and training curriculum was specifically designed to ensure that the refugees, after leaving the camp, could thrive wherever they lived. The foundation of this program was a spirit of solidarity among fellow human beings and a shared Muslim identity.”²³

²³ Sulaiman, “Interview” (Lhokseumawe, 2025).

Image. 2: Interview with the local Dayah and NGO leaders as confirmation at the refugee education and training location.



Source: Interview Documentation

Muslim refugees are not only provided with religious guidance and instruction according to their beliefs, which are generally similar to the religious practices developed in Dayah institutions, but also with skills training, such as English language training and agricultural practices. At Dayah institutions, religious scholars and several former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) combatants, accustomed to the challenges and struggles of living under limited conditions in Aceh, are involved in refugee management, facilitating coordination with local social institutions, such as the Acehese government and social elements. This collaboration between religious and community elements has made the handling of Rohingya refugees in Aceh more effective, including plans to establish a refugee camp similar to an educational dormitory.

Third, collaboration is focused on the continued well-being of refugees after they leave the camp. This collaboration is considered the most strategic and decisive for the future of refugee communities. In this third phase of collaboration,

education and training are considered the most central, especially for refugee children and adolescents. Of the approximately 500 refugees remaining in Aceh, 60% are children and adolescents. They are the most vulnerable refugee group facing challenges, including food, clothing, health, and psychological needs. The collaboration between the Indonesian Humanitarian Foundation (YKMI) and the Dayah (Islamic boarding school) institutions are two organizations at the forefront of assisting the ongoing Rohingya refugee response. The strong relationship between the Dayah institutions and the local government facilitates coordination and the provision of facilities for services and training. Funding from Islamic philanthropic institutions and UNHCR is limited to meeting daily food needs. Providing adequate shelter, education, and training requires significant funding.

Through a collaborative scheme between NGOs and Dayah institutions and the local government, there is greater hope for improving services for refugees. The goal is to enable refugees to live a decent life, despite the uncertain conditions. Years of living in refugee camps without a clear purpose have fostered solidarity among fellow refugees while awaiting information on developments in their home countries. The solidarity demonstrated by YKMI, led by Eliasnita, has made the path forward more realistic and feasible, with financial support from UNHCR, the UK-based Muslim Aid, the US and Canadian embassies, local communities, and contributions from religious study groups in Aceh. Financial aid data can be seen in the following table:²⁴

No	Institution/ Organization	Form of Donation	Period/Year	Evidence per Rupiah
1	UNHCR	Money in the form of US Dollars	From 2014 until now	1.2 million for those who are married and 950,000 for those who are still single
2	IOM	Money in the form of US Dollars	From 2014 until now	Assistance for refugee camp payments

²⁴ Tomo, “Interview” (Langsa, 2025).

3	Muslim Aid	Money in the form of US Dollars	From 2019 until now	For refugee training/education
4	Embassy USA	Money in the form of US dollars and other necessities	From 2024 until now	Determination of refugee quota until 2025
5	Embassy Kanada	Money in the form of US Dollars	From 2023-2024	For advocacy and workshops on refugee management
6	Religious Study Group	Basic necessities and wearable clothing	From 2024 until now	Time is not specified
7	Local Community	Provision of land and MCK	From 2024 until now	Fulfillment of daily needs
8	FBO	Advocacy and basic necessities	From 2023 until now	Daily needs but stopped
9	The head of Dayah	3 hectares of land for education and training	From 2024 until now	Ongoing through collaboration with NGOs and local government
10	Government	Building assistance for temporary refugee camps Financial assistance	From 2024-2025	It did not go smoothly because there were protests and rejections from the village head (Geuci)
11	YKMI	Coordinating (coordinating) Advocacy Basic necessities Cash assistance	-	Running until now

Source: Interview and Observation Data 2025

Financial assistance is fundamental in helping ease the burden on refugees. However, this assistance has been strengthened by the assistance provided in the form of field coordination, security, and surveillance by local volunteers who are familiar with the Aceh region. Among them are many former combatants

of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) who have volunteered to assist with the care of Rohingya refugees. The involvement of former GAM combatants as volunteers is reminiscent of the experiences of similar conflicts with the government military that Rohingya Muslims experienced, including violence and killings, as recounted by refugees.²⁵ Volunteers, along with Dayah clerics, are very close to the Acehnese people, especially the poor. In fact, refugees in Lhoksemawe are housed in camps that blend with the poor.

The challenge for NGOs and activist organizations in handling Rohingya refugees, despite the extensive assistance, remains the ongoing management process. Therefore, comprehensive and sustainable management is needed indefinitely. The development of concepts for handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh led to the initiative to hold a workshop facilitated by the National Research Agency (BRIN) in Jakarta in 2025, specifically addressing emergency response for newly arrived refugees. All elements involved in refugee management were invited to develop an appropriate and sustainable concept for handling Rohingya refugees in Aceh.

E. Religious Actualization of Rohingya Muslims

Is the Islamic identity of the Rohingya community, whether Kaman (descendants of Indian archers who served the Buddhist kingdom of Mrauk-U who assimilated into Rakhine culture), a small number of Panthay (Chinese Muslims) or Pashu (Malay Muslims), who are affiliated with their respective communities of origin, a trigger for hatred and fear among the Buddhist majority in Myanmar? If so, what about the ideas and actualization of Islam among Rohingya Muslims, is a question worth raising. This question is triggered by the conclusion of several researchers that most of the fear, discrimination, and acts of genocide against the Rohingya in Myanmar are fueled by Islamophobic sentiments.²⁶ The Rohingya Muslim community

25 Ronan Lee, "Extreme Speech in Myanmar: The Role of State Media in the Rohingya Forced Migration Crisis," *International Journal of Communication* 13, no. 1 (2019): 3202–24.

26 Adam E. Howe and Zachary Karazsia, "A Long Way to Peace: Identities, Genocide, and

has been accused of being Muslim, and some of its religious practices are said to involve coercion and violence.²⁷

On the other hand, Islam, for the Rohingya Muslim community, is a key force in confronting violence and attempts to eradicate their culture. Therefore, the religious ideas and practices of the Myanmar Muslim community need to be exposed, as they are seemingly incompatible with the culture of the Buddhist majority, which has been nationalized by the Myanmar government. Furthermore, there is information about efforts to establish an Islamic state and the practice of Islamic law.²⁸ This indication reminds us of the case of the Uyghur Muslim diaspora, where religious identity has grown beyond ethnic identity as the primary marker of community self-identification.²⁹

The Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority in Rakhine State, Myanmar, generally adhere to Sunni Islam, characterized by Sufism. Sunni Islam is renowned for its moderation in theology, politics, jurisprudence, and Sufism. Based on Sunni Islamic traditions in general, the actualization of Islam among Rohingya Muslims is closer to a more moderate and inclusive Islamic practice. Furthermore, the relationship between Muslims and Buddhists in Myanmar was initially established through interfaith marriage, with a Muslim father and a Burmese mother.³⁰ The implications of the influence of moderate Islam, as stated by G.E. Hervey, appear to have been acculturated with culture and language, as shown in the use of everyday terms that indicate the influence of Islam in the Buddhist tradition.³¹

State Preservation in Burma, 1948-2018," *Politics Groups and Identities* 8, no. 1 (2018): 1-21, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1529604>.

27 A.M. Thawngmung, "The Politics of Indigeneity in Myanmar: Competing Narratives in Rakhine State," *Asian Ethnicity* 17, no. 4 (2016): 527-547, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2016.1179096>.

28 Khin Maung Saw, "Islamization of Burma Through Chittagonian Bengalis as "Rohingya Refugees"," in *Burmalibrary.Org* (burmalibrary.org, 2011), https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Khin-Maung-Saw-NM-2011-09-Islamanisation_of_Burma_through_Chittagonian_Bengalis-en.pdf.

29 Malika. Abdulbakieva, "Uyghur or Muslim? Identity Development among Uyghur Diasporas: A Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Turkey," *JEMIE: Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 19, no. 1 (2020): 6-31, https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/redakteure/publications/JEMIE_Date.

30 Bilveer Singh, "Himalayan and Central Asian Studies," *Journal of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation* 18, no. 1 (2014), https://www.himalayanresearch.org/pdf/Vol18Nos1-2_January-June_2014.pdf.

31 Mohammed Ali Chowdhury, "The Advent of Islam in Arakan and the Rohingyas," in *Rohingya History* (rohingya.org, 2006), <https://www.rohingya.org/the-advent-of-islam-in->

Although the Rohingya community's Islamic practices are closer to those of the Sunni Muslims of Ghore, Afghanistan, which are "more austere" and less compromising with the local social and cultural system as analysts say.³² According to legal scholar Crouch, Myanmar does not have Islamic courts, but Muslim personal law matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody) can be, and continue to be, adjudicated in ordinary courts, which draw on the colonial codification of Anglo-Muhammad law and compilations of jurisprudence, both borrowed from India. Muslim communities can also resort to informal forms of arbitration based on Islamic law. This is based on Supreme Court rulings in the more flexible Burmese language and fatwas from the Myanmar Islamic Religious Affairs Council. The practice of Islamic law in Myanmar has continued long after independence and even under military rule.³³

However, within the Rohingya Muslim sub-community, they have also been found to accommodate local Buddhist values within the Myanmar context, becoming more moderate and inclusive, thus becoming more open and integrated in building a nation based on a pluralistic society. In fact, the Rohingya ethnic group is a community that easily adapts to local entities without losing its Islamic identity. This latter group seems to be responding to the discriminatory and extreme attitudes of Buddhists and the government towards Rohingya Muslims in general. This attitude is very disruptive to the building of a democratic society, as is currently happening in Myanmar, because it can damage and thwart the democratic process through the separation of Islamic groups from Buddhist communities.³⁴

The following statement is

Huntington's most cited passage in *The*

Clash of Civilization:

"It is my hypothesis that the

arakan-and-the-rohingyas/.

32 Nehginpao Kipgen, "Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims' Conundrum," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013): 298–310, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2013.810117>.

33 Melissa Crouch, *Islamic Law and Society in Southeast Asia*, Anver M Em (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015).

34 Samak Kosem and Amjad Saleem, "Nationalism, and the Rohingya's Search for Citizenship in Myanmar," in *The Modern Muslim World (MMUS)*, in *Muslim*, 2016, 211–24, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52605-2_9.

fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be culture”³⁵

F. Indonesian Government Response

The conflict that forced the Rohingya ethnic group from their homes in Myanmar and forced them to flee to neighboring countries has received attention from both local and international media. Referring to Awmy’s (2019) findings, media outlets in India and Bangladesh, the two countries most affected by the refugees, generally frame the Rohingya refugee issue as limited to the humanitarian crisis, torture victims, infiltration, responsibility, administrative issues, and repatriation to refugee camps.³⁶ Their focus is on specific human rights issues and the ongoing refugee management process. No media outlet has yet addressed the issue of Rohingya refugees’ religious identity as a policy issue in nation-building.³⁷ Even issues about how to carry out solution-oriented interventions and more substantive actions are still rarely revealed by the media.³⁸ Even though the issue of religious sentiment exists, it is only limited to discussion events and seminars and has not yet reached a solution-oriented level, such as how relations between people of different religions are built in Myanmar, as Marshall said.³⁹

35 Moisés Naím, “From the Self-Proclaimed Islamic State to Dylann Roof, Internal Struggles Are the Dominant Theme in Conflict Today.,” in *The Clash Within Civilizations* (Cernegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2015/07/the-clash-within-civilizations?lang=en>.

36 Mumtahn Awmy, “The Rohingya Refugee Issue: Differences in Media Framing in Bangladesh and India” (Iowa State University, 2019), <https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/062d9966-5457-497e-bfeg-ofaaf4819ceb/content>.

37 Tanvir Ahammad, Siam Ahmed, and Sherlina Sharmin, “Decoding Online Narratives and Unraveling Complexities in the Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” *Sage* 10, no. 4 (2024), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051241288942>.

38 Michelle J. Lee, “Media Influence on Humanitarian Interventions: Analysis of the Rohingya Refugee Crisis and International Media Coverage,” *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 6, no. 20 (2021), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-021-00108-5>.

39 Katherine Marshall, “The Myanmar Rohingya Tragedy: Religious Dimensions of a Refugee Crisis,” in *Berkley Forum* (Berkley Center, 2023), <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-myanmar-rohingya-tragedy-religious-dimensions-of-a-refugee->

Social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, and newspaper headlines, present dramatic information about hatred against the Rohingya ethnic group, as represented by the Tatmadaw. The Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper routinely reveals and reproduces this narrative of anti-Rohingya hatred in a glamorous and vulgar manner.⁴⁰ The spread of hate speech negatively impacts the freedom of expression, assembly and association for Myanmar's most vulnerable users.⁴¹ In fact, according to The Guardian, the Myanmar military cannot be denied to be involved in the agenda of expelling the Rohingya ethnic group, assisting non-state actors in the expulsion process which violates human rights.⁴²

Islamophobia has surfaced in connection with the expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group from Myanmar, even though not all of them are Muslim. Social and electronic media outlets have focused more extensively on reporting specific aspects of humanitarian violations, without revealing the more genuine side of the issue, which lacks religious awareness.⁴³ Yet, there is a dominant group, namely Buddhists, who are aligned with the authorities and have aggressively launched acts of violence and oppression against the predominantly Muslim Rakhine ethnic minority. This justification is religious conflict, which has been identified as an emotional factor in the Buddhists' efforts to expel the Rakhine ethnic group from Myanmar.

The minority-majority religious conflict between government-backed Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims is closely related, though not always, to similar cases in other parts of the world, such as Europe and America (West). Muslims appear to be the common enemy as portrayed in the media, or as Ahmed put

crisis.

40 Ronan Lee, "Extreme Speech| Extreme Speech in Myanmar: The Role of State Media in the Rohingya Forced Migration Crisis," *International Journal of Communication* 13 (2019): 3202–24.

41 Alexandra Stevenson, "Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar," in *The New York Times*, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.html>.

42 Guardian Staff and Agencies, "US Withdraws Assistance from Myanmar Military Aid Rohingya Crisis, 2017," in *The Guardian* (theguardian.com, 2017), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/us-withdraws-assistance-from-myanmar-military-amid-rohingya-crisis>.

43 Kudret Bülbül, Md. Nazmul Islam, and Md. Sajid Khan, *Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar, Ethnic Con* (Mc.Milan: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

it, Muslims are often accused in national relations, because they have stricter ethics and limit freedom.⁴⁴ This situation is also depicted by the Buddhist government regarding the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Local media in Myanmar have limited coverage of religious issues in the conflict, as they are highly sensitive and could provoke public reaction from Muslim-majority countries. Only a few media outlets outside Myanmar have dared to cover religious issues in the Rohingya tragedy, although their coverage is very limited.

Despite this, the Islamic world and scholars have analyzed that religious issues, while not the sole trigger for differences and the Rohingya issue, still provide justification for the problems that led to the tragedy of expulsion. Physical and social evidence serves as a language that points to gross human rights violations and humanitarian tragedies befalling Muslims. Incomplete knowledge of Islam is one of the fundamental issues, as has been raised for some time.⁴⁵ Hatred, suspicion, and even fear of Islam have given rise to a structural and systematic anti-Islam movement as represented by the 969 Monks, a loosely organized group of young activists who became popular in 2012. They massively produced anti-Muslim content in traditional media (printed press and sermons) and social media. Their anti-Muslim stance is very strong with their spokesperson U Wirathu, an international media figure as seen in Time Magazine entitled “The Buddhist” (Time Magazine, Europe, Middle East, and Africa edition, July 1, 2013, 182:1).

The flow of information about a peaceful and respectful Islam reaching Myanmar society is extremely limited, especially since this information is sourced predominantly from Western media. Issues of extremism, terrorism, and radicalism are widely understood to be linked to Islam as a long-standing project in the West. Systematic Islamophobia in the West has also spread to the East, becoming global and impacting their psychosocial well-being, such as restrictions on marital relations.⁴⁶ The

44 Akbar S. Ahmed, *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society* (London: Routledge, 1998).

45 Wai-Yip Ho, “Crossing the Cultural Divide between Muslim and Non-Muslim: Formation of Ambassadorial Identity,” *Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 11, no. 1 (2005): 29, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630500100399>.

46 Iselin Frydenlund, “Protecting Buddhist Women from Muslim Men: ‘Love Jihad’ and the Rise of Islamophobia in Myanmar,” *Religions* 12, no. 12 (2021): 1082, <https://doi.org/>

Construction of the Other, 'Stigmatization of Appearance and Dress', 'Homogeneity of Identity and Experience', and 'Concealment and Normalization of Behavior' experienced by Muslims as victims of "Islamophobia".⁴⁷ Even prominent monks, such as Sithagu Sayadaw, have expressed support for the military's violence. In a sermon delivered on October 30, 2017, to Burmese soldiers amidst the atrocities in Rakhine, Sithagu Sayadaw in certain parts justified the killing of non-Buddhists (Sithagu Sayadaw, YouTube, October 30, 2017).

The difference is that while in the West Islam is feared and pitted against Western civilization, in Myanmar Islam is pitted against Buddhist ideology. In fact, the negative stigma of Islam in Myanmar has virtually no countervailing organizations or institutions, making it easy to eliminate and expel Muslims. This includes Myanmar democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi, who has declared Islam an extremist religion incompatible with democracy.⁴⁸ Islamophobic practices in Myanmar have systematic and structural similarities to similar practices in other parts of the world. Systemic racism and anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, the "war on terror" is being used to legitimize more recent violence against Rohingya Muslims.⁴⁹ In fact, Islamophobia in Myanmar appears to be more systemic, organic and mechanical.

Influential Buddhist leaders organically became intellectual actors and leaders in spreading Islamophobia and acts of violence against the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group, so that Islamophobia entered and ran within the body of the main followers of the Buddhist community. As Ma War War Myint, a human rights activist, said that if a Muslim man marries a Myanmar woman, he will lose all freedom and will not get the opportunity to offer flowers to Buddha, far from going to the temple and worshipping Buddha.⁵⁰ This statement shows evidence that there

<https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121082>.

47 Ishba Rehman and Terry Hanley, "Muslim Minorities' Experiences of Islamophobia in the West: A Systematic Review," *Culture & Psychology* 29, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X221103996>.

48 Haikal Mansor, "Is Aung San Suu Kyi an Islamophobe?," in *Rohingya Today* (rohingyatoday.com, 2019), <https://www.rohingyatoday.com/en/aung-san-suu-kyi-islamophobe#>.

49 Neved Bakali, "Islamophobia in Myanmar: The Rohingya Genocide and the 'War on Terror,'" *Sage* 62, no. 4 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396820977753>.

50 Frydenlund, "Protecting Buddhist Women from Muslim Men: 'Love Jihad' and the Rise of Islamophobia in Myanmar."

is no room for tolerance regarding religion, including personal issues that should be tolerated because they are not related to practical politics.

The radical elimination of any relationship with Islam is also a manifestation of the Buddhist leaders' fear of religious conversion through marriage, as represented by U Wirathu and MaBaTha. Tolerating it is tantamount to allowing Islam to freely convert Buddhist followers to Islam, either by soft means or through violence and humiliation. They fear Islam, although their fear is more sociological, as they believe it could grow rapidly in Myanmar. The monks justify extreme actions (*asun-yauk-thamā*) and carry out terror against Rohingya Muslims, even though they consistently deny responsibility.⁵¹

Monks have publicly promoted anti-Muslim nationalist discourse, promoting bans on interfaith marriage, conversion, nationalist family laws, and business competition in defense of Buddhism. Such attitudes have created an anti-Muslim moral panic across Myanmar. Global stereotypes about Islam, derived from Western stereotypes about Islam, are constructed through social media and widely publicized in Myanmar.⁵²

G. Islamophobia in the Military

The Myanmar military, as a powerful element in the political system, even the political controller, has been a crucial pillar of domestic political policy, despite several coups. It is respected, but also needed by the people, as in the genocidal campaign against the Rohingya. The Myanmar military's Islamophobia is justified by its actions, including encouraging and carrying out violence and killings, as refugees have shared.⁵³ The military is a nationalist group of the state that only accepts social understanding and practices that are in line with the pillars of the state.

51 M. Walton and S. Hayward, *Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2014).

52 Niklas Foxeus, "The Buddha Was a Devoted Nationalist: Buddhist Nationalism, Ressentiment, and Defending Buddhism in Myanmar," *Religions* 49, no. 4 (2019): 661–90, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2019.1610810>.

53 Lee, "Extreme Speech| Extreme Speech in Myanmar: The Role of State Media in the Rohingya Forced Migration Crisis."

Nationalist military groups support anti-Islam movements in Myanmar through various channels and media. In Foxeus's view, the publicization of anti-Islam sentiment by nationalists, including within the military, occurs in three ways: first, through monastic authority, which authorizes nationalist and anti-Muslim discourse. Informal and official spaces are used as opportunities to convey incitement, jargon, and hatred of Islam through sermons. Monks collaborate with the military to publish anti-Islam sermons. Second, anti-Muslim conspiracy theories since the 1950s and historical narratives of collective victimization of Buddhists create fear and justify discrimination and violence against Muslims. Such stereotypical constructions then give rise to a third way, that Muslims constitute an existential threat to Buddhism and Myanmar's sovereignty by Muslim groups (local and international) who are interconnected in the nationalist imagination and reinforce Islamophobia in a global context.⁵⁴

Referring to the above assumption, the UNHCR document states that the Rohingya ethnic group is one of the many groups targeted for ethnic cleansing and genocide by the state and armed forces of Myanmar since the 1990s.⁵⁵ Persecution has escalated and intensified as new policies have been implemented over time. In 1992 and 2005, restrictions were imposed on Rohingya marriages, and official documents often required couples to have only two children. These restrictions are clearly discriminatory and disadvantageous to Rohingya Muslims. In other words, the Myanmar government has failed to manage a nation or country with diverse backgrounds.⁵⁶

H. ASEAN Countries' Response

The expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group, who have been present in Myanmar for centuries, will continue to occur without a solution, considering that the refugee problem has had a wide

54 Foxeus, "The Buddha Was a Devoted Nationalist: Buddhist Nationalism, Ressentiment, and Defending Buddhism in Myanmar."

55 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Rohingya Emergency," in Emergency Appeal, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/rohingya-emergency>.

56 Leni Winarni, "The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda," *Journal of ASEAN Studies* 5, no. 1 (2017): 37–50, <https://nbnresolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-63234-3>.

impact on nearby countries.⁵⁷ Yet, countries affected by these refugees, such as Bangladesh, are among those that did not sign the 1951 and 1967 Refugee Conventions and have consistently rejected them, despite pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accept them. The response from local humanitarian agencies, such as supporting UNHCR's pressure, has allowed immigrants to continue arriving in Bangladesh,⁵⁸ The spread of the Rohingya refugee crisis to Malaysia and Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim, has become an additional regional issue and has given rise to anti-Islamic sentiment. Referring to the above issues, the question arises: are ethnicity, religion, and historical differences the core of the problems affecting the Rohingya, or are there other issues? How can we uncover the responses of countries affected by the Rohingya refugee crisis from a more specific perspective, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia?

Indonesia and Malaysia, along with Bangladesh, have also been impacted by the Rohingya refugee crisis. Both countries, which are members of the ASEAN group, have also become destinations for Rohingya immigrants, albeit with differing responses. The Malaysian government appears confused and inconsistent regarding the Rohingya refugees. Meanwhile, the public rejects this, as evidenced by the hateful attitudes expressed on Twitter and Facebook.⁵⁹ Issues protested by the Malaysian people include refugees and undocumented immigrants, or illegal immigrants.⁶⁰ Moreover, information regarding the increase in Covid-19 cases in neighboring Malaysia has intensified public concerns.

In contrast to Malaysia, Indonesia is considered to have the most lenient attitude towards Rohingya immigrants, even towards previous refugees from Afghanistan, East Timor, and

57 Iftekharul Bashar, "Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Myanmar : Quest for a Sustainable Solution."

58 Faruque, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh: The Case of UNHCR's Response."

59 Rozanna Latiff and A. Ananthalakshmi, "Anti-Migrant Sentiment Fanned on Facebook in Malaysia," in Reuters (reuters.com, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-migrant-sentiment-fanned-on-facebook-in-malaysia-idUSKBN26ZoCO/>.

60 Nadhirah Zainal Rashid and Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin, "'#SayNoToRohingya': A Critical Study on Malaysians' Amplified Resentment towards Rohingya Refugees on Twitter during the 2020 COVID-19 Crisis," *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies* 112, no. 4 (2023): 386–406, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2023.2244287>.

Sri Lanka. The large number of refugees coming to Indonesia is faced with various complex problems, considering that Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Indonesia is not obliged to accept refugees, but the Indonesian government's stance remains to accept refugees for Human Rights (HAM) reasons. In the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, there are provisions related to human rights, such as: Article 4 (freedom of religion); Article 17 (right to work and receive wages); Article 21 (right to own a home); Article 22 (right to education); and others,⁶¹ This is a difficult situation for Indonesia, as domestic conditions and problems, such as unemployment and poverty, remain unstable. However, Indonesia is quite concerned about refugees, as stipulated in Article 26 of Law 37/1999, which states that granting asylum to foreigners is carried out in accordance with national laws and regulations and with due regard to international law, customs, and practices.⁶²

In the case of the Rohingya refugees, the Indonesian government initially rejected them. However, the Acehnese people, particularly fishermen, saw and rescued them when they were stranded in the Adaman Sea. Acehnese villagers and local NGOs then stepped in to provide critical emergency shelter and assistance to the refugees. Religious solidarity, friendliness, and a shared plight are thought to be some of the reasons for the Acehnese community's acceptance of the Rohingya refugees.⁶³

Indonesia and Malaysia are the two largest Muslim-majority countries in ASEAN, so the arrival of refugees, who are predominantly Muslim, is often handled without immediate deportation. The shared identity and religious solidarity seem to justify the two countries' stance. This stance is reflected in several high-ranking officials from both governments condemning the Myanmar military junta's inability to build a good nation.

61 Larose Dolok Saribu, "Penerapan Prinsip Non-Refoulement Dalam Hukum Nasional Indonesia, Malaysia, Dan Thailand Berdasarkan Prespektif Penghormatan Terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia" (Universitas Brawijaya, 2021), https://repository.ub.ac.id/id/eprint/195998/1/LAROSE_DOLOK_SARIBU.pdf.

62 Republik Indonesia, UU Nomor 37 Tahun 1999 Tentang Hubungan Luar Negeri (Indonesia: Presiden RI, 1999).

63 Lindsay Robbins, "The Rohingya Case in Aceh: Indonesia's Role as a Destination for Refugees," *Towson University Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2020): 1–15.

I. Research Findings

This study finds that religious identity creates a collaborative and supportive foundation for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and religious-based social institutions. Religious sentiments transform the situation, especially when several humanitarian and religious institutions are involved in the spirit of refugee management. Crucial factors in this crisis are the geopolitics of religion, identity formation, communal solidarity, and a global perspective on the humanitarian crisis. Acehese people view the refugee crisis as a matter of local security and stability, human rights, Muslim solidarity, and geosocial concerns. The involvement of international actors, local communities, local governments, and the mass media also contributes to the issue of refugee acceptance. This study contributes to understanding the dynamics of handling Rohingya refugees, Acehese acceptance of refugees, and its relevance to local politics, even in Southeast Asia. This study can also serve as a reference for more inclusive and productive policymaking in Aceh, Indonesia, regarding similar cases.⁶⁴

The Rohingya refugee issue, a result of the conflict in Myanmar, has brought changes to global social and political relations, especially in ASEAN countries. The conflict, which has emerged since 2012, had its symptoms long before. The root causes are quite complex, fundamental, and sensitive, namely the origins of the Rohingya ethnic group in Rakhine, who are considered an illegal community. The dichotomous minority-majority relationship in matters of race and religion, as well as the Rohingya community's suboptimal contribution to the country, have also been highlighted.⁶⁵ Albert and Maizland (2020) revealed that the information data related to the existence and problems of the Rohingya ethnic group was a problem of the Myanmar government's discriminatory policies.

64 Zulfikar Ali Buto Siregar et al., "The Dynamics of Religion and Ethnic Identity in the Reception of Rohingya Refugees in Aceh," *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama* 14, no. 2 (2024): 145–65, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v14i2.2522>.

65 Hyuk Kim, "A Complex Crisis: The Twisted Roots of Myanmar's Rohingya Conflict," *CSIS's Issues & Insights* 17, no. 8 (2017), https://www.globalasia.org/v12no3/focus/a-complex-crisis-the-twisted-roots-of-myanmars-rohingya-conflict_hyuk-kim.

The influx of Rohingya refugees has raised various issues, particularly in the areas they have fled to. One such area is Aceh, Indonesia, which has raised various issues and challenges, particularly regarding how to address them. Solutions for refugee management have emerged, ranging from the idea of returning refugees through deportation to their home countries to handling issues at refugee camps due to various humanitarian considerations. These humanitarian considerations have also given rise to various solutions and actions, as conceived and implemented in refugee camps around the world, including the handling of Rohingya refugees in Aceh, Indonesia, where local social elements play a role.

As a form of social and humanitarian solidarity regarding the plight of Rohingya refugees, Nusrat Jahan Mim (2020) offers a solution. Mim reveals how refugees, through various Islamic religious activities and practices, protect their cultural identity, negotiate with local government agencies, and maintain solidarity with their hosts. Many secular humanitarian programs often encounter challenges, resistance, or rejection from refugees because they fail to address their religious connections. Drawing on a diverse body of literature on forced migration, socio-economic human rights, and religious studies in the global South, it is also revealed that religion and religious activities protect refugees from various forms of marginalization often perpetrated by secular development institutions. The proposed approach involves ensuring socio-economic and cultural integration within human rights activities in refugee camps. However, this proposal remains incomplete and even very limited.⁶⁶

A similar suggestion by Mim was also made by Lukmanulhakim and Adib bin Samuri (2023). In their view, religious identity became a key sentiment in dealing with the plight of Rohingya Muslims, rather than ethnic or political issues. However, Rohingya refugees continue to face difficulties adapting to the local population, as is the case in Malaysia, a Muslim country. In fact, the local community's attitude, as

66 Nusrat Jahan Mim, "Religion at the Margins: Resistance to Secular Humanitarianism at the Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh," *Religions* 11, no. 8 (2020): 423, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11080423>.

will be seen later, differs from that of the government, a new finding regarding Rohingya refugees in Malaysia.⁶⁷

Hurd wrote a short, yet quite representative piece in 2017. In his view, the conflict that led to the expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group is closely linked to the government's economic and political interests in its relationship with the Hindu people of Myanmar. The Rohingya's religious differences with the majority Hindu population are narrow sentiments created to gain political sympathy. Issues of religion and ethnic origin exacerbate the tension of the conflict, making the decision to expel them an unavoidable option. A portrait of economic and political issues that have given rise to humanitarian issues is the central focus of the piece.⁶⁸

Social and political approaches are increasingly emerging as solutions to the Rohingya refugee problem, as proposed by Shahin and Hasan. In their 2023 article, "The Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Political and Humanitarian Perspectives," published in the journal *Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary*, they argued that social and political approaches must be implemented simultaneously, even though such a solution requires review and challenges related to Myanmar's laws, which explicitly exclude the Rohingya ethnic group from the country's integration map.

The Rohingya conflict has caused historical trauma since its inception in 1947, fueling fear and the initial failure of Burmese national integration, which has subsequently developed into a fear of different communities, including the rise of Islamophobia. Humanitarian issues and inter-ethnic conflict are the result of this historical trauma,⁶⁹ which has harmed democracy in the trend of modern state life.⁷⁰ In the case of the Rohingya expulsion, democratization in Myanmar is considered a failure or not yet

67 Nur Nadia Lukmanulhakim and Mohd Al Adib bin Samuri, "The Religious Identity of Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia," *Studia Islamika* 30, no. 3 (2024): 439–68, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v30i3.32095>.

68 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Rohingya Crisis: Focus on 'Intolerant Religion' Disregards Complex Moral and Policy Challenges," *EPW Engage* Are Web Exclusive, 2017.

69 Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Three Faces of the Rohingya Crisis: Religious Nationalism, Asian Islamophobia, and Delegitimizing Citizenship," *Studia Islamika* 25, no. 3 (2018): 504–40, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v25i3.8038>.

70 Muhamad Wildan, "Muhamad Wildan, The Persecution of Rohingya Muslims and the Path to Democratization in Myanmar," *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i1.11202>.

effective. Even the existence of democratization itself is questionable, as it cannot be implemented everywhere. The articles discussed above are explained from different perspectives and theoretical approaches. However, the fate of Rohingya refugees resulting from this conflict has become a regional issue and has yet to find a solution, especially in countries affected by the refugee influx, such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

The response and solution to these migrants, who are essentially refugees, is not merely a social, humanitarian, and political issue. Rather, it is primarily a domestic political issue that requires internal solutions and external pressure on Myanmar's rulers. The formal legal approach to refugee management, previously implemented in Austria and similarly in Sweden, has not yet provided a solution and addresses a broad scope and remains case-by-case in certain parts of Europe. Yet national refugee protection, including legal status, varies across national borders.⁷¹

Meanwhile, business and management approaches for immigrants seeking a new and promising livelihood remain complex. The assumption that economic and employment are the refugee's goals can obscure the essence of the problem. The economic management approach outlined above would be more effective if applied to immigrants, not refugees, as is commonly the case. Economic accumulation and distribution have also encountered several problems that are prone to manipulation of the distribution and operation of refugee budget funds. Humanitarian aid for refugees, from a constructivist perspective, is quite effective, but much of this aid goes untargeted through various humanitarian tactics.⁷²

These weaknesses of constructivism were then addressed by targeting a more progressive and cross-sectoral approach to refugee issues. The constructivist approach has not been widely implemented to its full potential due to the need for more thorough planning. The focus of refugee management is not limited to legality, existence, and accommodation, but also

71 Lee, "Media Influence on Humanitarian Interventions: Analysis of the Rohingya Refugee Crisis and International Media Coverage."

72 Linda Damela, "Islam and Humanity: Commodification of Aid for Rohingya in Aceh," *Al-Jami'ah* 59, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2021.591.57-96>.

encompasses all aspects of their future, including geopolitical challenges, thus yielding a more comprehensive, constructive concept of refugees. This constructivist approach is expected to provide conceptual and empirical solutions in the context of the Rohingya refugee community stranded in several countries.

One approach that is less well-informed and still rare due to its contextual nature is the collaborative approach through unique and crucial relationships within Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or non-profit organizations. According to relational theory, collaboration is a changing and dynamic social process,⁷³ which consequently changes over time. It's called dynamic because it occurs both informally and formally, but the collaboration always aims to improve and develop support for refugees. In a study focused on the Swedish context, for example, inclusive CSOs were implemented, which are non-profit organizations that do not profit financially, separate from the state and for-profit companies.⁷⁴

In the context of Rohingya refugees in Aceh, collaboration is strategic and appropriate between NGOs, Dayah leaders, local communities, and the local government in refugee response. Collaboration is crucial for understanding the motivations of relationships and adding a relational perspective to understand the complexities of collaboration. CSOs collaborate exclusively to benefit their own organizations. Past relationships are crucial for some collaborations, while other collaborations and behaviors create new ties and strengthen existing ones. The locality of CSOs in collaboration is crucial because they complement each other in meeting different needs.⁷⁵

J. Conclusion

The handling of Rohingya refugees in Aceh demonstrates a unique collaborative model between three main elements: NGOs

73 François Dépelteau, *What Is the Direction of the "Relational Turn"?* (Mc.Milan: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137342652_10.

74 Filip Wijkström, "The Role of Civil Society. The Case of Sweden in International Comparison" (Sweden: The Stockholm School of Economics, 2004).

75 Sophie Kolmodin, "Collaboration to Support Refugees: The Importance of Local-Level Relations among Civil Society Organizations," *Journal of Civil Society* 20 (2024): 130–49, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2024.2319357>.

(especially YKMI), traditional Islamic educational institutions (Dayah), and the local government. This collaboration is driven by humanitarian solidarity rooted in a shared religious identity, a shared historical experience with the GAM conflict, and the local wisdom of the Acehnese people. The response process takes place in three stages: first, an emergency response in the form of rescue at sea by local fishermen and the provision of temporary shelter; second, meeting the refugees' basic needs through assistance from UNHCR, IOM, and various philanthropic institutions; and third, a long-term program of education and skills training to prepare the refugees for their future. The involvement of Dayah and former GAM combatants as volunteers provides a unique advantage, as they have strong access to the local government and a deep understanding of the conflict experience. Despite facing various challenges such as health issues, sanitation, psychological stress, and uncertainty about the future, this collaborative model has proven effective in providing a more holistic and sustainable response. The research findings confirm that religious sentiment and communal solidarity are crucial factors in shaping the Acehnese community's response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. This locality-based collaborative approach can be a reference model for more inclusive and productive refugee management in other regions.

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